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Abstract 
 
The last twenty years have seen sustained pressure on firms in the UK and globally to 
demonstrate good corporate governance and, in particular, to manage risk in an 
appropriate manner; the overall aim of this study is therefore to contribute to the 
understanding of how to measure and manage risk at the firm level more effectively.  
This involves three specific research objectives: to investigate the measurement 
properties of some of the most commonly used corporate risk measures; to 
investigate the relationship between risk and return at the firm level; and to 
investigate the drivers for the development of a risk management capability within 
firms.  The research objectives were addressed in the context of UK firms, using 
accounting data from the FAME database and market data from Datastream.  A 
particular criticism of previous research in these areas is the lack of consideration 
about how to handle extreme values in the distributions of risk measures; so a 
number of different techniques, specifically designed to be robust to outliers, are 
employed throughout this study.   
The investigation of the measurement properties of a variety of corporate risk 
measures (Chapter Four) improves the overall understanding of what these different 
risk measures represent, how they are related and, crucially, that these relationships 
are not static but are functions of environmental uncertainty.  The analysis also 
identifies a compact set of risk measures, relevant to specific stakeholder groups; 
that can be used by both researchers and practitioners.  The investigation into the 
relationship between risk and performance (Chapter Five) finds a positive 
relationship between profit risk (variation in profitability) and subsequent 
profitability, as predicted; however, the relationship is mediated by both 
environmental conditions and the prior performance of the firm.  The study also 
finds that the relationship between market risk and realised return is contingent on 
the overall performance of the market.  Finally, the investigation into the drivers of 
the development of risk management capabilities (Chapter Six) provides evidence 
that, at least within this sample of large, listed UK firms; the desire on the part of 
managers to develop risk management capabilities is largely driven by traditional 
arguments based on protecting value for shareholders.   
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
1.1  Overview 
This introductory chapter aims to set the context for this study on the measurement 
and management of risk in UK listed firms.  This includes describing the background 
to, and motivation for, the research; describing the research objectives; explaining 
the proposed contribution of the research; and outlining the structure of the rest of 
the thesis, including synopses of the three empirical chapters.    
1.2  Background  
Beck (1992, p.19) asserts that “...in the course of the exponentially growing 
productive forces in the modernization process, hazards and potential threats have 
been unleashed to an extent previously unknown”.  Whether or not one agrees with 
Beck’s bleak, dystopian outlook on modern society, it is difficult to argue with 
Power’s (2009, p.304) contention that “The period since 1995 has seen an explosion 
of efforts to codify and formalize principles of risk management…organizations must 
apply rational standards of knowledge and frame what they do in these terms in 
order to maintain legitimacy”.  Within the corporate sphere, these efforts to 
formalise risk management have included the development of a “Corporate 
Governance Code” in the UK (Turnbull (1999)); passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
the US in 2002; and the adoption of Basel II (BIS (2006)) as an international 
regulatory framework for banks.  Efforts have intensified since the onset of the 
financial crisis in 2008 with, for example, the adoption of Basel III (BIS (2011)) and 
the publication of three new editions of the Corporate Governance Code (FRC (2010, 
2012, 2014)).  These actions have all contributed to a growing need to measure and 
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manage risk at the firm level: the overall aim of this study is to contribute to the 
understanding of how to do this more effectively.      
This section begins by discussing risk in the most abstract terms, setting out the 
ontological and epistemological positions adopted in this study.  This is followed by a 
discussion of contrasting definitions of risk; how these different definitions lead to 
the use of various risk measures; and the two schools of thought on probability 
(frequentist and Bayesian).  The discussion thereafter focuses specifically on risk as it 
applies to commercial firms, beginning by looking at the interaction of organisational 
structure, firm strategy and the environment; and the nature of corporate risk 
management.  The section concludes by summarising the important shortcomings in 
previous risk research. 
1.2.1 Ontological and Epistemological Considerations 
Risk is a highly contested construct with numerous different definitions in use.  
Underlying these differences is a gulf between conceiving risks to “pre-exist in 
nature, to be identifiable through scientific measurement, and to be controlled using 
such knowledge”; and considering that “Risk is never fully objective or knowable 
outside of belief systems and moral positions” (Gephart et al (2009, p.143-144)).  The 
approach taken throughout this thesis is that, as risk is based on individual beliefs 
about future states of the world, it is inherently subjective: in any given situation, 
different groups of stakeholders may have very different beliefs about future state of 
the world.  Moreover, different groups of stakeholders have different values; and will 
be impacted very differently by the various possible outcomes.  As Beck (1992, p.28) 
puts it: “There are always competing and conflicting claims, interests and viewpoints 
of the various agents of modernity and affected groups, which are forced together in 
defining risks …”   
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However, whilst accepting that “Risk descriptions are thus always context-bound, 
reflecting the point of view of the person describing the risk” (Hermansson (2012, 
p.18)); a completely relativist approach is rejected in this thesis, and it is argued that 
the existence of “alternative risk descriptions to every risk does not mean that some 
are not better or worse than others”.  Hermansson (2012, p.20) goes on to argue for 
the need to explicitly acknowledge, and critically examine, the values and 
background assumptions that have led to the use of specific risk descriptions in order 
to judge which are most useful in a given context; and to “include a number of 
different perspectives”.  It is interesting to note that March and Shapira (1987, 
p.1408)) found an acceptance of such a plurality of risk descriptions amongst 
practising managers “…although quantities are used in discussing risk, and managers 
seek precision in estimating risk, most show little desire to reduce risk to a single 
quantifiable construct.”  It is also interesting to note that Markovitz (1952, p.81) 
acknowledges the subjectivity of risk, emphasising that his “paper does not consider 
the difficult question of how investors do (or should) form their probability beliefs”.   
In view of this, risk is discussed, throughout the thesis, in the context of the risk to 
specific defined groups of people, based on their values and assumptions; and there 
is no attempt to privilege a single risk description.  In particular, there is a detailed 
discussion of the risks to the different stakeholders in the firm in Chapter Two; and a 
discussion about how different stakeholders use risk measures as mental models in 
Chapter Four.  It is very important to stress though that accepting that different 
stakeholder groups will experience different risks, in no way diminishes the potential 
of individual risk descriptions to influence important discussions; as Burningham and 
Cooper (1999 p. 310) state in the context of the debate on environmental change 
“the acid test of one’s argument remains its plausibility and its ability to convince.  
All that has been removed is the capacity to ground one’s own argument in, or to 
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discredit opposing arguments by comparing them unfavourably with, objective 
reality.”   
Having established this ontological and epistemological position, it is now possible to 
proceed to a discussion of risk, risk measures and probability. 
1.2.2 Risk, Risk Measures and Probability 
In common usage, the term “risk” is generally associated with negative outcomes 
and this definition has also been applied widely in the academic literature eg “Risk is 
expected harm” (Campbell (2005 p.569)) or “Risk is usually taken to indicate some 
degree of hazard” (Bettis (1982 p.22)).  However, other writers, particularly in the 
practitioner literature, argue that risk concerns both gains and losses eg “Risk is 
defined as uncertainty of outcome, whether positive opportunity or negative threat” 
(Chittenden (2006, p.9)); or “Risk is the combination of the probability of an event 
and its consequences” (ISO (2002, p.2)).  From the ontological and epistemological 
position outlined above, these very different uses of the term “risk” can be seen to 
arise simply from the different beliefs and values of the groups of people involved.  
As stated above, discussions of risk should therefore be conducted in the context of 
the risks to specific stakeholder groups: the risks to the main stakeholder groups in a 
firm are discussed in detail in the next chapter.  The need for different stakeholder 
groups to describe risks as they affect them has given rise to numerous risk measures 
being developed and applied in both the academic and practitioner literatures.   
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A widespread concern with negative outcomes, as expressed in the quotes of 
Campbell (2005) and Bettis (1982) above, has led to the development of a range of 
measures of downside risk.  Perhaps the most widely used of these measures is 
value-at-risk (G-30 (1993)), which is simply a percentile (typically 1% or 5%) from the 
left-hand tail of the expected profit and loss distribution for an activity over a 
specified time horizon.  This concern with negative outcomes has also stimulated 
work, particularly in the insurance and banking sectors, on extreme value theory (see 
Embrechts et al (1997)); which seeks to specifically model the tails of distributions in 
order to accurately predict the likelihood of extreme events, even those events so 
extreme that they have not yet occurred.  Clearly, outlying negative values in 
performance distributions (so long as these are valid observations and not 
erroneous) are critical to both the accurate calculation of value-at-risk (VAR) and the 
modelling of the tails of distributions in extreme value theory (EVT): exclusion of 
instances of extreme performance will severely impact upon the usefulness of these 
risk measures.  The importance of including observations that exhibit extreme 
performance when calculating risk measures is a central theme throughout the 
thesis and is discussed in detail in Chapter Three.   
By contrast, as an example of a symmetrical risk measure; risk to investors is often 
simply equated with variance of returns within the finance literature, without any 
perceived need for further explanation.  This convention stems from Markowitz’s 
(1952) work on efficient frontiers for investment portfolios, but it is important to 
point out that Markowitz himself merely stated (p.89) that “The concepts ‘yield’ and 
‘risk’ appear frequently in financial writings.  Usually if the term ‘yield’ were replaced 
by…’expected return’ and ‘risk’ by ‘variance of return’, little change of apparent 
meaning would result.”  An extensive range of the risk measures used in previous 
empirical research are discussed in detail in Chapter Four.  
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It is also important to highlight a distinction between risk measures based on 
accounting data and those based on market data.  Accounting data are, by definition, 
historical; so risk measures derived from them are essentially backward-looking.  
However, market data factor in investors’ expectations for the future so that risk 
measures derived from them have a forward-looking element.  This distinction will 
be developed further in Chapter Four. 
The concern of many stakeholder groups with negative outcomes, has also led to the 
expression of risk in terms of the probabilities of certain events, it is therefore 
important to briefly mention the distinction between the frequentist and Bayesian 
schools of probability.  Traditional statistical approaches have been based on 
frequentist probabilities, defined as “the fraction of times the event A occurs if the 
activity considered were repeated (hypothetically) an infinite number of times” 
(Aven (2011, p. 1519)); or “the limiting frequency of an event after repeated 
observations” (Berger (2010, p. 1045)).  However, the appropriateness of such a 
definition of probability depends entirely on the type of risk being considered: in 
many cases sufficient relevant data are not available to estimate such a probability 
with any accuracy.  By contrast, Bayesian frequencies are subjective and represent a 
“degree of belief” Aven (2011, p. 1518); which is constantly updated in the light of 
evidence.  The foregoing discussion on the ontology of risk, is clearly consistent with 
a Bayesian interpretation of probability.   
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1.2.3 Corporate Risk 
Turning to focus now on the specific area of risk with which this study is concerned; 
risk at the firm level is discussed extensively in both the strategy and financial 
economics literatures, but from very different perspectives.  Within the strategy 
literature, the uncertainty about the future that gives rise to risks to the various 
stakeholder groups is primarily viewed as an input to the strategy-making process.  
Specifically, in the resource-based view (Barney (1991))1; uncertainty about which 
resources to acquire and how to bundle them into capabilities results in some firms 
achieving a sustained competitive advantage whilst others do not.  Equally, in real 
options theory, it is uncertainty about the future that makes the opportunity to defer 
decisions valuable; and thus motivates the search for flexible strategies.   
Conversely, in the financial economics literature, risk (to investors) is seen as a 
consequence of the strategy adopted by the firm’s managers in the pursuit of profit.  
As well as acknowledging these two divergent viewpoints, it is also necessary to 
consider the influence of the environment in which the firm operates; and, drawing 
on the crisis management literature, the way in which organisational culture may 
mediate the relationships between strategy, the environment, risk and performance.  
The viewpoint taken throughout this thesis is that the risks to the various 
stakeholders in the firm arise from a complex interaction between the strategy 
adopted by the firm’s managers, the environment in which the firm operates and the 
culture of the organisation. 
  
                                                          
1 The resource-based view and the dynamic capabilities framework have become the 
dominant approach within the strategy literature to explaining sustained competitive 
advantage; they will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two and applied as analytical tools at 
various points throughout the thesis.   
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1.2.4 The Nature of Corporate Risk Management 
This study is concerned not only with the measurement of corporate risk, but with its 
management too.  The risks to a firm’s stakeholders may be managed in a variety of 
ways, including the purchase of insurance and derivatives; the design of incentive 
packages for senior management; and the implementation of specific policies on, for 
example, security and health and safety.  However, the extensive literature 
discussing how risk management can create value for shareholders has focused on 
two strategic issues: the importance of taking an integrated approach to risk 
management across the firm2 (eg Merton (2005), Nocco and Stultz (2006)); and the 
importance of maintaining a consistent approach to risk management over time in 
order to reassure stakeholders (Shapiro and Titman (1986)), maintain stable 
cashflows (Lessard (1990), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993)) and enable investors 
to accurately gauge performance (Meulbroek (2002), Rebonato (2007)).   
This emphasis on the essential long-term nature of effective risk management is 
consistent with the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm; which asserts that it is the 
creation of “capabilities” through the effective combination of resources over an 
extended period of time, not the mere possession of individual resources, which 
leads to sustained competitive advantage (Grant (1991)).  A focus on the long-term is 
also consistent with the crisis management literature (eg Pauchant and Mitroff 
(1988, 1992), Miller (1988)) which emphasises the effect of underlying organisational 
culture, another enduring characteristic of the firm, on both the incidence and 
severity of crises.   
 
                                                          
2 This point will be revisited in Chapter Six in a detailed discussion of enterprise risk 
management (ERM). 
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Approaching risk management as a capability has a number of practical implications 
for the design of research.  Firstly, capabilities are, by definition, unobservable so 
one or more proxies must be used: the difficulties of “making intangibles tangible” 
are discussed in detail in Molloy et al (2011).  The measurement of the performance 
effects of capabilities presents even more formidable methodological challenges.  As 
will be discussed in Chapter Two, tests of the performance effects of capabilities are 
also confounded by both the selection of an appropriate dependent variable (Ray et 
al (2004)); and alternative explanations for superior performance (Denrell et al 
(2013)).  The specific challenges of measuring the effect of risk management on 
performance are discussed in detail in Chapter Seven.  
1.2.5 Shortcomings in Previous Research into Corporate Risk and Risk Management 
This section highlights some important shortcomings in previous empirical work.  The 
first two paragraphs look specifically at prior research into the relationship between 
risk and performance, and research into the adoption of risk management 
respectively.  This is followed by a brief discussion of a critical shortcoming in both 
these areas of research: a lack of proper consideration in the handling of extreme 
outliers in the distributions of risk and performance data.    
Probably the largest single area of corporate risk research concerns the relationship 
between risk and performance (eg Bowman (1980), Bettis (1982), Marsh and 
Swanson (1984), Fiegenbaum & Thomas (1988), Ruefli (1990), Miller & Bromiley 
(1990), Fama and French (1992), Miller & Leiblein (1996), Miller & Chen (2004), 
Alessandri & Khan (2006), Ang, Chen and Xing (2006), Andersen et al (2007), Bali et al 
(2009), Henkel (2009)).  The most important shortcoming in this body of work is that 
most of the models only include a single measure of risk amongst the dependent 
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variables3; implying that the risks to all the relevant stakeholder groups can be 
captured in a single measure.  However, whilst the models used in most studies 
include only one risk measure, different studies use different measures; and there 
has been little discussion of why particular variables have been chosen, nor any 
agreement on what the best risk measures are: this represents another significant 
shortcoming of this whole area of research.  Also, there is a general assumption that 
the relationships between measures of risk and performance are static; and no 
account is taken of the role of changing environmental conditions in mediating these 
relationships.   
As regards research into risk management there are two main areas of interest, the 
drivers of risk management and the impact (on performance) of risk management.  
In addition to the fundamental problems of measuring the effect of risk management 
on performance, which were discussed in section 1.2.4; another shortcoming is 
evident in most previous studies in both areas: the use of inappropriate proxies for 
risk management.  Early studies tended to use variables such as the possession of 
derivatives contracts (eg Nance et al (1993), Géczy et al (1997)) or levels of insurance 
coverage (eg Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008)), which simply indicate that certain 
specific risks are being mitigated, as the dependent variable.  More recent studies 
have used measures such as the appointment of a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) (eg 
Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003)); or have searched media databases for phrases relating 
to risk management (eg Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011), Eckles et al (2014)).  Whilst 
these represent attempts to proxy a firm’s overall capability to manage risk, they are 
all reliant on what a firm says about risk management, which may simply be 
                                                          
3 Miller and Bromiley (1990), Fama and French (1992) and Alessandri and Khan (2006) are 
notable exceptions to this pattern: Miller and Bromiley (1990) and Alessandri and Khan 
(2006) are discussed in detail in Chapter Four. 
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deliberate signals to the market, rather than evidence of a long-term commitment to 
developing a capability.   
An additional, and very important, observation applies to both studies of risk and 
performance and studies of risk management.  In so far as previous studies have 
engaged at all with the issue of outliers in the distribution of risk measures, they 
have done so by Winsorizing; that is simply removing a proportion of the most 
extreme values from the data set.  Thus, following the argument set out in section 
1.2.2, they have actually removed the data of most interest from the analysis.  This 
issue is discussed in detail in Chapter Three.  The more intelligent handling of 
extreme values, using a range of techniques that are specifically designed to be 
robust to outliers, is a central theme throughout the thesis. 
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1.3  Research Objectives 
1.3.1 Investigating the Measurement Properties of Corporate Risk Measures 
As discussed in section 1.2.2, risk is a highly contested construct with numerous 
definitions in use.  In the context of corporate risk, this has given rise to a very wide 
range of measures being employed in previous empirical work; often with little 
explanation of why these particular variables have been chosen.  The first objective 
of this research is to investigate the measurement properties of some of the most 
commonly used risk measures; bearing in mind that these properties may vary as the 
environment changes.  This investigation contributes to the debate on the desirable 
properties of corporate risk measures, proposing a number of additional 
considerations for choosing a measure; and identifies a set of underlying risk 
components that can be used as risk measures, both by practitioners and in future 
academic research. 
1.3.2 Investigating the Relationship between Risk and Performance 
Utility theory (Bernoulli (1738)) predicts that people who are risk averse will require 
compensation to accept risk.  Arguments based on risk aversion have been applied to 
explain the decisions of both investors and the managers of firms; and predict a 
straightforward positive relationship between risk and return regardless of 
environmental conditions, organisational culture or firm capabilities.  Whilst early 
(market-based) empirical tests were generally supportive of this simple theory; more 
recently, numerous studies (eg Bowman (1980)), using both market and accounting 
data, have failed to find such a relationship (or have even found a significant 
negative relationship between risk and return).  The second research objective of this 
study is therefore to investigate the relationship between risk and return, using both 
accounting and market-based measures; addressing both the epistemological and 
methodological shortcomings of previous empirical work.  The contribution of this 
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part of the study is to resolve the apparent paradox of a negative relationship 
between accounting measures of risk and return (Bowman’s (1980) “paradox”); more 
broadly, this work points to a more nuanced understanding of the relationship 
between multiple risk measures and measures of performance, contingent upon 
environmental conditions.   
1.3.3 Risk Management 
Despite sustained pressure on firms to “...codify and formalize principles of risk 
management…” Power (2009, p.304), considerable heterogeneity persists in the 
maturity of risk management across firms.  For instance, based on the data used in 
Chapter Six concerning the employment of risk management professionals, as of July 
2011: 35 firms in the FTSE 350 had (or intended to develop) an enterprise risk 
management capability; 40 firms had a business continuity management capability; 
15 had both capabilities and 206 had neither4.  The third and final research objective 
is to investigate why some firms develop a risk management capability, whilst other 
firms do not.  The contribution made by this part of the study is to understand if the 
desire to develop a risk management capability can be explained by rational 
arguments based on creating value for shareholders. 
Each of the three research objectives is addressed in a separate chapter within the 
thesis, as described below in section 1.4.    
  
                                                          
4 A number of firms are excluded from the analysis (see Chapter Five) so the total does not 
add up to 350. 
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1.4  Thesis Structure 
1.4.1 Outline 
The remainder of the thesis is organised into six chapters as described below.  The 
empirical work is conducted on UK firms over the period 2003-12 using accounting 
data from the FAME database (in certain instances where data were missing in FAME 
these were gathered from individual company annual reports) and market data from 
Datastream5.  It is important to note that this period covers the onset of the global 
financial crisis in 2008, which was characterised by immediate significant falls in UK 
GDP growth and market returns, together with substantial increases in the volatility 
of both measures. 
Chapter Two introduces and critiques the diverse literature that underpins the whole 
thesis, the four main strands of literature discussed are: strategy; the risks to 
different stakeholder groups; the origins of corporate risk; and corporate risk 
management.  Chapter Three begins by describing in detail the data sources used for 
the study; highlighting some of the statistical issues involved in dealing with such 
data; and critiquing the attempts of previous empirical researchers to address these 
issues.  This is followed by a discussion of a number of analytical methods that are 
robust to outliers, including: estimators of location, dispersion and correlation; 
robust regression techniques; and robust principal component analysis.  Chapter 
Four is the first empirical chapter, which investigates the measurement properties of 
a number of widely-used measures of corporate risk; Chapters Five investigates the 
relationship between risk and return; and Chapter Six investigates why some firms 
develop specific risk management capabilities.  Chapter Seven concludes by 
reviewing the empirical results as a whole; summarising the contributions to theory; 
                                                          
5 All data were downloaded from FAME between 1st October 2013 and 17th January 2014; 
data were downloaded from Datastream between 4th October 2013 and 24th January 2014. 
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making recommendations for policy and practice; acknowledging the limitations of 
the current research; and proposing productive avenues for further work.  The three 
empirical chapters, Chapters Four Five and Six, are summarised below. 
1.4.2 Chapter Four - Measuring Corporate Risk 
The first research objective of the study is to investigate the measurement 
properties of some of the most commonly used corporate risk measures in previous 
research: this is the subject of Chapter Four.  Building on the conceptual discussions 
of risk in the first two chapters, the chapter begins by discussing how observable risk 
measures can be translated into predictions about future states of the world by way 
of a range of mental models.  The extant literature on the desirable properties of 
corporate risk measures is then reviewed and some additional criteria are proposed.  
A range of corporate risk measures that have been used in previous empirical work 
are assessed against these desirable properties, but it is impossible to select a 
preferred set of measures purely on this basis.   
An alternative approach is therefore taken, in which a principal component analysis 
(PCA) is conducted on a set of corporate risk measures in order to try to identify the 
underlying, unobservable, dimensions of risk.  Whilst the overall approach is based 
on that of Miller and Bromiley (1990) and Alessandri and Khan (2006), this study 
improves on previous work by using a wider range of risk measures, including 
measures of cashflow risk; and by taking a rigorous, exploratory approach that does 
not allow any preconceptions about the number or nature of components.  As 
mentioned previously, one of the key issues in risk research is the handling of 
outlying values of risk measures: these outliers have the potential to cause serious 
bias to the variance-covariance matrix upon which the standard PCA technique is 
based, as the elements of the matrix are calculated from the squares of residuals.  
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The study therefore also makes use of a robust PCA technique, based on the use of 
the minimum covariance determinant method of Rousseeuw (1984)6, to minimise 
the influence of outliers in the distributions of risk measures without simply deleting 
observations from the sample.    
Nineteen separate corporate risk measures are estimated for all listed firms in the 
UK: in common with previous work7, risk measures are estimated over five-year 
periods.  Risk measures are estimated over six overlapping periods from 2003-2007 
to 2008-12: the number of sample firms varies from 963 (2003-07) to 1347 (2007-
11).  As expected, the distributions of a number of these risk measures contain some 
extreme outliers.  It is clear from a preliminary analysis that the results from the 
standard (non-robust) PCAs are strongly affected by the inclusion or exclusion of 
these outliers, so all subsequent work is conducted using the robust PCA method.   
Three components relating to variability in profits, variability in share price and 
variability in cashflow are retained in each five-year period: these are interpreted as 
“profit risk”, “market risk” and “cashflow risk” respectively.  These three components 
constitute a compact set of risk measures that can potentially be used both by 
practitioners and in academic research.  However, it is interesting to note that the 
component structures are not the same in each time period; indeed in both 2003-07 
and 2008-12 an additional component is retained.  This is at variance with the 
findings of Miller and Bromiley (1990), who found a consistent component structure 
across two non-overlapping five-year periods.  The findings of this study suggest that 
the relationships between different risk measures are not fixed, but are mediated by 
changes in environmental uncertainty: as environmental uncertainty changes, and 
the more forward-looking risk measures react to this new information, the long-term 
                                                          
6 The technique is described in detail in Chapter Three. 
7 Dating back at least as far as Fama and MacBeth (1973) for market-based measures; and 
Bowman (1980) for accounting-based measures. 
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relationships with more backward-looking measures are temporarily disturbed until 
a new equilibrium is established.  As well as the theoretical contribution of this 
chapter, the components resulting from the robust PCA are used as risk measures in 
the subsequent empirical chapters. 
1.4.3 Chapter Five - The Relationship between Risk and Performance 
Chapter Five is concerned with measuring the relationship between risk and 
subsequent performance; using accounting, market-based and hybrid measures for 
performance, and multiple risk measures.  The chapter begins by continuing the 
discussion about the relationship between corporate risk and performance that was 
initiated in Chapter Two; in particular, the mediating effect of prior performance on 
the risk-performance relationship is explored, and prior empirical work on the 
relationship between risk and performance is reviewed and critiqued.  This 
discussion leads to a number of predictions concerning: the relationship between 
market risk and future returns to shareholders; the relationship between profit risk 
and future profitability; the relationship between cashflow risk and future 
profitability; and the mediating effect of prior performance on the relationship 
between profit risk and future profitability.  The same data set is used as for the 
previous chapter, so the same issues of extreme outliers are present.  Risk measures 
and other control variables are estimated over five overlapping five-year periods 
(2003-07 to 2007-11); and performance is generally measured over a single year 
following the end of each estimation period.   
In order to make a direct comparison with early empirical work, a number of 
univariate tests of the relationship between accounting measures of risk and return 
are carried out.  The first set of tests makes a direct comparison with Bowman (1980) 
and Fiegnebaum and Thomas (1988) by examining the correlation between the 
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standard deviation of ROA and the average ROA over the same five-year period and, 
in common with the earlier studies, finds significant negative correlation coefficients 
in all time periods.  Given the many criticisms of this approach (eg Marsh and 
Swanson (1984), Ruefli  (1990)), the correlations between standard deviation of ROA 
and ROA for the year following the five-year period over which the standard 
deviation was estimated were then examined: significant negative correlations are 
still observed in all time periods.  Bowman (1980) suggested that a possible 
explanation of the observed negative relationship between accounting measures of 
risk and return was that well-managed firms may be able to combine high 
profitability with low variability in profits: Andersen et al (2007) subsequently 
demonstrated mathematically that a “strategic responsiveness” capability gives rise 
to a negative association between risk and return.  The correlation tests were 
therefore repeated with first-differenced values of ROA and the standard deviation 
of ROA (to remove firm fixed effects): the correlation coefficients with these first-
differenced variables were either positive or insignificant in all time periods. 
A series of cross-sectional regressions were then estimated in order to investigate 
the relationship between risk and performance in more detail.  As explained in the 
previous paragraph, a first-differenced regression model is used8 to remove 
unobservable firm fixed effects; however this has the unfortunate consequence of 
also removing firms’ risk management capabilities (this issue will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Seven).  Regression models are developed with return on 
book value of equity and ROA as the dependent variable and profit risk, cashflow risk 
and market risk as explanatory variables; but it is not possible to estimate these.  
Return on market value of equity is therefore used as an alternative dependent 
                                                          
8 There are alternative ways of removing firm fixed effects, such as de-meaning and de-
medianing; but these lead to more intractable endogeneity issues in the subsequent 
regression analysis.  
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variable, but the use of a hybrid performance measure introduces issues in the 
interpretation of the results.  Models with return on market value of equity and 
returns to shareholders as the dependent variable were estimated using OLS and 
three different robust regression techniques.  The results of the different regression 
techniques are broadly consistent within each model; it is also noticeable that both 
models perform best in the first time-period, which uses data from before the onset 
of the financial crisis in 2008, and have less explanatory power in the more turbulent 
conditions of later time periods.   
The results of the regressions with return on market value of equity as the 
dependent variable support the prediction of a positive relationship with profit risk 
for high-performing (above median) firms in both pre and post-crisis conditions 
(although the size of the effect was much reduced post-crisis).  As regards low-
performing (below median) firms, there is a positive association between profit risk 
and subsequent profitability pre-crisis, but a negative association post-crisis: this is 
consistent with arguments based on the behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and 
March (1992)).  The results of the regressions with returns to shareholders as the 
dependent variable confirm that the relationship between market risk and returns to 
shareholders is contingent on overall market returns (consistent with Pettengill 
(1995)); this finding can be observed even without the removal of firm fixed effects.  
The results of some of the regressions also suggest that measures of profit risk and 
cashflow risk can influence future returns to shareholders; whilst market risk can 
influence future profitability.          
1.4.4 Chapter Six - Risk Management Capabilities in UK FTSE 350 Companies 
The finding in Chapter Five of a positive association between profit risk and return (at 
least in normal market conditions) implies that a firm’s capability to manage risk can 
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create value:  Chapter Six investigates why some firms develop specific risk 
management capabilities, whilst other firms appear not to.  The study uses novel 
measures, based on the employment of risk management professionals, as a proxy 
for the desire to develop a risk management capability.   
The chapter begins by developing the “’managerial’ concept of risk management” 
(Power (2007, p.3)), looking specifically at two formalised approaches to risk 
management: enterprise risk management (ERM) and business continuity 
management (BCM); previous empirical tests on the adoption of risk management 
(measured in a number of ways) are also reviewed.  As well as publicly-available 
accounting and market data, the study uses membership databases supplied by the 
Institute of Risk Management (IRM) and Business Continuity Institute (BCI): it is 
believed that this is the first time that such data have been used in an academic 
study of risk management.  Risk measures and other explanatory variables are 
estimated over the period 2006-10 and membership data were provided as at July 
2011.  
Two separate analyses were conducted on each data set (IRM members and BCI 
members): a binary-outcome model, with the employment of one or more members 
of the relevant institute as the dependent variable; and a count-data model, using 
the actual number of members employed as the dependent variable.  Both models 
include a range of explanatory variables that have been commonly used in previous 
work (eg Nance et al (1993), Géczy et al (1997), Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003), Hoyt 
and Liebenberg (2011), Eckles et al (2014)), as well as novel measures for the 
proportion of tangible assets and exposure to profit risk, market risk and cashflow 
risk.   
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All the regressions show support for the argument that managers’ desire to develop 
a risk management capability is driven by considerations of protecting shareholder 
value.  The regressions also show support for the idea that the proportion of tangible 
assets in the firm, and the proportion of institutional ownership, are both drivers for 
the development of an ERM capability.  As regards risk exposure, there was no 
evidence that profit risk or cashflow risk were significant drivers of the decision to 
develop either risk management capability; however, there was evidence of a 
negative association between market risk and the development of a BCM capability.  
Firms with greater market risk have a higher cost of capital so the managers in these 
firms will require a higher expected return for projects: it is therefore less likely that 
risk management projects will be approved.  
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1.5  Summary 
This chapter has described the background to the study and, in particular, identified 
four key issues for the conduct of corporate risk research: that different stakeholder 
groups experience different risks; that corporate risks arise from the complex 
interrelationship of strategy, environment and organisational culture; that risk 
management is fundamentally a long-term activity; and that the extreme values in 
distributions of risk measures need to be handled with great care.  Awareness of 
these issues highlighted a number of important shortcomings in previous research 
into corporate risk and risk management which have motivated the current 
investigation.  The three specific research objectives of the study were then outlined 
and these are repeated below.  
1. To investigate the measurement properties of some of the most commonly 
used corporate risk measures; bearing in mind that these properties may 
vary as the environment changes.   
2. To investigate the relationship between risk and return, addressing both the 
epistemological and methodological shortcomings of previous empirical 
work. 
3. To investigate the drivers for the development of a risk management 
capability. 
The chapter concluded by outlining the structure of the rest of the thesis, including 
synopses of the three empirical chapters.  
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Chapter 2 - Strategy, Risk and Risk Management 
2.1  Introduction 
The overall aim of this chapter is to introduce, critique, compare and contrast 
theories and associated empirical research concerning strategy, risk and risk 
management from a variety of different academic literatures; in order to develop an 
overall theoretical framework upon which the subsequent empirical chapters are 
based.  The chapter is organised in four main sections: strategy; risks to different 
stakeholder groups; the origins of corporate risk; and corporate risk management.   
The chapter begins by introducing two important theoretical frameworks from the 
strategy literature that will be applied at various points throughout the thesis; the 
resource based view and the dynamic capabilities framework.  It becomes clear from 
the discussion that risk is rather on the periphery of the development of these 
frameworks; but this first section of the chapter concludes by looking at an area of 
the strategy literature where risk is absolutely central: the theory of real options.  An 
important theme throughout the thesis is the acknowledgement that different 
stakeholder groups experience different risks; and the next section of the chapter 
draws on various different literatures to discuss the risks to owners, managers, 
lenders and other stakeholders in the firm.  The existence of tensions between these 
different stakeholder groups leads to a short discussion of agency costs, which will 
be relevant at various points throughout the empirical chapters.      
  
24 
 
Section 2.4 examines the various origins of corporate risk.  Risk at the firm level has 
most widely been discussed in the past as a necessary consequence of taking 
business decisions with uncertain outcomes in the hope of generating profits; this 
has led to long-standing debates about the relationship between risk and return in 
both the financial economics and strategy literatures.  A shortcoming of both of 
these literatures is that they tend to ignore the context within which businesses 
operate: more recently though, there has been growing interest in the relationship 
between macroeconomic factors and risk at the firm level.  This topic is of particular 
importance to the empirical work in this thesis because of the highly unusual global 
economic conditions that existed over the study period, which included the financial 
crisis beginning in 2008.  Aside from the strategic decisions that are taken, and wider 
environmental issues, some firms appear to be more prone to poor outcomes than 
others, and a significant strand of research within the crisis management literature 
concerns the organisational factors that predispose organisations to crises.  Drawing 
together these different perspectives on the origins of risk, the final part of this 
section critiques the ways in which a number of previous authors have sought to 
classify and categorise risks in order to enable better research and risk management 
practice.   
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Section 2.5 discusses corporate risk management; the section begins by looking at 
the historical origins of risk management and, in particular, some important recent 
advances in practice.  This is followed by an explanation of why, contrary to the 
CAPM (Sharpe (1964)), the appropriate management of idiosyncratic risks can create 
value for shareholders; and a discussion of why managers may choose to manage 
risk independently of considerations of shareholder value.  The penultimate section 
attempts to integrate the various strands of literature discussed so far; and the 
chapter concludes with a short summary.   
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2.2 Strategy 
This section discusses three important theoretical frameworks within the strategy 
literature: the resource based view (RBV); the dynamic capabilities framework9; and 
real options.  The section begins by introducing the closely-related concepts of the 
RBV and the dynamic capabilities framework; this is followed by some comments on 
previous empirical tests of these theories.  Risk has not been central to the 
development of either literature, but some examples where the role of risk has been 
highlighted are then discussed.  The section concludes with a brief discussion of the 
theory of real options, in which risk is very much at the core.  All of these topics will 
be developed in more detail in the empirical chapters, in the context of specific 
research objectives. 
2.2.1 The Resource Based View 
The RBV has become, since its inception in the late 1980s, the dominant approach 
within the strategy literature to explaining sustained competitive advantage.  
Remarkably though, for such an influential theory, its foundations lack precision; and 
key definitions have evolved somewhat over the years.  According to one of the 
leading early contributions to the RBV debate, sustained competitive advantage is 
derived from the possession of resources that have “value” and “rareness”; whilst 
lacking “imitability” and “substitutability” (Barney (1991, p. 99)).  Specifically, a firm’s 
ability to gain a competitive advantage depends upon having specific “Physical 
capital resources”, “Human capital resources” and/or “Organizational capital 
resources” (p. 101).  However, Peteraf (1993, p.179) expresses things rather 
differently “…four conditions underlie competitive advantage, all of which must be 
                                                          
9 The RBV and dynamic capabilities framework are also closely related to the strategic factors 
market literature: see Leiblein (2011) for a detailed analysis. 
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met.  These include superior resources (heterogeneity within an industry), ex post 
limits to competition, imperfect resource mobility and ex ante limits to competition.”   
Foss and Knudsen (2003) subsequently tried to integrate the two approaches, and 
improve precision, by separating out the necessary and additional conditions for a 
sustained competitive advantage.  They concluded that the only necessary conditions 
were “immobility” and “uncertainty”10: “all other conditions are additional in the 
sense that they: (1) are somehow derived from uncertainty and immobility… or, (2) 
serve to lend a particular form of expression to SCA [sustainable competitive 
advantage]…” (p.299).”  Meanwhile (Grant (1991, p. 122)) stresses that individual 
resources themselves do not directly create competitive advantage; rather it is the 
creation of capabilities, that is, “Complex patterns of coordination between people 
and between people and other resources” which drive competitive advantage.  
Becerra (2008, p.1121) shares this focus on how resources are combined and 
concludes that “a collection of resources may generate above-normal profits” when 
the following conditions are met: “value uncertainty, resources specificity and firm-
level innovation” (p.1122).    
The development of the RBV to date has resulted in two classes of specific, testable 
predictions, these concern: “…the relationship between firm performance 
[competitive advantage] and the possession of identifiable and imperfectly imitable 
resources/capabilities/ competences”; and “…whether the prior possession of such 
resources shapes the subsequent development of the firm” (Lockett et al (2009, p. 
18)).  Whilst the RBV has gained widespread acceptance and stimulated much fruitful 
strategy research, it is important to note that it is not without its critics.  Many of 
these criticisms centre around the tautology contained in Barney’s (1991, p.101) 
                                                          
10 This constitutes a fundamental link between strategy, as expressed in the RBV, and risk; the 
interaction of the two literatures is discussed further in section 2.6. 
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original definition of resources as “...all assets, capabilities and organizational 
processes, firm attributes...that enable the firm to conceive of and implement 
strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness.”  In particular, Toms (2010) 
and others highlight the lack of a theoretical basis for ascertaining the value of a 
resource.  However, as Kraaijenbrink et al (2010, p.357) point out; even without 
resolving this issue RBV may still have value “...as a heuristic for managers...rather 
than as a theory...”  Other critics (eg Hoopes et al (2003)) have argued that resources 
and capabilities are only a partial explanation for persistent differences in 
performance, and have proposed a broader theory of competitive heterogeneity. 
2.2.2 The Dynamic Capabilities Framework 
Teece and Pisano (1994) introduced the dynamic capabilities framework in order to 
address the perceived failure of the RBV to explain why many historically successful 
firms fail as the environment changes.  Building on the RBV construct of capabilities, 
Teece et al (1997, p.516) defined “Dynamic capabilities as the firm’s ability to 
integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competences to address 
rapidly changing environments.”  Many other authors offered their own definitions 
over the next few years, such as: “the process to integrate, reconfigure, gain and 
release resources – to match and even create market change” (Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000, p. 1107)).   
Reviewing the literature up to that point, Ambrosini and Bowman (2009, p.33) 
concluded that “...there generally is consensus about the dynamic capabilities 
construct.  These definitions reflect that dynamic capabilities are organizational 
processes in the most general sense and that their role is to change the firm’s 
resource base.”  The authors also offer a number of specific examples of dynamic 
processes such as: R&D, acquisition, product innovation, absorptive capacity, 
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organizational structure reconfiguration and resource divestment.  Teece (2012, 
p.1396) proceeds to divide dynamic capabilities “...into three clusters of activities 
and adjustments: (1) identification and assessment of an opportunity (sensing); (2) 
mobilization of resources to address an opportunity and to capture value from doing 
so (seizing); and (3) continued renewal (transforming).”  He also makes clear the 
important distinction between ordinary capabilities, which are routed in routines; 
and dynamic capabilities which “...may be based on the skills and knowledge of one 
or a few executives...” (p.1395). 
2.2.3 Empirical Tests of the RBV and Dynamic Capabilities Framework 
One of the principal criticisms of the RBV is the lack of empirical support; indeed, as 
discussed above, some critics argue that the tautological nature of the definition of 
resources means that the claims of RBV are inherently unfalsifiable.  Even when this 
tautology is addressed (eg by applying the resource value-resource risk perspective 
(Toms (2010))), empirical tests of the central prediction of the RBV, that the 
possession of resources and/or (dynamic) capabilities leads to superior performance, 
are confounded by three factors: the difficulty of operationalising resource and 
capability constructs; the selection of an appropriate dependent variable; and the 
existence of alternative explanations for superior performance.  These issues are 
described in more detail below; this is followed by a brief summary of the findings of 
a systematic review of empirical tests of the predictions of the RBV that had been 
published up to 2005.     
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Much of the theoretical focus of the RBV is on a firms’ possession of intangible 
resources and capabilities which, by definition, cannot be directly measured. 
Reviewing a number of previous RBV studies, Molloy et al (2011, p.1496) conclude 
that: “...the dominant approach to measuring intangibles is mechanical and 
unidisciplinary (ie rooted in either economics or psychology)...”; and, in particular, 
“...economists often use ‘coarse’ measures (ie single-item proxies) which threaten 
internal validity” (p.1500).  The authors proceed to advocate the use of a 
“Multidisciplinary Assessment Process” (p.1507), involving: clearly defining 
constructs; embedding the construct within the RBV; selecting appropriate 
indicators; and a multidisciplinary validity argument.   
Whilst Molloy et al focused on issues with the right-hand-side variables, Ray et al 
(2004) highlight the importance of the correct choice of dependent variable.  They 
argue that “If competitive advantages in one business process are offset by 
competitive disadvantages in other business processes, of if any profits 
generated...are appropriated by a firm’s stakeholders and not reflected in a firm’s 
overall performance, there may be no relationship between...resources and 
capabilities...and a firm’s overall performance” (p.34).  Toms (2010, p.660) makes a 
similar point: “Where accountability mechanisms are ineffective, rents accrue to 
insiders...Reported profits are normal...”.  Ray et al (2004) therefore advocate the 
consideration of more direct measures of the effectiveness of business processes as 
alternatives to overall firm performance, and illustrate this with an example where 
multiple measures of customer service performance are used as the dependent 
variable.  Likewise, Leiblein (2011, p.912) argues that: “…the appropriate level of 
analysis for resource and capability-based logic is at the level of the resource, not the 
level of the firm”. 
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Finally, Denrell et al (2013) caution about inferring causal relationships from any 
association between superior capabilities and sustained high performance.  Using a 
Bayesian approach the authors demonstrate that, unless successive competitive 
contests in an industry are truly independent; “chance events have enduring 
consequences” (p.184), and it is very dangerous to infer anything simply from the 
observation of sustained superior performance.   
Concerns about the level of empirical support for the RBV were confirmed by 
Newbert’s (2007, p.121) review of 55 articles published between 1994 and 2005 
which found that “...the RBV has received only modest support overall and that this 
support varies considerably with the independent variable and theoretical approach 
employed.”  In particular, he found that tests using capabilities as explanatory 
variables have proven to be much more likely to yield significant results in support of 
the RBV than tests using resources.  As Lockett et al (2009) observe, even these low 
levels of support for the RBV are probably inflated by the publication bias towards 
significant results.  Similarly, Arend and Bromiley (2009, p.75) conclude that the 
dynamic capabilities framework enjoys only “weak empirical support”.  In view of 
these many concerns it is important to stress that, whilst the RBV and dynamic 
capabilities framework are used throughout this thesis as a basis for integrating risk 
and risk management into the wider discussion of firm strategy; no reliance is made 
on its central predictions.    
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2.2.4 Real Options 
Real options are analogous to financial options, in that they confer the right but not 
the obligation to take some action in the future; but they are different in that they 
concern investment in real assets (eg buildings, plant, patents) rather than financial 
ones.  The emergence of a specific real options literature can be traced back to the 
early 1990s with articles such as Trigeordis (1993) and Dixit and Pindyck (1995); but 
the basic idea has much earlier origins.  Myers and Turnbull (1977 p.331-332) 
suggested that firms derive value from “options to purchase additional units of 
productive capacity in future periods”; and, even before Black and Scholes’ (1973) 
seminal article on option valuation, Miller and Modigliani (1961) had observed that 
growth opportunities contribute significantly to firm value.   
Reviewing the literature up to that point, Trigeordis (1993) identified six specific 
types of real option: the option to defer, the option to alter operating scale, the 
option to abandon, the option to switch inputs or outputs, growth options and 
multiple interacting options.  Since then, the literature has evolved along a number 
of distinct paths; in their later review, McGrath et al (2004, p.87) noted that four 
distinct strands had emerged: “(1) the idea of option value as a component of the 
total value of the firm...(2) a specific investment with option-like properties; (3) 
choices that might pertain to one or more proposals; and (4) the use of options 
reasoning as a heuristic for strategy.”  Building on the fourth strand, and of particular 
relevance to this study, Tong and Reuer (2007, p.19) argue that “...real options 
theory can offer a more positive view of uncertainty and a more constructive view of 
managerial discretion...”  The discussion below begins by considering the application 
of real option theory to the valuation of specific investments with option-like 
properties, before proceeding to consider the application of most interest for this 
study: the use of options logic as a heuristic for strategy.   
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2.2.4.1 Real Option Valuation of Investment Opportunities 
In the context of valuing a specific investment opportunity, the real options approach 
improves upon net present value (NPV) in two important ways: it recognises that 
many decisions are irreversible, ie expenditures cannot be fully recovered later if 
conditions change; and, in most cases, the decision does not have to be taken 
immediately (Dixit and Pindyck (1995)).  Recognition of these factors has the 
immediate practical implication that, even if an NPV analysis concludes that the 
project is worth pursuing, greater value may be created for the firm’s owners by 
delaying a decision until more information is available.  Delaying the decision is 
conceptualised as a “real option” and, by analogy with financial options, the value of 
this option increases with the uncertainty in future cashflows.  Conversely, even if 
the output of an NPV analysis is negative, it may still be worth pursuing a course of 
action (eg some R&D activity) because of the options that it generates; once again, 
the value of these options will increase with the uncertainty in the future value of 
the underlying assets.  Options may also be generated by, for example, investments 
in land, buildings and equipment; or entry into a new market.  This rationale for 
valuing specific investments can (with one very important caveat, discussed below) 
be extended to the valuation of firms by considering the portfolio of options that a 
firm owns.   
Whilst clearly representing an advance on the NPV valuation of investments, it is 
important to highlight some limitations of the real options approach.  
Fundamentally, and in common with the RBV and dynamic capabilities framework, 
risk (or uncertainty) is viewed purely as an input to the strategy process; the output 
of which is some measure of expected value.  Also, the analogy with financial options 
has to be treated with considerable caution: upon exercise of a financial option one 
owns a (presumably) liquid security which can be sold immediately and the funds 
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invested in risk-free assets; by contrast, exercising a real option confers ownership of 
an irreversible asset with an associated long-term revenue stream which is, itself, 
subject to uncertainty.  This observation addresses the counter-intuitive prediction 
of real options theory, that uncertainty can increase firm value: in reality firms 
cannot own options in isolation, but will always have a mixture of options and actual 
assets.   
There are also a number of practical problems in applying formal options valuation 
approaches to real projects, as highlighted by Bowman and Moskowitz (2001).  Using 
a case study of a real options-based project appraisal carried out by Merck, the 
authors highlight the following issues: the inability to observe the value of the 
underlying asset; the assumption of a particular distribution of the value of the 
underlying asset (typically log normal) as a function of time; the lack of data with 
which to estimate historic volatility; and the lack of a fixed time to expiration of the 
option.  In some cases there is the additional complication that the exercise price is 
not fixed; for example in joint ventures there may be an option for one partner to 
buy out the other based on fair market value at that future time.  The authors 
therefore conclude that real options theory is most applicable as a heuristic for 
strategy, rather than as a quantitative tool: this is the approach taken throughout 
this thesis.      
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2.2.4.2 Real Options Logic as a Heuristic for Strategy 
In attempting to clearly distinguish strategic approaches based on real options logic 
from others, Klingebiel and Adner (2015, p.221) delinetated “three dimensions of 
resource allocation behaviour...sequencing, low initial commitment and 
reallocation”.  Whilst sequencing is fundamental to real options logic, it is also a 
feature of other resource allocation regimes; likewise, low initial commitment is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition to classify a strategy as being based on real 
options logic.  The authors argue that a strategy is based on real options logic only 
when these two features are accompanied by evidence that resources are 
systematically reallocated from failing projects to winning projects.  The authors 
proceeded to measure the effect of each of these three dimensions of resource 
allocation on innovation performance, operationalised as “the proportion of firms’ 
turnover that pertains to new products” (p.229).  They find a significant positive 
effect of sequencing on innovation performance; but neither low initial commitment, 
nor reallocation, show individual direct effects.  However, a correct fit between low 
initial commitment and reallocation (either both or neither) does have a significant 
positive effect.  Thus, whilst they conclude that dynamic resource allocation regimes 
are superior to static ones, and superior to those involving low initial commitment 
but no effective reallocation of resources between projects; they cannot say if 
strategies based on real options logic perform better than those that simply commit 
to specific projects at the outset.        
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2.2.5 Real Options, the Resource-Based View and the Dynamic Capabilities Framework 
It is important to stress that the real options and the resource based view 
approaches are not mutually exclusive, but complementary.  Dixit and Pindyck (1995, 
p.111) hinted at a link in a discussion of real options, stating that “investment 
opportunities flow from a company’s managerial resources, technological 
knowledge...Such resources enable the company to undertake in a productive way 
investments that individuals or other companies cannot undertake.”  Returning to 
the example in the previous paragraph of R&D activity having value because of the 
options that it creates; from a RBV stance, R&D activity has a value because it 
enables a firm to more accurately assess the value of a particular resource in a factor 
market.   
Kogut and Kulatilaka (2001, p.747) made an explicit link in the title of their paper 
“Capabilities as Real Options”, in which they define a resource as “a scarce 
factor...that embeds complex options on future opportunities”.  The authors proceed 
to explain capabilities in terms very similar to Teece et al’s (1997) definition of 
“dynamic capabilities”; and Andersen et al’s (2007) definition of a “strategic 
responsiveness” capability: “...we define core competence as the choice of 
capabilities that permits the firm to make the best response to market 
opportunities” (p.744). Looking to the future, Tong and Reuer (2007, p.21) 
specifically highlight the value of combining the two theoretical approaches: 
“Connecting real options analysis with the resource-based view has the potential to 
improve the analysis of firms’ corporate development trajectories...Incorporating the 
resource-based view...also holds the potential to explain the heterogeneous 
expectations and investment behaviours of firms facing the same external 
uncertainty.”  
37 
 
That concludes this brief introduction to three very important concepts from the 
strategy literature; once again, it is important to stress that the RBV, dynamic 
capabilities framework and real options logic are primarily applied as heuristics for 
decision making.  In the course of the preceding review of the strategy literature, 
there has been some mention of risk in a rather vague sense.  In keeping with the 
discussion of the ontology of risk in Chapter One, it is now necessary to consider the 
specific risks to different stakeholder groups: this is the subject of the next section.  
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2.3 Risks to Different Stakeholder Groups 
As highlighted in Chapter One, the key question in any discussion of risk is “risk to 
whom?”: within the ontological framework outlined in that chapter, it is meaningless 
to talk about risk to an inanimate entity such as the firm itself.  As Holton (2004, 
p.22) puts it “Risk is a condition of individuals – humans and animals – that are self-
aware.  Organizations are not self-aware, so they are incapable of being at risk.”  
Following the chronological development of theory, this section begins by looking at 
the risks to shareholders, before considering the risks to three other key groups: 
lenders, senior managers and society at large.  The section concludes by relating the 
tensions between different stakeholder groups back to the broader discussion of 
agency issues.   
2.3.1 Risks to Shareholders, Managers, Lenders and Society 
The discussion of risk within the financial economics literature has traditionally 
focused on the interests of shareholders, who are concerned about the uncertainty 
in the future returns on their investment portfolios.  In particular, early work focused 
on the risks to idealised well-diversified shareholders investing in an efficient market 
who, according to the Capital Assets Pricing Model (Sharpe (1964)), are only 
concerned with that component of the variability in returns from their portfolio of 
stocks that is correlated with fluctuations in the market as a whole (in this model the 
effects of idiosyncratic variability can be mitigated, without cost, by diversification).   
However, more recent work has highlighted a number of other risks to shareholders, 
for example: Smith and Stultz (1985) explain how, with a convex tax function, 
variability in earnings increases the overall proportion of profit paid in tax; whilst 
Miller and Bromiley (1990) discuss the direct “adjustment costs” of constantly having 
to increase and decrease capacity.  It follows from these arguments that 
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shareholders will be interested in both positive and negative fluctuations in 
performance and will therefore perceive risk in a symmetrical fashion.  However, 
Smith and Stultz (1985) also argue that uncertainty in earnings increases the 
expected direct costs of bankruptcy; and Lessard (1990) and Froot, Scharfstein and 
Stein (1993) argue that uncertainty in cash flows means that funds may not always 
be available when required to exploit value-creating opportunities: there is thus a 
compelling argument that shareholders may also be concerned specifically with 
negative outcomes.  
It is misleading though to consider the risks to shareholders in isolation.  Within an 
efficient market, any risk averse stakeholder in the firm will have to be paid 
compensation to bear risk: ultimately this will reduce returns, so shareholders should 
actually be concerned with the risks to all shareholder groups.  In the absence of an 
efficient market, risks to other stakeholders represent important externalities which 
may attract the attention of government and regulators.  Risks to stakeholders can 
also create indirect costs for the firm, for instance McNamara and Bromiley (1999) 
found that an increased probability of default was associated with more restrictive 
loan conditions.  More generally, Shapiro and Titman (1986) highlighted that 
uncertainty in the ability of a firm to honour its obligations in the future impacts 
negatively on relationships with customers, suppliers and other key stakeholders: an 
important source of sustained competitive advantage according to the RBV, and one 
that is particularly difficult for competitors to imitate (Delmas (2001)).  In the next 
two paragraphs the risks to managers, lenders and society at large are therefore 
considered.   
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The risk to senior managers in firms is rather nuanced.  It has traditionally been 
theorised that managers are primarily concerned with specific negative outcomes 
such as loss of employment and/or damage to their reputation (Amihud and Lev 
(1981), Oswald and Jahera (1991)); and more generally, Libby and Fishburn (1977) 
found that managers conceptualised risk as the probability of failing to meet targets.  
Similarly, March and Shapira (1987 p.1407) found that “most managers do not treat 
uncertainty about positive outcomes as an important aspect of risk”; they also found 
that “risk is not primarily a probability concept...the magnitude of possible bad 
outcomes seemed more salient to them [managers interviewed].”  However, 
DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) argue that managers may also experience other risks, 
specifically that volatility in performance may be taken to indicate poor managerial 
ability and reduce their value in the labour market.  Moreover, in recent years much 
attention has been paid to aligning managers’ interests with those of shareholders, 
through the design of equity-based compensation packages; which make managers 
undiversified shareholders in the firm who, according to the arguments in the 
previous paragraph, will be concerned with volatility.   
By contrast, the risk to lenders is relatively straightforward.  Lenders, and indeed 
individual bank lending officers, will be primarily concerned with specific negative 
outcomes, characterised by the probability of a default and the loss distribution 
given a default: lenders do not share in any positive outcomes so these are of no 
consequence to them.  This particular relationship has been tested empirically by 
(amongst others) McNamara and Bromiley (1999), who found that bank lending 
officers did indeed adjust interest rates to reflect their judgements of the probability 
of default.  National government, local government, regulators and society at large 
may also be concerned about the performance of firms where there are significant 
externalities, such as occurs in the financial services sector and industries that 
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support critical national infrastructure: like lenders these stakeholders are primarily 
concerned with specific negative outcomes around the inability of firms to meet 
their obligations.   
2.3.2 Agency Costs 
The discussions above of the risks to different stakeholder groups highlighted various 
potential conflicts of interest.  In particular, the conflict of interest between the 
shareholders and managers of a firm is a specific example of the more general 
problem of agency which arises “when one or more persons (the principal(s)) 
engages another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent” Jensen and 
Meckling (1976, p.308).  In the context of the separation of ownership and control in 
a firm with outside investors, the problem of agency can be expressed in the 
following form “As managers gain control in the firm they may be able to pursue 
actions which benefit themselves, but not firm owners” (Dalton et al (1998, p.270)).  
In the context of this study, this could include managers pursuing actions to reduce 
the risks to their reputation and personal wealth which are detrimental to 
shareholders.  Whilst, ideally, company directors would prevent managers taking 
decisions that benefitted them personally at the expense of shareholders; in 
practice, directors must balance any such “residual loss” against the “monitoring 
expenditures” incurred to optimise managers’ decisions for shareholders in order to 
minimise the total “agency costs” (Jensen and Meckling (1976 p.308)).    
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Drawing on theories of agency, property rights and finance, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976, p.305) developed a new “theory of ownership structure for the firm” which 
“explains how the conflicting objectives of the individual participants are brought 
back into equilibrium so as to yield this result [maximisation of present value]” 
(p.307).  This theory explains, amongst other things why “a manager or entrepreneur 
in a firm which has a mixed capital structure (containing both debt and outside 
equity claims) will choose a set of activities for the firm such that the total value of 
the firm is less than it would be if he were the sole owner” (p.306).  Nevertheless, 
they stress that it is wrong to conclude from this that agency relationships are non-
optimal because “benefits arise from the availability of profitable investments 
requiring capital investment in excess of the original owner’s personal wealth” 
(p.328); similarly, Fama and Jensen (1983) conclude that the separation of ownership 
and management can provide a survival advantage because of the freedom it gives 
firms to employ the best managers, regardless of their ability and willingness to put 
their own personal wealth at risk. 
It is difficult to directly test Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) central prediction that 
firms with outside equity are less valuable, as firms with no outside equity would 
have very different characteristics (principally size) to firms with outside investors; 
moreover one would be restricted to accounting-based measures of firm value.  
Most empirical work has therefore been based on testing the related prediction that 
managerial share ownership aligns the interests of managers with those of outside 
investors, reduces agency costs, and hence maximises value for shareholders.  Early 
tests (eg Lloyd et al (1986), Kesner (1987)) failed to find a significant relationship, 
possibly because of a failure to adjust for the different risk exposures across firms; 
but more recent tests have found significant positive relationship between share 
ownership and both accounting-based (Schellenger et al (1989)) and market-based 
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measures of firm value (Kim et al (1988), Oswald and Jahera (1991)).  As regards 
predictions about managers pursuing actions, such as implementing risk 
management systems, to reduce risk to their reputations and personal wealth; a 
detailed review of the numerous empirical studies on the relationship between 
managerial incentives and specific risk management activities is postponed until 
Chapter Six. 
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2.4 The Origins of Corporate Risk 
In as much as risk has been discussed previously within the strategy literature (see 
section 2.2); it has generally been considered as exogenous, an input to the decision-
making process rather than one of the outputs.  This section begins by taking the 
diametrically opposite view; that is, looking at risk (to various stakeholder groups) as 
the inevitable consequence of making business decisions with uncertain outcomes: 
this is normally expressed in terms of a debate about the relationship between risk 
and return.  The discussion then proceeds to consider the risks arising from the 
environment in which the firm operates; although it will be argued that it is incorrect 
to see these as truly exogenous.  The mediating effects of organisational factors on 
the risks to the firm’s stakeholders are then considered; and the section concludes by 
reviewing some previous attempts to categorise risks.  
2.4.1 Corporate Risk and Return 
Arguments about the relationship between risk and performance are generally based 
on the application of Utility Theory (Bernoulli (1738)), which predicts that risk averse 
individuals will require compensation to bear risk. This sub-section considers how 
this general argument has been applied firstly in the context of market risk and 
returns, and then in the context of accounting risk and returns.  
2.4.1.1 Market Risk and Return 
The concept of risk aversion, or at least variance aversion, was developed in the 
specific context of the stock market by Markowitz (1952, p.77); who argued that 
investors “consider expected return a desirable thing and variance of return an 
undesirable thing.”  He then demonstrated geometrically (p.82) that this gives rise to 
a range of “efficient combinations” of investments that have the lowest variance for 
a given expected return.  It is important to note though that Markowitz (1952) does 
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not equate variance with risk, in fact all he says (p.89) is that “The concepts ‘yield’ 
and ‘risk’ appear frequently in financial writings.  Usually if the term ‘yield’ were 
replaced by…’expected return’ and ‘risk’ by ‘variance of return’, little change of 
apparent meaning would result.”  Building on this argument, and using the term ‘risk’ 
explicitly, Sharpe (1964) then showed in the Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM) 
that well-diversified investors are unconcerned with unsystematic risk, but will 
require higher returns as compensation for bearing systematic risk; that is the 
variation in return that is correlated with the overall movement of the stock market.  
This predicts a very simple positive relationship between systematic risk (beta) and 
expected returns on a portfolio, as follows: 
 E(Rp) = Rf + βp * (E(Rm) – Rf)     (2.1) 
Where:  Rp is the return on a portfolio, Rf is the risk-free rate of return, βp is the beta 
for the portfolio and Rm is the return to a market portfolio. 
The CAPM received initial support from a number of early empirical studies, such as 
Fama and Macbeth’s (1973) analysis of monthly returns on US stocks over the period 
1935-68, which found a statistically significant positive relationship between beta 
and returns.  However, over the next twenty years, the model was challenged by 
both repeated failures to find a positive relationship between beta and returns in 
other time periods; and the finding of significant relationships between a number of 
idiosyncratic variables and returns, such as: size (Banz (1981), Lakonishok and 
Shapiro (1986)), leverage (Bhandari (1988)) and book-to-market value of equity 
(Stattman (1980)).  Building on this whole body of work, Fama and French (1992) 
tested a wide variety of models for market returns, using monthly data for US stocks 
from 1963-90: their key finding was that a parsimonious model using only size and 
book-to-market value of equity effectively explained the cross-sectional variation in 
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average stock returns.  They find that the size effect is negative and significant over 
the period 1963-90 (but insignificant in the sub-periods 1963-76 and 1977-90); whilst 
the book-to-market effect is positive and significant over all three periods.  
Importantly, beta was insignificant over the period 1963-90, and indeed when the 
period was extended to 1926-90. 
Despite not providing any convincing interpretation of the size and book-to-market 
variables, and indeed acknowledging that their results were not “economically 
satisfying” (Fama and French (1992, p.450)); the “three-factor” model became very 
widely adopted11.  However, only three years later, Pettengill et al (1995) identified a 
fundamental flaw in all the previous empirical tests of market risk and return; in that 
the models are based on expected returns but the factors are actually estimated 
using realised returns12, as follows:   
Rp = Rf + ?̂? p * (Rm – Rf) + εp     (2.2) 
There is a non-zero probability that the realised market return will be less than the 
risk-free rate, in which case there is a negative risk premium. Thus the relation 
between beta and returns “is conditional on the market excess returns when realised 
returns are used for tests” (Pettengill et al (1995, p.115)); with “a positive relation 
during positive market excess return periods and a negative relation during negative 
market excess return periods” (p.105).  The authors go on to argue that the failure to 
find a significant relationship between beta and returns in previous tests arises 
because periods when a positive relationship is expected have been aggregated with 
periods when a negative relationship is expected.  Separating out months with 
                                                          
11 The article had been cited over 2000 times by June 2015 and was still being cited at a rate 
of ten citations per month (based on Web of ScienceTM database).  
12 The “Implied Cost of Capital” literature also highlights the problems of using realised 
returns as an estimator of expected returns (see for example Gebhardt et al (2001, p.136)); 
but takes a very different approach to addressing the issue.  
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positive and negative market returns13, Pettengill et al (1995) find highly significant 
parameter estimates (positive in periods of positive market excess returns and 
negative in periods of negative excess market returns) for beta14 over the period 
1936-90 and in three sub-periods (1936-50, 1951-70, and 1971-90).  Despite the 
compelling simplicity of this argument, the model has not been widely used15.  
However, both Morelli (2011) and Cotter et al (2015) have confirmed the 
conditionality of the relationship between beta and returns using data from the UK 
stock market (over the periods 1980-2006 and 1990-2009 respectively).  Cotter et al 
(2015) also found a conditional relationship (positive when excess market returns are 
positive and negative when market excess returns are negative) between 
idiosyncratic risk and returns.      
2.4.1.2 Accounting Risk and Return 
Similar arguments based on risk aversion have also been applied to the relationship 
between accounting measures of risk and return, suggesting that managers require 
increased expected (accounting) return in order to invest in projects with greater 
uncertainty in outcomes: extending this argument to the level of the firm would 
imply a positive relationship between variability in profits and the profitability of 
firms.  Bowman (1980, p.17) appears to imply that this behaviour is driven by the 
interests of managers themselves, stating that “The argument for economic 
rationality suggests that because the typical business executive is risk averse, the 
higher risk project/investment will require a higher expected return…”  This risk 
aversion could arise because executive pay is often explicitly linked to accounting 
                                                          
13 There are 380 months in which the market excess return is positive and 280 in which it is 
negative. 
14 Pettengill et al (1995) do not consider the impact of size, book-to-market value of equity or 
any other factors in their regressions. 
15 The article had been cited only 55 times by June 2015 (based on Web of ScienceTM 
database). 
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performance; or, more generally, because accounting performance influences job 
security and career prospects.  Contrary to Bowman (1980), Marsh and Swanson 
(1984, p.35) argue that managers are actually acting on the behalf of shareholders, 
suggesting that managers factor the relationship between risk and return in the stock 
market16 directly into investment decisions: “In the absence of some impediment, an 
equilibrium should be reached in which the positive relation between risk and return 
on stocks reflects the relation between risk and return on firms’ marginal projects”.  
However there are also a number of arguments for a negative relationship between 
accounting measures of risk and return.  Firstly, the market-based argument 
completely omits the quality of managerial decision making, and it is entirely 
possible that good management teams could simultaneously deliver high profitability 
and low variability in profits; indeed Andersen et al (2007) define a “strategic 
responsiveness” construct and demonstrate mathematically that this leads to a 
negative relationship between the average performance and standard deviation of 
performance of firms.  More broadly, according to the RBV, firms could derive 
sustained competitive advantage from possession of a number of different (dynamic) 
capabilities.  In addition size and/or market dominance could allow individual firms 
to combine high profitability with low profit variability, even without superior 
capabilities (that is, the firm’s market power is also an omitted variable issue in 
studies such as Bowman (1980)).   
Empirical attempts to test these competing theories of the relationship between 
accounting risk and return are frustrated by a very significant practical issue, as 
highlighted by Miller and Leiblein (1996 p.100): “Although it has been widely argued 
that risk affects return and vice versa, one of the difficulties in specifying a model of 
                                                          
16 Obviously this predates Pettengill et al (1995), so assumes a positive risk-return 
relationship in the market. 
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risk-return relations is inadequate understanding of the timing of these effects.”  
Projects will typically be characterised by significant cash outflows (hence reduced 
profitability) and high uncertainty in the early stages, followed by lower uncertainty 
and, hopefully, positive cash flows later on; but the timescale of this process could 
vary widely from project to project.  Unsurprisingly, the results of different empirical 
tests of the relationship between accounting measures of risk and performance have 
been very mixed: these studies are discussed in detail in Chapter Five.  
2.4.2 Corporate Risk and the Environment 
The discussion of the relationship between risk and return outlined above implies 
that firms operate in complete isolation, and that the only risks that stakeholders 
face derive from the managers of the firm voluntarily engaging in projects with 
uncertain outcomes; whereas “A more complete perspective on organizational risk 
would acknowledge that risks can occur that are environmentally determined and 
result in deviations from managers’ risk preferences” (Miller and Leiblein (1996, 
p.116)).  The interaction between risk and the environment is very complex: whilst all 
risks that the firm faces are ultimately the result of the corporate strategy adopted, 
and are in that sense endogenous; it is important to acknowledge that there are 
“market factors beyond management control” (Andersen (2008 p.155)).  It is also 
necessary to consider the way in which the environment affects decision-making at 
all levels within the firm.   
In order to understand the relationship between risk and the environment better, it 
is useful to introduce the concept of “environmental uncertainty” as a generalisation 
of the concepts of “environmental variability” (Andersen (2008)) and 
“macroeconomic uncertainty” (Calmes and Theoret (2014)); which changes over 
time.  The construct can be operationalised in various ways, including “The volatility 
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of stock market or GDP…forecaster disagreement, mentions of uncertainty in news, 
and the dispersion of productivity shocks to firms” (Bloom (2014 p.154)).   
In the absence of agency issues, and within the limits of “bounded rationality” 
(Simon (1955)), the managers of firms should set a corporate strategy which aims to 
deliver an appropriate expected return to shareholders for the risks that they bear17, 
and hence the environmental uncertainty at that time must be a consideration in 
strategy-setting.  Evidence that environmental uncertainty is indeed a consideration 
in setting corporate strategy comes from numerous sources such as Miller and 
Friesen’s (1983) finding that successful firms adapt their strategy-making process in 
light of “environmental dynamism”; and Calmes and Theoret’s (2014) finding that 
the cross-sectional homogeneity of asset allocation within banks increases with 
“macroeconomic uncertainty.”  However, according to the RBV (see section 2.2.1), 
strategy is implemented through the building up of resources and capabilities over 
an extended period of time: when the level of environmental uncertainty changes 
there is inevitably a lag before the firm’s managers can decide upon, and implement, 
a new strategy with the desired risk-return relationship.  Thus, changes in 
environmental uncertainty will have an effect on the risks to the firm’s stakeholders, 
if only whilst a new equilibrium is established; indeed Andersen et al (2007) 
specifically investigate a “strategic responsiveness” construct as a possible 
explanation for Bowman’s (1980) risk-return paradox.18.   
Environmental uncertainty may also affect the risks to firms’ stakeholders through 
the way in which it affects managers’ decisions about the treatment of “passive 
                                                          
17 According to the CAPM, well-diversified investors need only be compensated for systematic 
risk but, as discussed previously, there are a number of reasons why they may also be 
concerned with unsystematic risks. 
18 It is interesting to note that whilst Andersen et al (2007 p.415) mention “dynamic 
environmental change”, their modelling is actually conducted under the assumption of stable 
conditions. 
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risks” Merton (2005), or “non-core risks” Nocco and Stultz (2006).  Ultimately these 
risks arise from the strategy that the firm pursues and specific investments that are 
taken (eg a decision to invest in new plant and machinery leads to an increase in the 
potential loss from a fire or flood), but they are distinguished by the fact that the 
firm has no comparative advantage in bearing these risks and, following Merton 
(2005) should therefore seek to transfer these to other parties.  Merton’s (2005) 
admonition to transfer all “passive risks” is somewhat simplistic as many of them 
cannot be transferred through established mechanisms such as the purchase of 
derivatives and insurance; but many of these risks can be effectively mitigated 
contractually or through management processes such as quality management, 
physical security, IT security and risk management.  It is argued that the prevailing 
level of environmental uncertainty affects both managers’ desire to mitigate these 
risks and the cost of doing so if they should choose to.   
2.4.3 The Impact of Organisational Factors 
Whilst accepting that risks fundamentally arise from an interaction between the 
decisions made by the firm’s managers and the environment; it is important to note 
that a number of organisational factors can significantly affect both the likelihood of 
these risks materialising and the impact if they should do so.  The “Onion Model of 
Crisis Management” (Pauchant and Mitroff (1992)) provides a useful framework for 
analysing the issues that predispose organisations to crises.  The model suggests that 
the crisis-proneness of an organisation is the result of a combination of four factors: 
“organisational strategies”; “organisational structures”; “organisational culture” and 
“character of the individuals working in the organisation.”  Each of these factors 
represents a deeper layer of the “onion”, less accessible to observation.  Within this 
overall framework, the approaches of four groups of researchers are described 
below. 
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Pauchant and Mitroff (1988) focused specifically on issues concerning 
“organisational culture”, analysing it along five dimensions to identify “healthy” and 
“unhealthy” companies.  These dimensions are: “humanity’s relation to nature”; “the 
nature of reality and truth”; “the nature of human nature”; “the nature of human 
activities” and “the nature of human relationship.”  “Unhealthy” companies were 
characterised by: viewing nature as a resource to be exploited; use of denial and 
disavowal; classifying people simplistically as either “good” or “bad”; fatalism and a 
competitive and individualistic outlook.  Miller (1988) also focuses on issues 
concerning “organisational culture” and identifies five types of “pathological” 
organisation that he asserts are prone to crises.  “Compulsive organisations” are 
rule-based and hierarchical whilst “depressive organisations” are bureaucratic, 
conservative and lack confidence: both types of firm are therefore slow to react to 
the changing environment in which they operate and therefore susceptible to being 
overtaken by events.  The managers in “Dramatic organisations” are impulsive and 
overly ambitious which can lead to them over-reaching themselves and/or being 
caught out by a neglect of detail.  In “detached organisations” there is a leadership 
vacuum at the top, resulting in poor coordination between different functions in the 
company which lays them open to potentially dangerous mistakes in the execution of 
their corporate strategy.  Finally, the managers in “suspicious organisations” devote 
so much attention to obsessing about external conspiracies that they tend to miss 
the really important hazards.  
By contrast, Greening and Johnson (1996), in their quantitative study of the 
incidence of crises, looked primarily at issues of “organisational structure”.  This 
consisted of examining six characteristics of the top management team of 
corporations: functional background heterogeneity; education; organisation tenure; 
organisation tenure heterogeneity; age and age heterogeneity.  They also looked at 
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two factors related to “organisational strategies”: the number of acquisitions (in the 
last two years) and the level of diversification.  Of these factors, the following were 
found to be significantly related to the likelihood of an organisational crisis: 
functional background heterogeneity; education; organisation tenure and number of 
acquisitions.   
Meanwhile researchers in the “High Reliability Organisations” (HRO) school, which 
has contributed much to the crisis management literature; have taken yet another 
approach, based on painstaking ethnographic research.  Whilst, like Pauchant and 
Mitroff (1988) and Miller (1988), these researchers are primarily concerned with 
organisational culture; rather than looking at the factors that predispose 
organisations to crises, they focus on what enables organisations operating in 
obviously risky environments (eg nuclear power and the military) to function safely 
over extended periods.  Summarising this whole body of work, Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2007) outline the five principles underlying HROs as: “preoccupation with failure”, 
“reluctance to simplify”, “sensitivity to operations”, “commitment to resilience” and 
“deference to expertise”.  
The critical role of organisational culture, evident in the studies discussed above, has 
important implications for any quantitative risk research, as the difficulty of 
observing culture presents the significant possibility of omitted variables in any 
regression models.  There is also an important overlap with the study of corporate 
risk management; this will be discussed further in section 2.5.4.    
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2.4.4 Categorising Corporate Risks 
It is clear from the above discussion that there are numerous different sources of risk 
to the stakeholders of firms.  In order to make the problem of understanding and, 
indeed, managing this diverse range of risks more tractable; much previous work has 
been devoted to devising meaningful categorisations of these risks.  Given the 
practical imperative to categorise risks in order to manage them effectively, much of 
this work appears in the practitioner literature (eg IRM (2002), ISO (2009)); but the 
focus here is on the more theoretical contributions within various academic 
literatures.  The discussion begins by looking at two categorisations of risks that were 
developed in the crisis management literature; this is followed by a brief comparison 
of various categorisations that have been developed in the strategy and financial 
economics literatures.  The section concludes by summarising the key themes that 
are common to multiple categorisations.  
Mitroff et al (1988) developed a categorisation of threats to organisations (not 
necessarily firms), in which threats were analysed along two, orthogonal, 
dimensions.  One dimension concerns whether events are primarily 
“technical/economic” in nature (eg IT systems failures); or essentially “human, social 
or organisational” in nature (eg industrial action).  The other dimension is concerned 
with whether the event is internally or externally triggered: this distinction is 
potentially problematic, given the complex relationship between the risks to the 
firm’s stakeholders and the environment in which it operates, as discussed in section 
2.4.2.  Gundel (2005) addressed this issue in his categorisation of threats, also based 
on two orthogonal dimensions, by considering the degree to which a threat can be 
“influenced” (the other dimension was the extent to which an event is 
“predictable”). 
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The importance of considering the degree to which threats can be influenced 
(Gundel (2005)), has particular resonance in the context of the firm, the fundamental 
purpose of which is to take (appropriate) risks in pursuit of profits.  The taking of risk 
in pursuit of profit has formed the basis of a variety of categorisations of risks in the 
strategy and financial economics literature: the categories used in five important 
articles are summarised in table 2.1.  Within this sample of articles there is a broad 
consensus for a dichotomy between risks that are taken deliberately, in the hope of 
achieving superior returns, and those that are an unavoidable consequence of the 
firm’s operations.  However, as stated in the previous paragraph, interpreting this as 
a division between exogenous and endogenous risks is misleading.  A more 
interesting distinction arising from the sample of previous articles is that between 
“risks where the firm has a comparative advantage in risk-bearing” (Nocco and Stultz 
(2006)); and those where the firm has none.  Moreover this distinction has an 
important practical value in terms of identifying those areas where conventional risk 
management activities (eg hedging or purchase of insurance) can be applied.     
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Table 2.1 – Categorisations of Risks 
Reference 
Categories 
of Risk 
Definition 
Suggested 
Approaches to 
Managing Risk 
Chatterjee 
et al (1999) 
Strategic risk 
Probability that a firm can isolate 
its earnings from macroeconomic 
and industry-specific disturbances 
 
Tactical risk 
Uncertainty in a firm’s expected 
returns that managers can reduce 
Financial tactics 
Hedges 
Real options 
Normative 
risk 
Risk premium that a firm incurs for 
failing to comply with any of its 
institutionally expected norms 
 
Palmer and 
Wiseman 
(1999) 
Managerial 
risk 
Management’s proactive strategic 
choices involving the allocation of 
resources 
 
Organization
al risk 
Characteristic of organizations 
experiencing volatile income 
streams 
 
Merton 
(2005) 
Value-
adding risks 
Risks associated with positive-net-
present-value activities in which 
the company has a competitive 
advantage 
 
Passive risks All other risks 
Hedging 
Insurance 
Nocco and 
Stultz 
(2006) 
Strategic 
and 
Business 
Risks 
Risks where the firm has a 
comparative advantage in risk-
bearing 
 
Non-core 
Risks 
All other risks 
Hedging 
Insurance 
Kaplan and 
Mikes 
(2012) 
Strategy 
Risks 
Risks taken for superior strategic 
returns 
Rules-based 
compliance 
approach 
Preventable 
Risks 
Risks arising from within the 
company that generate no 
strategic benefits 
Risk 
management 
system designed 
to reduce the 
probability that 
threats 
materialise and 
to improve the 
company’s ability 
to manage or 
contain the 
impact should 
they occur 
External 
Risks 
External, uncontrollable risks 
Identification 
and mitigation of 
their impact 
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As mentioned above, the identification and categorisation of risks is primarily 
motivated by a desire to manage them better.  Continuing this theme, the next 
section looks at the emergence of risk management as a discipline, and examines its 
appeal from the point of view of both shareholders and managers.     
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2.5 Corporate Risk Management 
This section begins by looking at the historical origins of risk management and, in 
particular, some important recent advances in practice; such as the use of derivatives 
and the emergence of formalised approaches to managing risk.  This is followed by 
an explanation of why, contrary to the CAPM (Sharpe (1964)), the appropriate 
management of idiosyncratic risks can create value for shareholders; and, drawing 
on both agency theory (Jensen and Meckling (1976)) and the behavioural theory of 
the firm (Cyert and March (1992)), a discussion of why managers may choose to 
manage risk independently of considerations of shareholder value.  The section 
concludes by briefly discussing the relationship between organisational culture and 
corporate risk management. 
2.5.1 The History of Risk Management 
The practice of risk management can be traced back to at least 1800 BC in the form 
of insurance for ship owners (Bernstein (1996)); and as recently as “Twenty years 
ago, the job of the corporate risk manager…involved mainly the purchase of 
insurance” (Nocco and Stultz (2006, p. 8)).  The main advance in risk management 
over the next four millennia was the emergence of the legal form of the corporation 
as a means of investors limiting their risk; whilst providing equity capital that acts as 
an “All-purpose risk cushion” (Meulbroek (2001, p.69)) for management.  This use of 
legal mechanisms to manage risk was subsequently extended to the setting up of 
individual corporate vehicles to ring-fence the risk of specific projects.  In recent 
years though, the nature of corporate risk management has changed significantly, in 
two distinct ways.  Firstly, following important theoretical advances in the pricing of 
derivatives (Black and Scholes (1973)); an obvious change has been the availability of 
capital market solutions to transfer risk.  In some instances this simply provides an 
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alternative to traditional forms of insurance (eg “catastrophe bonds”); but the 
existence of these solutions has also allowed firms to transfer risk in areas where this 
was previously not possible, such as currency risk and interest rate risk.   
Driven by a number of high-profile corporate failures, the other main change in this 
period has been a move towards formalised, auditable processes for managing risk, 
as Power et al (2009, p. 304) put it “The period since 1995 has seen an explosion of 
efforts to codify and formalize principles of risk management…organizations must 
apply rational standards of knowledge and frame what they do in these terms in 
order to maintain legitimacy”.  This particular development is of direct relevance to 
this thesis: as well as being the focus of the study of risk management capabilities in 
Chapter Six, the adoption of formalised risk management processes has stimulated 
the debate about how to measure corporate risk which motivates the study in 
Chapter Four.  The validity of Power’s (2009) assertion is demonstrated by the 
proliferation of guidance on corporate governance and internal control in recent 
years such as COSO (1992, 2004) and various versions of the “Corporate Governance 
Code” in the UK (Turnbull (1999), FRC (2010, 2012, 2014)); the passing of the 
Sarbane-Oxley Act in the US in 2002; and the adoption of Basel II (BIS (2006)) and 
Basel III (BIS (2011)) as international regulatory frameworks for banks.  Power (2007, 
p.3) summarises the change in approach to risk management over this period as 
follows: “...the dominant discourse on risk management has shifted from the logic of 
calculation to that of organization and accountability.”  Power’s (2009) assertion is 
also supported by the emergence of a number of new professional groups with 
accompanying professional institutions: two of these, the Institute of Risk 
Management and the Business Continuity Institute, will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter Six where they are directly relevant. 
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2.5.2 Risk Management as a Value-Creating Activity 
The potential for risk management to create value for shareholders is challenged by 
a simplistic interpretation of Sharpe’s (1964) Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM); 
which suggests that all investors are able to mitigate firm-specific risks in the firms 
that they invest in, for free, simply by diversifying their portfolios.  It follows that 
firms should not divert resources into managing these risks if investors can achieve 
the same effect themselves without incurring any cost.  The CAPM is, of course, an 
idealised picture, containing a range of assumptions about how markets work so its 
predictions are, in reality, only approximations.  There are, in fact, a number of 
compelling theoretical arguments why appropriate investments in risk management 
can create value for shareholders: these are outlined below.  
Arguably the most important function of risk management is to reduce the likelihood 
of financial distress.  Building on the previous literature on drivers for corporate 
insurance (eg Mayers and Smith (1982)), Smith and Stultz (1985) also argued that risk 
management adds value to the firm by increasing debt capacity (with the associated 
tax-shield effect); reducing the cost of debt; and lowering the expected tax liability.  
Shapiro and Titman (1986) subsequently highlighted an additional, related benefit in 
that reducing the likelihood of financial distress improves relationships with 
customers, suppliers and other key stakeholders: the RBV argues that relationships 
with such stakeholders are critical to developing lasting competitive advantage 
(Delmas (2001)).  Lessard (1990) and Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) 
subsequently extended this line of thinking: rather than being simply a means of 
avoiding bankruptcy, risk management is valued as a way of maintaining sufficiently 
stable cash flows to ensure that funds are always available to invest in valuable 
opportunities as they arise.  The logic is straightforward in that if external finance is 
more expensive than internally-generated funds, then any temporary shortfall in 
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internally-generated funds may result in attractive opportunities not being pursued.  
On a more practical level, Miller and Bromiley (1990, p.765) argued that firms incur 
“adjustment costs” if activity continually increases and decreases.  Finally, in most 
jurisdictions, effective marginal tax rates are an increasing function of pre-tax 
earnings; in such circumstances, reducing the volatility of earnings will reduce 
average tax liabilities.   
More recently, Meulbroek (2002) has suggested some more subtle ways in which risk 
management adds value; for instance managing risk enables investors to estimate 
beta more accurately, and to measure performance more easily.  Rebonato (2007 
p.111) develops the latter point in the specific context of the valuation of growth 
firms: underlying growth is not directly observable and has to be inferred from 
periodic accounting snapshots, but volatility in earnings confounds attempts to 
estimate the underlying growth with any accuracy and may therefore result in a 
company being undervalued.  It follows from all of the above arguments that 
managers in firms that have a greater probability of financial distress; firms operating 
in sectors where the costs of bankruptcy are inherently high; and firms that have 
greater growth opportunities are more likely to choose to actively manage risks.  The 
effect of firm size on the propensity manage risk is unclear: the proportional cost of 
bankruptcy is greater and tax functions are usually more convex for smaller firms; 
but larger size is generally associated with greater complexity (Gatzert and Martin 
(2015)), and larger firms have more resources with which to implement ERM 
(Beasley et al (2005)) or alternative formal approaches to risk management.   
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2.5.3 Managerial Perspectives on Risk Management 
The arguments introduced above can be applied, in principle, to predict the 
behaviour of the owners of firms of all sizes from small privately-held companies to 
large public corporations.  However, in the large, publicly-quoted firms that are the 
subject of this study, most decisions are taken by professional managers who are not 
normally (major) shareholders; so one cannot automatically assume that they will 
maximise value for shareholders.  One important issue, as discussed in section 2.3.1 
above, is that different stakeholders in the firm experience different risks: presenting 
the potential for conflicts of interests.  Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling (1976)), 
as a framework for dealing with such conflicts of interest, was introduced in section 
2.3.2; and its specific application to risk management is discussed further below.  
Equally, managers may not make economically optimal decisions because of 
“bounded rationality” (Simon (1955)); it is therefore also relevant to discuss the 
behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and March (1992)), a set of rules derived from 
extensive empirical work about how managers in large firms operating under 
uncertainty actually make decisions.     
2.5.3.1 Application of Agency Theory to Risk Management 
The most widespread application of agency theory to risk management is in studies 
of the effect of managerial compensation.  Managers usually receive pay-rises and 
bonuses based on performance (typically benchmarked against their peer group of 
firms); and are often awarded shares in the company which constitute a large part of 
their total wealth: it is therefore impossible for these individuals to simply diversify 
away the firm-specific risks related to their employment.  Furthermore they may 
suffer very significant financial and reputational loss if the firm should fail and they 
lose their jobs (although job security is presumably a factor in the overall 
determination of remuneration: if managers fear that the company is likely to go 
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bankrupt they will demand higher pay19).  Managers may therefore be inclined to 
engage in risk mitigation activities, over and above those which increase firm value, 
purely to reduce the risk to themselves.  DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) suggest another 
personal motivation for managers to engage in specific risk management activities.  
They hypothesise that managers use financial hedging to reduce volatility of earnings 
in an attempt to demonstrate how well the firm is being managed; thereby making 
themselves more valuable in the labour market.  Following this line of argument, 
managers who are in the relatively early stages of their career, or who tend to 
change jobs frequently, may be more inclined to invest in risk management.  In 
considering these arguments though, it should be remembered that the purpose of 
risk management is not to reduce risk per se; rather it is about mitigating “passive” 
(Merton (2005)) or “non-core” (Nocco and Stultz (2006)) risks to other parties so as 
the firm can take on additional “value-adding” (Merton (2005)) risks.   
It is equally important to recognise that managers who are incentivised against 
short-term goals, or who hold large quantities of share options, may not invest 
enough in risk management.  Indeed Mayers and Smith (1982) specifically argue that 
one of the benefits of insurance is that the insurance company performs a 
monitoring role on behalf of shareholders to ensure that managers are engaging in 
appropriate risk management activities to protect long-term value.   
The previous two paragraphs focused on the nature of management, but the nature 
of ownership (ie individual or institutional shareholders) may also be important: 
Pagach and Warr (2011 p. 201) suggest that there is “an institutional desire for 
greater risk management.”  Even if institutional investors do not value reduction in 
the firm’s idiosyncratic risk per se (as would be predicted by the CAPM); they are 
                                                          
19 Peters and Wagner (2014) studied a related issue, that of dismissal risk; and found that for 
a one percent increase in the risk of dismissal, CEOs received on average a 7% increase in 
compensation.  
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likely to encourage managers to adopt good practice in corporate governance, of 
which formalised processes for risk management are a core component (Power 
(2007)). 
Agency theory has also been used to explain the voluntary disclosure of risk 
information (eg Deumes and Knechel (2008), Höring and Gründl (2011)) and similar 
logic can be applied as an additional argument for adopting formalised approaches 
to risk management.  The adoption of such a system, particularly one that is widely 
used (such as enterprise risk management), should reduce the monitoring costs for 
owners by making risk information more readily accessible and understandable 
(Meulbroek (2002)).  Following this line of argument, managers of firms where the 
monitoring costs are high may choose to implement formal risk management 
processes in order to reduce efficiency losses.  It would be expected that this effect 
would be most pronounced in firms which have a large number of small shareholders 
for whom the monitoring costs are disproportionately high relative to the value of 
their shareholdings.  Of course this effect would be in the opposite direction to the 
effect hypothesised in the previous paragraph of large institutional owners 
demanding formal risk management approaches. 
2.5.3.2 The Behavioural Theory of the Firm 
Numerous aspects of the behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and March (1992)) 
can usefully be applied to better understand the decision by the managers of firms to 
adopt risk management.  Perhaps most importantly the concept of “problemistic 
search” (p.169), wherein innovation is triggered by the failure to meet organisational 
goals; suggests that managers are generally driven to explore new ideas (such as risk 
management) by specific negative events (eg failure to meet targets), rather than 
broader considerations of value maximisation.  Meanwhile, consideration of how 
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such searches are conducted, particularly the concepts of “local rationality” (p.165) 
and “simple-minded search” (p.170); would imply that risk management will only be 
identified as a possible solution to the perceived problem if it happens to be readily 
visible to those people closest to the negative event that triggered the search in the 
first place.  In addition, the application of “acceptable level decision rules” (p.165) 
may mean that an inferior, but adequate, solution is adopted simply because it is 
identified more quickly.  The concept of the “negotiated environment” (p.168), part 
of a broader idea of “uncertainty avoidance”; argues that there are unwritten, 
industry-wide conventions on good practice: it is perfectly plausible that these may 
include conventions on appropriate approaches to risk management, leading to 
inter-sector variations in the adoption of specific approaches.  Cyert and March 
(1992) also draw attention to a tendency towards inertia in allocating funds to 
activities where the link to organisational goals is hard to establish; they cite the 
specific example of R&D but this could equally well be applied to risk management.     
2.5.4 Corporate Risk Management and Organisational Culture 
As alluded to in section 2.4.3, there is clearly a complex interrelationship between 
organisational culture, as discussed extensively in the crisis management literature, 
and corporate risk management.  On the one hand, certain organisational cultures 
may be more suited to the implementation of formal risk management systems: 
Kimborough and Componation (2009) specifically highlighted the importance of 
organisational culture as a factor in the successful implementation of enterprise risk 
management in their survey of 116 internal audit executives.  Alternatively, an 
appropriate organisational culture may actually be a partial substitute for formal, 
rules-based risk management.  Ultimately, an effective risk management capability is 
based on a combination of individual beliefs, organisational routines and external 
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networks developed over a period of time; so, to an extent, the two literatures are 
investigating the same underlying characteristics of the organisation.   
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2.6 Integrating the Strategy and Risk Management Literatures 
Notwithstanding the fundamental connection between strategy and risk, highlighted 
by Foss and Knudsen’s (2003) identification of “uncertainty” as one of the two 
necessary conditions for sustained competitive advantage; the RBV, dynamic 
capabilities and real options literatures have developed quite separately from those 
concerning risk management.  However, there are a few interesting examples where 
the different literatures have interacted, if only indirectly.   
One area in which overlap has occurred is in the discussion of the influence of risk on 
strategy formulation.  Preble (1997) explicitly identified risk management (or “crisis 
management”) as an important input in his proposed model of the strategic 
management process; but he made no reference to the RBV (although it was well 
established by that time), and the model that he developed now appears rather 
dated.  More recently, Sirmon et al’s (2007) seminal paper on dynamic capabilities 
highlights the influence of “environmental uncertainty” on the resource 
management process.  The authors’ focus is specifically on the epistemic uncertainty 
concerning which resources firms should acquire, which capabilities to bundle them 
into and which market demands to attempt to satisfy: this type of uncertainty relates 
to the “value adding” risks (Merton (2005)), or “strategic and business risks” (Nocco 
and Stultz (2006)) that can only really be managed by maintaining debt capacity and 
liquidity.  However, the same thinking could also be applied to the aleatory 
uncertainty inherent in the resource management process; in order to develop the 
theory of risk management within the dynamic capabilities framework.   
Constructs closely related to risk have also been advanced as mediating factors in the 
relationship between the firm’s possession of capabilities and subsequent 
performance.  Reinforcing the importance of distinguishing between ordinary 
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capabilities and dynamic capabilities; Drnevich and Kriauciunas (2011) found that 
higher degrees of “environmental dynamism” reduced the contribution of ordinary 
capabilities to firms’ relative performance, but increased the contribution of dynamic 
capabilities.  However Schilke (2014, p.182) subsequently argued that “Although 
highly dynamic environments provide ample opportunity for resource 
reconfigurations, the high frequency of novel situations and the necessity to bring 
about discontinuous organizational change in these settings makes the routine-based 
mechanisms dynamic capabilities rest on comparatively less appropriate...” 20  This 
led him to hypothesise that “the relationship between [dynamic capabilities] and 
competitive advantage is strongest under intermediate levels of environmental 
dynamism” (p.185): tests using alliance management and product development as 
examples of dynamic capabilities were both supportive of his hypothesis.  
It should also be noted that the RBV has been directly applied in two areas that are, 
in some ways, analogous to risk management: quality management and 
environmental management.  Quality was specifically cited as an example of a 
capability or “competence” by Teece et al (1997); although it is important to note 
that only one of the eight empirical tests reported by Newbert (2007) that used 
“quality” as an explanatory variable provided statistically significant support for the 
theoretical predictions of the RBV.  Meanwhile Delmas (2001, p.348) applied the RBV 
to the adoption of environmental management systems, specifically certification to 
ISO 14001, hypothesising that “…involvement of stakeholders in the design and 
structure of ISO 14001 sets up a path dependency process generating the sort of 
causal ambiguity just described and, with it, increases the difficulty of imitating the 
process for other competing firms.”   This hypothesis is supported by the results of 
                                                          
20 This statement suggests a lack of consensus on what constitutes a dynamic capability: 
Teece (2012) argues that, by their very nature, dynamic capabilities tend to be less rooted in 
routines than ordinary capabilities (see section 2.2.2).  
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structural equation modelling, which shows that the involvement of external 
stakeholders in the design of the system had the greatest effect on firms’ 
competitive advantage; much more so than the involvement of employees.    
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2.7 Summary 
This chapter began by introducing three important approaches from the strategy 
literature: the RBV, the dynamic capabilities framework and real options.  Given the 
reservations discussed about the accuracy of specific predictions from these 
theories, it is important to stress that all three approaches are used primarily as 
heuristics in this thesis.  Crucially it was argued that these approaches were 
complementary, not mutually exclusive, so they can be applied singly or in 
combination as appropriate.  The RBV and dynamic capabilities framework are 
applied in Chapter Four, in discussing the relationship between strategy and 
corporate risk; and in Chapter Five, in the development of a model relating risk and 
performance.  The RBV is also invoked in a discussion of how risk management might 
lead to superior performance in Chapter Six; and real options theory is applied 
directly in the development of the empirical model in that chapter.  However, all of 
these approaches from the strategy literature have two important limitations in the 
context of discussing corporate risk; so a number of other literatures have been 
introduced.   
Firstly, there is an assumption that corporate risk is a one-dimensional concept; 
indeed, in the case of valuing real options, it is assumed that risk can be reduced to a 
single number derived from the uncertainty in future cashflows.  It became clear 
though, from the discussion of the risks to different stakeholder groups, that this is a 
crude over-simplification.  The approach adopted throughout this thesis is therefore 
to always use multiple risk measures, as proxies for the risks to the different 
stakeholder groups.  Secondly, the strategy literature generally considers corporate 
risk as simply one of a number of exogenous inputs to the decision-making process; 
whereas it is clear from the discussion of the origins of corporate risk in section 2.4, 
that both strategic decisions and organisational factors are actually important 
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sources of risk.  It is therefore misleading to consider any form of risk as truly 
exogenous: rather corporate risk arises from the complex interrelationship between 
the environment and decisions made at various levels within the firm.  This theme 
will be explored in much more detail in Chapter Four, in the context of measuring 
risk; and again in Chapter Five, which investigates the relationship between risk and 
performance. 
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Chapter 3 - Issues in the Estimation of Corporate Risk  
3.1  Overview 
Distributions of real firm-level data will often contain extreme values.  These values 
may arise for a variety of different reasons including accounting idiosyncrasies, errors 
at some stage in the processing of the data or genuinely extreme performance by 
some firms; but it is frequently not possible to determine the cause for individual 
data points.  Given the potential for small numbers of outliers to disproportionately 
affect the results of any statistical analysis, it is very common in empirical work to 
simply exclude the most extreme values: a process called Winsorization.  But this 
approach implicitly treats all outliers as errors, when we know that this is not 
necessarily the case.  Deleting instances of genuinely extreme performance may not 
be a major problem in many fields of research, where these observations are of no 
more significance than any other points in the distribution; but, as discussed in 
Chapter One, extreme (negative) performance is an important component of the risk 
to many stakeholder groups, so the deletion of outlying values destroys some of the 
most valuable information.  There are now a rich range of techniques specifically 
designed to mitigate the effects of outliers without simply discarding data: the 
application of these techniques to risk research is the subject of this chapter.     
This chapter begins by describing the data sources used in this study.  Section 3.3 
outlines the problem to be addressed, discussing: the distributions of performance 
data, in particular their skewness and kurtosis; the distributions of risk measures; the 
implications of skewness and kurtosis for the conduct of risk research; and how 
these issues have been addressed in previous empirical work.  The next section 
introduces some measures of location, dispersion and correlation that are 
specifically designed to be robust to outliers, many of these are used throughout the 
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empirical chapters; this is followed by a detailed discussion of various robust 
regression techniques, which are applied specifically in Chapter Five.  The chapter 
concludes by introducing the technique of principal component analysis and, in 
particular, describing a robust version which is applied in the empirical study in the 
next chapter.    
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3.2 Data Sources for the Study 
The study is based on a sample of listed UK firms over a ten-year period: accounting 
periods ending between 1st April 2003 and 31st March 2004 are denoted “2003”; 
through to accounting periods ending between 1st April 2012 and 31st March 2013, 
which are denoted “2012”.  Accounting data are taken from the FAME database (in 
certain instances where data were missing in FAME these were gathered from 
individual company annual reports) and market data from Datastream21.  In common 
with previous work22 risk measures (and a number of other variables) were 
estimated over a five-year period; and to be considered valid in an estimation period, 
firms had to have a positive figure for turnover and to have at least one employee in 
the last financial year of that period.  The number of valid firms for each estimation 
period in the study is shown in table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 – Number of Valid Firms by Estimation Period 
Estimation Period Sample Size 
2008-12 130023 
2007-11 1347 
2006-10 1258 
2005-09 1056 
2004-08 1005 
2003-07 963 
 
In order to minimise the incidence of erroneous extreme values, firms that had 
irregular accounting periods were excluded from the sample; as this may be 
indicative of major restructuring.  In addition firms that listed or de-listed during any 
five-year period will automatically be excluded from the sample for that period.   
                                                          
21 All data were downloaded from FAME between 1st October 2013 and 17th January 2014; 
data were downloaded from Datastream between 4th October 2013 and 24th January 2014. 
22 Dating back at least as far as Fama and MacBeth (1973) for market-based measures; and 
Bowman (1980) for accounting-based measures. 
23 The apparent fall in the number of valid firms in the final period is believed to be due to the 
delay between firms publishing accounts and them being uploaded onto the FAME database: 
72 firms did not have data for an accounting period ending between 1st April 2012 and 31st 
March 2013 at the time of the download.  
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3.3 Statistical Issues with Corporate Risk Measures 
The majority of risk measures at the firm level are derived from performance data; in 
this section two such measures, that have been widely used in previous empirical 
work, will be used to illustrate some more general issues in the distributions of risk 
measures.  The risk measures used are the (longitudinal) standard deviation of ROE 
(as used, for example, in Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988), Miller and Bromiley 
(1990), Alessandri and Khan (2006)) and standard deviation of ROA (as used, for 
example, in Bettis (1982), Miller and Bromiley (1990), Miller and Leiblein (1996), 
Miller and Chen (2004), Alessandri and Khan (2006), Andersen et al (2007)).  The 
discussion will begin by looking at the performance data themselves, ROE24 and ROA; 
before characterising the distributions of the risk measures derived from them and 
discussing the implications for risk research.  
3.3.1 Distributions of Performance Measures 
As stated above, the standard deviations of ROE and ROA have been widely used as 
risk measures in previous research: in order to understand the distributions of these 
variables, it is necessary to first understand the distributions of the underlying 
performance data.  Descriptive statistics for ROE and ROA in both 2008 and 2009 are 
shown in table 3.2. 
  
                                                          
24 Return on market value of equity is used throughout the thesis; the choice of this definition 
of ROE is explained in section 4.3.1. 
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Table 3.2 – Descriptive Statistics for ROE and ROA (2008 and 2009) 
 N25  Mean Median Min Max SD Skewness Kurtosis 
ROE 
(2009) 
994 -0.0365 0.0533 -10.4 1.21 0.485 -11.3 212 
ROE 
(2008) 
994 -0.333 0.0388 -57.2 2.92 0.241 -16.1 335 
ROA 
(2009) 
994 -0.0300 0.0291 -8.23 0.519 0.460 -11.9 187 
ROA 
(2008) 
994 -0.0824 0.0149 -8.68 1.12 0.421 -9.89 179 
 
There is a similar pattern in each of the four distributions which is characterised by 
high (negative) skewness and high (positive) kurtosis.  Skewness is a measure of how 
symmetrical a distribution is: a perfectly symmetrical distribution has a skewness of 
zero and a distribution with skewness of magnitude greater than 1 is generally 
regarded as highly skewed (Lewis (2004 p.54)).  The extremely large negative values 
observed in these samples mean that large negative values of ROE and ROA occur 
much more frequently than large positive values: this is intuitively reasonable, as it 
means that extreme losses occurred more often than extremely high profits in this 
period.  Kurtosis is a measure of the heaviness of the tails of the distribution: the 
normal distribution has a kurtosis of 3 and the very high values observed here26 
mean that extreme values occur much more frequently than would be the case in 
the normal distribution.  The financial crisis starting in 2008 has stimulated 
considerable interest in the study of extreme events, and there is a growing 
awareness of “fat tails” in the distributions of many financial data such as (log) share 
returns (Kemp (2011 p.30)).  Fat tails may arise, contrary to the Central Limit 
Theorem, for a number of reasons including (Kemp (2011 p.35)): lack of 
diversification; multiple distributions; and distributions with infinite variance.  At an 
individual level, the data points in the tails represent firms exhibiting extremes of 
                                                          
25 There were 994 firms for which the data to calculate all of the risk measures used in 
Chapter Four were available for the period 2008-12. 
26 There is no upper bound on kurtosis. 
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performance; in particular, those in the left-hand tail relate to firms with a high 
likelihood of financial distress, an important component of the risk to both managers 
and lenders.  In addition, it can be seen from table 3.2 that the mean (and to a lesser 
extent the median) values vary markedly from year to year.  All of these points are 
illustrated further in fig. 3.1 which shows the distributions of ROE in 2008 and 2009. 
Fig. 3.1 – ROE in 2008 and 2009 
 
3.3.2 Distributions of Corporate Risk Measures 
In line with a significant body of previous research27, the sample standard deviations 
of ROE and ROA were then estimated from five annual values of ROE and ROA: 
clearly estimates based on only five observations will be very susceptible to being 
influenced by outliers.  Given the skewness and kurtosis of the performance data 
highlighted above, it is not surprising that the distributions of these risk measures 
are also far from the normal distribution.  Descriptive statistics for the standard 
deviations of ROE and ROA in the period 2008-12 are shown in table 3.3. 
  
                                                          
27 Dating back at least as far as Bowman (1980). 
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Table 3.3 – Descriptive Statistics of Standard Deviation for ROE and ROA (2008-12) 
 N  Mean Median Min Max SD Skewness Kurtosis 
SD of ROE 994 0.389 0.123 0.00143 55.5 2.07 21.3 534 
SD of ROA 994 0.128 0.063 0.000462 4.03 0.268 9.73 127 
 
Both of these distributions also exhibit very high skewness; although the 
distributions of the standard deviations are positively skewed, meaning that very 
high values of the standard deviations of ROE and ROA occur much more frequently 
than very low values (of course, by definition, all values must be positive).  Both 
distributions also exhibit very high kurtosis, ie extreme values of these risk measures 
occur much more frequently than would be the case in the normal distribution: the 
fat tail in the distribution of the standard deviation of ROE is very clearly visible in the 
quantile plot shown in fig. 3.2.   
Fig. 3.2 – Quantile Plot of Standard Deviation of ROE 
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As will be discussed in section 4.3, many of the distributions of corporate risk 
measures used in the thesis have similar issues of skewness and kurtosis (although 
some of the measures are highly negatively skewed): some important implications of 
skewness and kurtosis for the conduct of empirical risk research are discussed in the 
next section. 
3.3.3 The Impact of Skewness and Kurtosis 
Such extreme skewness and kurtosis makes it difficult to characterise the 
distributions of individual variables with parameters.  Location, or central tendency, 
is the most basic parameter of a distribution, and the sample mean is the most 
common measure of this: in order to illustrate the problem of using the sample 
mean to describe a distribution such as that of the standard deviation of ROE 
described above, a simulation was conducted.  500 data points were randomly 
drawn from the distribution shown in table 3.3 and the sample mean was calculated; 
this was repeated 100 times and the distribution of the sample means is shown in 
the fig. 3.3. 
Fig. 3.3 – Distribution of Sample Mean of Standard Deviation of ROE 
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The sample mean is clearly very dependent on the precise values present in each 
sample used to calculate it, and it gives very little useful information about the 
overall population from which the sample is drawn: it is thus not possible to 
generalise from sample parameters to the population.  Similar problems arise with 
the use of standard deviation to characterise the dispersion of such a distribution.    
The issue of outliers becomes even more problematic when one wishes to analyse 
the relationships between variables.  OLS regression and related techniques (eg 
ANOVA and principal components analysis) are based on calculations involving the 
squares of residuals, making these techniques very sensitive to large residuals; they 
may therefore give highly misleading results in the presence of outliers.  The effect of 
outliers on regression results depends on both the distance of regressors from their 
mean values (“leverage”); and the “discrepancy” between the actual and predicted 
values of the dependent variable.  Various measures have been proposed which 
combine leverage and discrepancy in order to give an overall measure of the 
“influence” of an individual observation on the regression results; these include 
DFITSi and Cook’s Di (Cook (1977)).  However these techniques suffer from the 
drawback that they are all based on non-robust estimates of location and dispersion, 
so may not effectively detect outliers.  The search for more robust methods of 
identifying influential outliers led to the development of the minimum covariance 
determinant (MCD) method (Rousseuw (1984)); which will be explained in more 
detail in section 3.6, where it is introduced in the context of its application in a 
robust technique for principal component analysis.     
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Building on the ideas of leverage and discrepancy, Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987) 
defined three classes of outliers, depending on how they impact on the regression 
results: “good leverage points”, “bad leverage points” and “vertical outliers”.  The 
definitions of these are illustrated in the simple two-variable regression example 
shown in fig. 3.4. 
Fig. 3.4 – Definition of Vertical Outliers, Good and Bad Leverage Points 
 
Vertical outliers directly influence the parameter estimates, particularly the 
estimated intercept; and bad leverage points affect both the estimated slope and 
intercept.  Good leverage points do not directly affect the estimated parameters but 
are still a concern because they deflate the estimated standard errors.   
3.3.4 Treatment of Outliers in Previous Research 
Despite growing awareness that outliers can unduly influence results, previous risk 
research has relied extensively on the estimation of standard parameters of 
distributions, such as sample means and standard deviations; Pearson correlations; 
and OLS regression.  In the few cases where any acknowledgement has been made of 
the potential for outliers to distort the results; the problem has generally been 
addressed by simply removing the firms with the most extreme values from the 
82 
 
sample (eg Miller and Bromiley (1990), Miller and Leiblein (1996)) which, as 
previously discussed, results in the loss of the most useful risk data.  The other 
established technique, of transforming individual variables (typically taking the log or 
the square root) to reduce skewness and kurtosis, does not appear to have been 
widely used in risk research.   
There is an alternative approach, using techniques that are specifically designed to 
be robust to outliers; but within the risk literature Bhagat et al’s (2015) study of risk-
taking in banks appears to be the only example of this approach, and the authors 
give no details of which of the many available technique(s) they used.  Indeed, the 
application of such techniques throughout the whole of business and management 
research has been surprisingly limited: in a review of papers on the ECONLIT 
database, Zaman et al (2001) found only 14 examples containing the term “robust 
regression”.  The authors attribute the lack of use of these techniques to the 
following five factors: “The belief that large sample sizes make robust techniques 
unnecessary...”; “The belief that outliers can be detected simply...”; “Existence of 
several ‘robust regression’ techniques with little guidance available as to which is 
appropriate”; “Unfamiliarity with interpretation of results from a robust analysis”; 
and “Unawareness of gains available from robust analysis in real data sets” (p.1).  
The next three sections of this chapter aim to address some of these persistent 
barriers by describing and comparing a range of different robust techniques.    
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3.4 Robust Estimators of Location, Dispersion and Correlation 
3.4.1 Estimators of Location 
The sample median is a widely-accepted robust estimator of location.  Whereas the 
estimated mean can be very significantly influenced by a single outlier; the median is 
bounded even if 50% of the data are replaced by arbitrarily high or low numbers.  
Formally, 50% is known as the “breakdown point” of the median28, that is “the 
smallest proportion of the sample that may be arbitrarily replaced or added, which 
may result in the estimate becoming unbounded” (Berk (1990, p.301)).  The other 
key consideration in choosing a suitable technique is efficiency, which is usually 
expressed as the efficiency relative to the corresponding non-robust technique on a 
Gaussian sample; which, for the median, is 64%.  Typically, a trade-off is required 
between a high breakdown point and high efficiency; so the final choice for a given 
application will depend upon a good understanding of the nature of the data.  This 
trade-off is illustrated below, once again using the data for the standard deviation of 
ROE in the period 2008-12 (see table 3.3).  The simulation in section 3.3.3, based on 
drawing random samples of 500 data points from the distribution of the standard 
deviation of ROE, was repeated; and this time both the sample mean and median 
were calculated: the distributions of the estimated values are shown in fig. 3.5. 
  
                                                          
28 The breakdown point of the mean is 0. 
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Fig. 3.5 – Distribution of Sample Mean and Median of Standard Deviation of ROE 
 
As can be seen from the figure, despite its lower theoretical efficiency; the dispersion 
of the sample median is actually much less than the dispersion of the sample mean 
with this data because of the median’s higher breakdown point.  The sample median 
thus conveys information not only about the sample from which it was estimated, 
but also about the populations as a whole. 
3.4.2 Estimators of Dispersion 
A similar problem exists with measures of dispersion: once again the most common 
estimator of dispersion, standard deviation, is influenced by even a single outlier.  
The inter-quartile range is sometimes used as a more robust alternative but it has a 
breakdown point of only 25%.  However, the median absolute deviation, defined as 
follows, is much more robust with a breakdown point of 50%.   
MAD = b medi(xi –medj(xj))     (3.1) 
Where b is a constant; for instance setting b equal to 1.4826 makes the estimates of 
the mean and median consistent for a Gaussian distribution.  Rousseuw and Croux 
(1993) point out that the median absolute deviation has low relative efficiency 
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(37%); but, as measures of dispersion are not used directly for hypothesis testing in 
the empirical chapters of the thesis, this is not problematic. 
3.4.3 Correlation Tests 
The standard (Pearson) test of correlation between variables may also be severely 
influenced by a single outlier, as it depends on the squared deviations from 
estimated means.  Spearman’s (1910) correlation test provides a more robust 
approach, by ranking the data and then performing a Pearson correlation test on the 
ranks.  An alternative robust correlation test was proposed by Kendall (1938), as 
follows: 
 𝑟𝐾 =  
2
𝑛(𝑛−1)
 ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 ((𝑥𝑖𝑖<𝑗 −  𝑥𝑗 )(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗))    (3.2) 
Clearly both of these tests provide some robustness to outliers, but there is no 
generally agreed definition of “breakdown point” in the context of correlation tests.  
The relative efficiencies of both the Spearman and Kendall tests are greater than 70% 
for all possible correlation coefficients (Croux and Dehon (2010)).      
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3.5 Robust Regression Techniques 
The effect of different types of outliers on regression results was discussed in section 
3.3.3 above; and, as discussed by Zaman et al (2001), various different approaches 
have been developed to mitigate the impact of some, or all, of these different types 
of outliers.  Three such approaches are discussed in this section: median regression, 
M-estimators, and high-breakdown-point estimators.  
3.5.1 Median Regression 
Median regression is a simple alternative to OLS regression that provides some 
robustness to outliers because it is based on minimising absolute values rather than 
squared residuals.  The θth sample quantile in the location model is defined as any 
solution to the following minimization problem: 
min[∑ 𝜃𝑖:𝑦𝑖≥𝑏 │yi-b│ + ∑ (1 − 𝜃)│𝑦𝑖 − 𝑏│𝑖:𝑦𝑖<𝑏 ]  (3.3) 
Where b is the value to be estimated.  When θ = ½ this is, of course, equivalent to 
calculating the median.  Koenker and Bassett (1978, p.38) extended this idea by 
defining the θth regression quantile as any solution to the following minimization 
problem: 
min[∑ 𝜃𝑖:𝑦𝑖≥𝒙’𝒊𝜷 │yi-x’iβ│ + ∑ (1 − 𝜃)│𝑦𝑖 − 𝒙’𝒊𝜷│𝑖:𝑦𝑖<𝒙’𝒊𝜷 ] (3.4) 
Where x is a column of regressors and β is a column of coefficients to be estimated.   
The minimization problem (2) has to be solved by linear programming methods but 
the estimated regression quantiles are still consistent and asymptotically normal.  
Koenker and Bassett (1978) made the assumption that the conditional quantiles 
(Qθ(y│x)) were linear in x; but it turns out that the concept of the regression quantile 
is still useful even if this is not the case (see, for example, Angrist and Pischke (2009, 
p. 277)).  The regression quantiles so defined have many useful applications, as they 
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provide a much richer view of the relationship between the regressors and the 
dependent variable; including the ability to study the effect of regressors on both 
location and dispersion.  As Angrist and Pischke (2009, p. 269) put it “Applied 
economists increasingly want to know what is happening to an entire distribution, to 
the relative winners and losers, as well as to averages.”  However, in this thesis, only 
the median regression (or “least absolute-deviations regression”) is used as a robust 
alternative to OLS29.  Whilst the median regression is robust to vertical outliers and 
good leverage points, it does not protect against bad leverage points so has a low 
breakdown point if these are present in the data; as regards efficiency, median 
regression has a relative efficiency of 64% (Verardi and Croux (2009)). 
3.5.2 M-Estimators 
The median regression is actually part of a broader class of “M-estimators” (Huber 
(1964)) which are based on solving the following minimization problem: 
min [Σ ρ(yi – x’iβ) ]       (3.5) 
Where x is a column of regressors; β is a column of coefficients to be estimated; and 
the objective function, ρ, is left unspecified; for example if ρ(t) = t2 then the 
minimization problem is equivalent to OLS regression.  In order to achieve greater 
robustness than median regression, various different sub-linear objective functions 
can be used such as least absolute residual (LAR), Huber, bi-weight/bi-square and 
Bell.  The LAR and Huber estimators are both consistent and asymptotically normal; 
however, care needs to be taken with the use of bi-square and Bell objective 
functions if the distribution is not strongly unimodal (Berk (1990)).  As with the 
median regression, all four of these estimators are robust to vertical outliers and 
                                                          
29 The technique is also attractive as it avoids making assumptions about the parametric 
distribution of regression errors. 
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good leverage points but cannot protect against bad leverage points; so have a low 
breakdown point.   
M-estimators are calculated by an iterative process; wherein an initial regression is 
performed to estimate the coefficients and calculate the residuals, which are then 
used to calculate the weights for the first stage of an iteratively-reweighted least 
squares regression.  The Stata rreg function, used in the empirical chapters of this 
thesis, is based on an M-estimator which uses the Huber objective function to 
calculate an initial estimate, and the Tukey bi-weight function iteratively thereafter.  
However, the rreg function also provides some protection against bad leverage 
points by deleting (weighting zero) observations associated with a Cook’s Di greater 
than 1.  With the objective functions given above, and the specific tuning constants 
used, rreg has a relative efficiency of approximately 95% (Hamilton (1991)). 
3.5.3 High-Breakdown-Point Estimators 
More recently, regression techniques have been developed that are also robust to 
bad leverage points; these are generically known as high-breakdown-point 
estimators.  Rousseeuw and Yohai (1984) proposed a new type of estimator, the “S-
estimator”, based on computing a robust measure of dispersion, s.  The S-estimator 
is conducted by choosing the regression coefficients that minimise s, subject to the 
following constraint: 
1/n ∑ρ (ri/s) = K       (3.6) 
Where: ri are the residuals; ρ is a loss function which awards lower weight to large 
residuals; and K = E[ρ(Z)].  Setting K to this value ensures that s is a consistent 
estimator for σ, so long as the residuals are normally distributed.  Once again, 
numerical methods must be employed to conduct the minimization.  Using the Tukey 
bi-weight function as the loss function, a breakdown point of up to 50%, is 
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achievable but at the expense of only 28.7% relative efficiency: this rose to 75.9% for 
a 25% breakdown point and 96.6% for a 10% breakdown point (Rousseeuw and 
Yohai (1984, p.268)).  In order to address this shortcoming, Yohai (1987) 
subsequently proposed the “MM-estimator”; which consists of an initial S-estimate 
to give a high breakdown point, followed by iterated M-estimates providing high 
efficiency.  A user-defined MM-estimator, mmregress, is available in Stata; it uses the 
Tukey bi-weight function as the loss function (for both the S-estimator and the M-
estimator) to achieve a breakdown point of 50% with relative efficiency of 95% 
(Verardi and Croux (2009)).  
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3.6 Principal Component Analysis 
Although not used extensively in the economics literature, principal component 
analysis (PCA) is a widely-used technique, within various branches of both the 
natural sciences and social sciences, for transforming a set of correlated variables 
into a smaller set of (usually uncorrelated) variables.  PCA works by transforming the 
variables into a set of linear components: this is distinct from factor analysis which 
uses a mathematical model to estimate factors.  The components are usually 
constructed using the eigenvectors of the variance-covariance matrix for the 
variables; with the components associated with the greatest eigenvalues explaining 
the highest proportion of variance.  Whilst this sort of PCA has successfully been 
applied in many areas, the use of the variance-covariance matrix (based on squared 
residuals) makes the standard technique very prone to being skewed by outliers.  
This section begins by introducing a robust alternative to the standard variance-
covariance matrix; this is followed by a brief explanation of how to choose which 
components to retain; and the section concludes with some remarks about 
interpreting the results of a PCA.    
3.6.1 The Minimum Covariance  Determinant Method 
Rousseeuw (1984) developed the minimum covariance determinant (MCD) method 
as a way of constructing a robust variance-covariance matrix30.  The method involves 
constructing a variance-covariance matrix for each subset containing h31 
observations and then using the matrix which has the lowest determinant; thus the 
MCD method has a breakdown point of h/n.  Clearly though, this approach becomes 
impractical for large datasets as the number of subsets to be handled becomes 
                                                          
30 In addition to their use in PCA, robust variance-covariance matrices have a range of 
other applications, including the detection of outliers and calculating robust 
correlation coefficients.  
31 For example Rousseeuw and Van Driessen (1999) used h = 0.75n. 
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impossibly large.  Rousseeuw and Van Driessen (1999) therefore developed the 
FAST-MCD algorithm to approximate the MCD.  Rather than randomly calculating 
covariance matrices for all possible subsets containing h observations; the FAST-MCD 
method starts with a number (typically 500) of subsets containing only p+1 
observations (where p is the number of variables).  Based on the parameters 
estimated from each p+1 subset, Mahalanobis distances (Mahalanobis (1936)) are 
calculated for all observations and subsets containing the h observations with the 
lowest Mahalanobis distances constructed.  Variance-covariance matrices are 
computed from each h subset, and a small number (typically ten) of matrices with 
the lowest determinants are then iteratively “concentrated”, a process that is 
guaranteed to yield a matrix with an equal or lower determinant, until convergence 
is achieved.  The matrix with the overall lowest determinant is selected as the best 
approximation to the true MCD.  Having constructed the MCD matrix in this way; the 
eigenvalues and eigenvectors are then used to generate the principal components in 
exactly the same way as for a conventional PCA.   
3.6.2 Criteria for Deciding on how many Components to Retain 
The output from the PCA contains as many components as there were original 
variables but, typically, only a small proportion of these components need to be 
retained to explain most of the variation.  The PCAs conducted in this thesis are all 
exploratory PCAs: that is to say it is not known a priori how many components there 
should be or what they represent32; but a number of methods are available to decide 
how many of the components to retain.  The choice of the most appropriate method 
depends on both the nature of the data and the purpose of the PCA.  The Kaiser 
(1960) criterion simply consists of retaining all components with eigenvalues greater 
                                                          
32 The related technique of confirmatory PCA is used where there is a solid theoretical and/or 
empirical basis for predicting the components. 
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than 1: this approach has been shown to be generally quite accurate unless there are 
a large number of variables and low communality (Stevens (2002, p.389)).  For 
communalities less than 0.6 (Stevens (2002, p.390)), it is better to use the “scree 
test” (Cattell (1966)); which consists of plotting each eigenvalue against its ordinal 
number and retaining all components up to (but not including) the point of 
inflection.  Alternatively one may simply choose to retain as many components are 
required to explain a certain amount of the total variance (usually at least 70%).   
3.6.3 Interpretation of Components 
The goal of exploratory PCA is to identify and interpret a small number of 
components that explain the majority of the total variation.  However, typically, the 
retained components have many different variables loading onto them, making 
interpretation difficult: the components are therefore often rotated, using either an 
“orthogonal” or “oblique” rotation.  For example varimax rotation (Kaiser (1960)), an 
orthogonal technique, aims to load small numbers of variables highly onto each 
component to aid interpretation.  The choice of an orthogonal or oblique method in 
a particular setting depends on whether there is a theoretical basis for believing the 
components to be correlated or not.  Stevens (2002, p.394) recommends “only using 
loadings which are about .40 or greater for interpretation purposes”; but he also 
tabulates critical values for statistical significance of loadings on components. 
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3.7 Summary 
This chapter has introduced the data sources that are used throughout this study and 
highlighted some issues with the distributions of performance measures, and the risk 
measures derived from them, particularly with regard to the presence of outliers.  
Some of the problems that outliers present for conventional statistical techniques 
were then explained.  As discussed in Chapter One, the treatment of outliers is a 
particularly important issue in risk research, as firms that experience extreme 
performance convey very important risk information; however previous risk 
research, in so much as it has addressed the issue of outliers at all, has tended to 
simply discard (firms with) outlying observations.  A number of techniques that are 
robust to the effects of outliers were then discussed; these progressed from simple 
estimators of location and dispersion to multiple regression and, finally, principal 
component analysis.  It is important to note that the different robust techniques 
(particularly the robust regression techniques) mitigate the influence of outliers in 
fundamentally different ways, and have different theoretical efficiencies; so 
wherever possible in the empirical chapters which follow, a range of techniques 
(including non-robust techniques) are used and the results compared.  
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Chapter Four - Measuring Corporate Risk 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in detail in Chapter One, risk is a highly contested construct; different 
stakeholder groups experience different risks; and there are numerous definitions in 
use, both in the academic and practitioner literature.  In addition, risks are not 
directly observable so empirical work is necessarily based on the use of observable 
risk measures.  The combination of these factors has resulted in the use of a 
bewildering array of different variables being used as corporate risk measures in 
previous research, often with little or no explanation of what they purport to 
measure; “Indeed, the empirical literature in finance often makes little distinction 
between variables which are measures of risk and those which constitute 
determinants of risk” (Ben-Zion and Shalit (1975, p.1017)).  The objective of this 
chapter is to investigate the measurement properties of some of the most commonly 
used corporate risk measures; bearing in mind that these properties may vary as the 
environment changes.  The risk measures are explored by way of a principal 
component analysis (PCA) of nineteen risk measures, most of which have been used 
in previous empirical work; in order to identify the underlying, unobservable, 
dimensions of risk.  The analysis is repeated for six overlapping five-year time periods 
from 2003-07 to 2008-12: it is important to highlight that this timeframe includes the 
global financial crisis, beginning in 2007. 
As well as a need for better corporate risk measures for use in academic research, 
this investigation is also motivated by the needs of risk management practitioners.  
Driven by a number of high-profile corporate failures, there has been a significant 
move towards formalised, auditable processes for managing risk in recent years, as 
Power et al (2009, p. 304) put it “The period since 1995 has seen an explosion of 
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efforts to codify and formalize principles of risk management…organizations must 
apply rational standards of knowledge and frame what they do in these terms in 
order to maintain legitimacy”.  The validity of this assertion is demonstrated by the 
proliferation of guidance on corporate governance and internal control in recent 
years such as COSO (1992) and Turnbull (1999); and, more recently, formal standards 
for risk management such as ISO (2009).  Effective measures of corporate risk are a 
fundamental requirement of all of these approaches. 
The PCA results in a small number of components (three or four) being retained in 
each five-year period however, crucially, the component structure is not the same in 
each period.  This finding is at variance with a previous similar study (Miller and 
Bromiley (1990)), and suggests that the relationships between different risk 
measures are not fixed but are mediated by the environmental uncertainty at the 
time.  The outputs from the PCA represent another contribution, as they can be 
usefully applied as corporate risk measures; as indeed they are in subsequent 
chapters.  The chapter also contributes to the wider debate on the desirable 
properties of risk measures, proposing a number of additional considerations for 
choosing a corporate risk measure.  
The layout of the rest of this chapter is as follows.  Building on the discussions in 
Chapter Two concerning the risks to different stakeholder groups and the origins of 
corporate risk; this chapter begins with a detailed review of the literature of direct 
relevance, including: risk measures as mental models; desirable characteristics of risk 
measures; and previous empirical work in related areas.  The next section describes 
the data used in the PCA; this is followed by a section describing the methods of 
analysis and results.  The chapter concludes by looking in detail at the results of the 
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PCA, including a discussion of the way in which different risk measures are affected 
by environmental uncertainty.  
4.2  Risk Measures 
This section picks up directly from the discussions in Chapter Two covering the risks 
to different stakeholder groups and the origins of corporate risk.  The section begins 
by looking at how different mental models may be applied to convert observable risk 
measures into beliefs about future uncertainty; this is followed by a review of the 
desirable properties of corporate risk measures.  The second half of the section 
focuses on a review of previous empirical work, looking at the risk measures that 
have been used in a wide range of studies; and then focusing on two previous 
analyses of the relationships between risk measures.  This last sub-section concludes 
by making a number of observations about how these analyses of the relationships 
between risk measures can be improved upon, in order to develop more useful risk 
measures for both academic researchers and practitioners: this provides the 
motivation for the empirical work of this chapter.    
4.2.1 Risk Measures as Mental Models 
Risks are not directly observable so, necessarily, empirical work is based on the 
analysis of various observable risk measures.  Rather than being simple proxies, 
these measures are only meaningful in the context of specific mental models of risk; 
as Slovic (2000, p.xxxvi) puts it: “There is no such thing as real or objective risk.  Even 
the simplest, most straightforward risk assessments are based on theoretical models, 
whose structure is subjective and assumption-laden.”  Similarly, Beck (1992, p.58) 
argues that “Even in their highly mathematical or technical garb, statements on risk 
contain statements of the type that is how we want to live...”  For instance, many of 
the corporate risk measures used in previous empirical work are based on the 
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variability in some key aspect of firm performance, either accounting or market-
based, such as the standard deviation of ROA or the idiosyncratic volatility of the 
share price.  Indeed this approach had already become so standard that Bowman 
(1980, p.18) simply stated that “variance of profit is used here as a measure of risk.  
Research and professional practice accept this measure of risk.”  However, the use of 
such risk measures without any discussion of the mental model underlying them is 
meaningless, as these measures are ex-post estimates of the parameters of the 
firm’s performance distribution; whereas “risk is inherently an ex-ante concept” 
(Henkel (2009 p.288)).  Some sort of mental model is therefore required to convert 
these measures of historic variability into a (subjective) view of future states of the 
world.  Such models could be based solely on the structure of the historic variability 
(for example this could be formalised in a GARCH model); or be based on a 
combination of the historical firm-level data and explicit predictions of how various 
environmental factors will evolve in the future.   
Another category of corporate risk measures, or mental models, are based on 
observable firm characteristics, primarily financial ratios such as debt-to-equity or 
capital intensity: these are what Ben-Zion and Shalit (1975, p.1017) referred to as 
“determinants of risk.”  These measures can be interpreted in a number of different 
ways.  At one extreme there is a straightforward, mathematical relationship between 
measures such as debt-to-equity and the (frequentist) probability of financial distress 
from which one can model this particular risk33; but measures such as capital 
intensity and R&D intensity have a much less straightforward interpretation.  One 
can argue, for instance, that investment in capital equipment results in less flexibility 
to respond to fluctuations in demand, and that investment in R&D activity increases 
                                                          
33 Note that this is not in conflict with the previous discussion of risk as subjective: even if the 
probability of an event is essentially objectively known, individual stakeholders will still have 
different perspectives on the impact if the event occurs.   
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the uncertainty of outcomes; R&D intensity is also widely used as a proxy for the 
costs incurred by financial distress, which is another important component of the risk 
to both shareholders and lenders.  However, an alternative argument supports a 
relationship in the opposite direction “a company investing heavily in R&D may 
exhibit greater dynamic efficiency, or more flexibility than its competitors…” (Miller 
and Bromiley (1990, p.764)); recall also the discussion in Chapter Two about R&D 
activity creating real options.  In addition, the observed aggregate R&D intensity 
does not differentiate between higher-risk “explorative” activities and lower-risk 
“exploitative” activities (March (1991)).  All of the examples in this paragraph of firm 
characteristics (and many others) can also be interpreted as indicators of managerial 
propensity for risk taking from which stakeholders may draw conclusions about the 
future prospects of the firm.   
4.2.2 Desirable Properties of Corporate Risk Measures 
It was stressed in Chapter One that in any given situation there will always be a 
diversity of risk descriptions; however it was also emphasised that, if one is to 
proceed beyond a completely relativist approach, some means of arguing which 
particular risk descriptions (or risk measures) are of most use in any particular 
circumstances is required.  What properties should one look for in a risk measure?  
This question is of both theoretical and practical importance and has previously been 
investigated from the point of view of regulators (eg Artzner et al (1999)); investors 
(eg Szëgo (2002)); and insurers (eg Wang (1998)).  This section begins by 
summarising this prior work; before discussing the importance of one of the 
properties identified, subadditivity, in the context of this study.  The section 
concludes by proposing some additional desirable properties of corporate risk 
measures.  
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4.2.2.1 Desirable Properties of Risk Measures 
Taking the perspective of regulators, who are interested in the downside risks to the 
value of portfolios of securities; Artzner et al (1999) defined a risk measure ρ(X) as 
“the minimum extra cash the agent has to add to the risky position X, and invest 
‘prudently,’ that is in the reference instrument”. The authors then proceeded to 
define “coherent” risk measures as those which satisfy the four axioms of translation 
invariance, subadditivity, positive homogeneity and monotonicity; these axioms are 
defined respectively as follows: 
ρ (X + αr) = ρ(X) – α    
ρ (X + Y) ≤  ρ(X) + ρ(Y) 
ρ (λX) ≤  λρ(X) 
X ≤ Y => ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y) 
Where r is the reference instrument; and α and λ are real numbers (λ ≥ 0).  Applying 
these axioms, it is interesting to note that the widely-used measure value-at-risk is 
not coherent as it violates subadditivity.  The concept of the “coherence” of risk 
measures has subsequently been applied by other authors, including Szëgo (2002); 
who thereby aligns the perspectives of investors and regulators.   
As mentioned previously, the question of the desirable properties of risk measures 
has also been investigated from the point of view of insurers. The perspective of 
insurers is quite different to that of regulators and investors as it is principally 
concerned with the division of risks into different layers of cover.  In particular, Wang 
(1998) highlights the importance of preserving first and second stochastic dominance 
(standard deviation and variance do not preserve first stochastic dominance); he also 
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stresses the importance of additivity (as opposed to subadditivity) when risks are 
comonotonic.   
4.2.2.2 Subadditivity of Corporate Risk Measures 
Of all the criteria that are listed above the one that is most relevant in this study, 
indeed the only criterion that is directly relevant, is subadditivity.  Subadditivity of 
risks is central to both Markowitz’s (1952) work on “efficient combinations” of 
investments and Sharpe’s (1964) CAPM, which were introduced in section 2.4.1.1 to 
explain investors’ attitudes to risk.  At the same time, subadditivity of risks provides 
the justification for pooling risks across the firm (Merton (2005), Nocco and Stultz 
(2006)), which is the core tenet of enterprise risk management (ERM); this is 
discussed in more detail in section 6.2.1.1.  Subadditivity of risks is also relevant in 
the context of the merger of firms; as violation of subadditivity would imply that 
mergers, in themselves, create risks.  Importantly, this creates potential agency 
issues as managers may seek to reduce the risk (eg of loss of employment) to 
themselves by acquiring other companies even if this is not in the interests of 
shareholders (who can achieve diversification simply by buying shares in other 
companies).  Given the theoretical importance of the subadditivity of risks, from the 
perspectives of multiple stakeholder groups, satisfying this axiom must be a 
significant consideration in assessing the usefulness of any corporate risk measure. 
4.2.2.3 Other Desirable Properties of Corporate Risk Measures 
The desirable properties of risk measures discussed above are all binary: a risk 
measure either meets or does not meet each of them.  It may also be useful to 
consider some criteria that capture the relative usefulness of different corporate risk 
measures on a continuous scale.  For example, the risks to different stakeholder 
groups were discussed in some detail in Chapter Two; it is argued that the extent to 
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which a corporate risk measure captures the risk to the particular stakeholder group 
of interest is another desirable property.  This has, of course, already been captured 
implicitly in the articles mentioned in section 4.2.2.1 because these have only been 
looking at risk from the perspective of one particular stakeholder group (ie 
regulators, investors or insurers).  In addition, it is proposed to introduce two further 
desirable properties:  the degree to which a risk measure is forward-looking, and the 
resolution of a risk measure; these concepts are described in more detail below.   
Section 4.2.1 discussed the difficulty of measuring the ex-ante concept of risk with 
ex-post data: each observable risk measure occupies a point somewhere on a 
continuum between backward-looking and forward-looking, with forward-looking 
measures being more useful.  Variables derived from historical profitability figures 
represent the most backward-looking (and therefore least useful) risk measures; 
whereas those derived from market data are inherently more forward-looking 
because the future expectations of market participants are embedded in prices.  As 
Vassalou and Xing (2004, p.3) argue, in the specific context of default risk models, 
“There are several concerns about the use of accounting models in estimating the 
default risk of equities.  Accounting models use information derived from financial 
statements.  Such information is inherently backward-looking, since financial 
statements aim to report a firm’s past performance, rather than its future 
prospects.”  
The second proposed property is of a more practical nature.  Measures that are 
derived from accounting data can only be updated annually, indeed many of these 
(eg standard deviation of ROE/ROA) require several years of accounting data, so they 
can only be calculated over a period of years; they are therefore unable to capture 
changes in risks occurring on timescales shorter than this (by contrast, market data is 
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available almost continuously).  A risk measure with greater resolution will generally 
be more useful than one with less resolution.   
4.2.3 Corporate Risk Measures Use in Previous Research 
As discussed above, an extremely diverse range of corporate risk measures has been 
used in previous empirical work.  A selection of these, mainly drawn from studies of 
the relationship between firm-level risk and performance, are listed in table 4.1.   
Table 4.1 - Risk Measures Used in Previous Studies 
Risk Measure References 
Standard deviation of ROA 
Bettis (1982), Miller & Bromiley (1990), 
Miller & Leiblein (1996), Miller & Chen 
(2004), Alessandri & Khan (2006), 
Andersen et al (2007) 
Trend standard deviation of ROA Miller & Leiblein (1996) 
Variance of ROA Ruefli (1990) 
First-order root-lower-partial-moment of ROA Miller & Leiblein (1996) 
Second-order root-lower-partial-moment of ROA Miller & Leiblein (1996) 
Standard deviation of ROE 
Fiegenbaum & Thomas (1988), Miller & 
Bromiley (1990), Alessandri & Khan (2006) 
Variance of ROE Bowman (1980) 
‘True variance’ of ROE Marsh and Swanson (1984) 
'Corrected variance’ of ROE Henkel (2009) 
Debt-to-equity Miller & Bromiley (1990) 
Capital intensity 
Miller & Bromiley (1990), Alessandri & 
Khan (2006) 
R&D intensity 
Miller & Bromiley (1990), Alessandri & 
Khan (2006) 
'Altman's Z' Alessandri & Khan (2006) 
Beta 
Miller & Bromiley (1990), Alessandri & 
Khan (2006), Ang, Chen and Xing (2006) 
‘Downside beta’ Ang, Chen and Xing (2006) 
Unsystematic risk 
Miller & Bromiley (1990), Alessandri & 
Khan (2006) 
Value at Risk Bali et al (2009) 
Standard deviation of analysts' forecasts Miller & Bromiley (1990), Bromiley (1991) 
Coefficient of variation of analysts’ forecasts Miller & Bromiley (1990) 
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It should be noted that probability of default estimates (McNamara & Bromiley 
(1999)) are not included above as, following the discussion in section 4.2.1 above, 
they are not risk measures at all; rather they are the output from lending officers’ 
mental models, formalised or not, which are presumably based to some extent on a 
number of the risk measures in the table.   
The concept of subadditivity is not meaningful in the context of risk measures based 
on the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts (Miller & Bromiley (1990), Bromiley (1991)); 
but of the remaining risk measures listed above, none violates the axiom34.  Turning 
to look at the other desirable properties proposed above, the majority of the 
corporate risk measures used in previous empirical work can be plausibly associated 
with the risks to particular stakeholder groups.  Variability of profitability, as 
captured by the standard deviation of ROE and/or ROA, has previously been argued 
to be the risk measure of most relevance to firm managers: “Reductions in profits 
result in numerous, usually unpleasant, managerial actions, such as layoffs, 
reductions in capital investment, and increases in cost control.  In addition, stable, 
adequate profits facilitate implementation of corporate strategies. Alternatively, if 
managers are likely to be fired when profits fall rapidly, income stream stability 
should increase the stability of employment for a company's managers and other 
employees” (Miller and Bromiley (1990, p.763)).  Building on these arguments, Miller 
and Leiblein (1996) subsequently proposed the first and second-order partial 
moments of ROA as downside measures of risk in an attempt to better capture the 
risk to managers.  Financial ratios such as debt-to-equity and capital intensity are 
predictors of financial distress and thus more associated with the risk to lenders; 
                                                          
34 Artzner et al (1999, p.215-217) provide various examples of portfolios of 
derivatives where value at risk violates subadditivity; but the measure used by Bali et 
al (2009), based on the lowest monthly market return for a firm in a 60-month period 
is indeed subadditive if one combines two firms.  
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indeed Altman’s Z is specifically designed to predict the likelihood of financial 
distress.  Meanwhile, measures based on market data would appear to capture the 
risk to investors; and the sample listed above includes both symmetrical and 
asymmetrical versions of these, as well as measures based on analysts’ forecasts 
(Miller & Bromiley (1990), Bromiley (1991)).   
Clearly relevance to the stakeholder group of interest will be a critical factor in 
choosing a risk measure.  However, if we wish to choose between different risk 
measures relevant to a specific stakeholder group, the remaining desirable 
properties (the extent to which they are forward-looking and resolution) are of little 
use; as the measures relevant to each group tend to share many of the same 
characteristics (for instance, all the measures of risk to managers are derived from 
accounting data so share the same drawbacks of being backward-looking and having 
low resolution).   
In view of the significant difficulty of choosing between these using arguments based 
on the desirable characteristics of corporate risk measures, some researchers have 
taken a completely different approach and attempted to synthesise new measures 
which correspond to some underlying, unobservable, dimensions of risk using the 
techniques of factor analysis and principal component analysis.  Two of these 
previous analyses are discussed next.  
4.2.4 Previous Studies of the Measurement Properties of Corporate Risk Measures  
Two previous studies have investigated the measurement properties of corporate 
risk measures: Miller and Bromiley (1990) and Alessandri and Khan (2006).  Miller 
and Bromiley (1990) investigated nine measures of firm-level risk that had been 
widely used in strategic management research up to that point: standard deviation 
of ROA, standard deviation of ROE, standard deviation of analysts' forecasts, 
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coefficient of variation of analysts' forecasts, beta, unsystematic risk, debt-to-equity, 
capital intensity and R&D intensity.  The study purported to be an exploratory factor 
analysis but, in fact, the three factors (“income stream risk, stock returns risk and 
strategic risk” (p. 756)) were introduced, without any theoretical discussion, prior to 
the analysis actually taking place.  The study was based on a sample of “large”, 
publicly-listed US firms across all industry sectors.  Two five-year periods were 
studied (1978-82 and 1983-87), in order to test the stability of the relationships 
between risk measures, with data from 526 firms used in the first time period and 
data from 746 firms in the second (493 firms appeared in both time periods).  The 
authors provide no summary statistics and simply state that “the firms studied were 
generally large”, and that “these data included some extreme outlier values”; so it is 
impossible to say how significantly factors such as the skewness of distributions and 
presence of extreme values may have affected the results.   
A number of different methods of analysis were applied but these all produced 
similar results; so the authors only reported figures for the PCA, in which three 
components were retained because they had eigenvalues greater than 1.0 (Kaiser’s 
(1960) criteria).  Unfortunately it is impossible to judge if the decision to retain three 
components was appropriate, and not influenced by the previous exposition of three 
“factors”; as no details are reported on the eigenvalues of the other components, or 
the amount of variance explained by those factors that were retained.  The nine risk 
measures loaded onto the three components as predicted (all factor loadings were 
greater than 0.66 after varimax rotation); and tests of congruence (Harman (1976, 
p.344)) between the structures for 1978-82 and 1983-87 were greater than 0.98 for 
all three components, which led the authors to conclude that the component 
structure was indeed stable over the time period of the study.  
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Despite the emergence of a number of additional corporate risk measures in the 
intervening period, Alessandri and Khan (2006) used almost exactly the same set of 
risk measures as Miller and Bromiley (1990) and very similar terminology for their 
factors: “strategic risk”, “market risk” and “returns risk”.  The study is based on a 
factor analysis of data from 373 large (average number of employees is 111 000), 
publicly-traded US firms over the period 1998-2003.  Risk measures were also 
calculated at the industry level but, given that there were only 94 industries (at the 
4-digit SIC level), it is not clear whether factor analysis was reliable (no formal test 
statistics of sampling adequacy are reported).  There are also absolutely no 
descriptive statistics of the data so once again it is impossible to know if, for 
example, skewness may be affecting the results.  The authors give very little detail 
about the conduct of the factor analysis, indeed it is not even clear if it was actually a 
PCA.  Three factors were retained, which together explained 55.1% of the variance; 
but there is no explanation of how this decision was arrived at which, once again, 
raises the concern that the analysis was not truly exploratory.  The eight risk 
measures loaded onto the three factors as predicted by theory, with all factor 
loadings greater than 0.57; it is not clear if factor rotation was applied and, if so, 
what kind (although it is explicitly stated that the factors are orthogonal).   
Analysis of these two previous studies highlights a number of important ways in 
which improvements can be made, in order to identify more useful corporate risk 
measures for both academic researchers and practitioners; and this provides the 
motivation for the current study.  Firstly, a much richer range of risk measures will be 
considered than in prior work, including measures of variability in cashflow; 
measures that are robust to outliers; and specific measures of downside risk (as per 
Miller and Leiblein (1996)).  As regards the PCA, it will be conducted using a standard 
exploratory approach with absolutely no preconceptions about either the number, or 
107 
 
interpretation, of components.  In addition to a PCA based on the normal variance-
covariance matrix; a PCA based on the minimum covariance determinant (MCD) 
matrix (Rousseeuw (1984, 1985)) will be used to improve robustness to outliers.  
Most importantly, following the analysis, it is intended to explore in much more 
detail: the relevance of these components to different stakeholder groups; their 
usefulness as risk measures; what they tell us about the underlying relationships 
between commonly-used risk measures; and how these relationships are affected by 
changes in environmental uncertainty.     
  
108 
 
4.3 Data  
The analysis is based on a sample of listed UK firms over a ten-year period: 
accounting periods ending between 1st April 2003 and 31st March 2004 are denoted 
“2003”; through to accounting periods ending between 1st April 2012 and 31st March 
2013, which are denoted “2012”.  All of the risk measures listed in table 1 are 
included in the analysis unless otherwise stated.  Accounting data are taken from the 
FAME database (in certain instances where data were missing in FAME these were 
gathered from individual company annual reports) and market data from 
Datastream.  As discussed in the previous chapter, a number of steps were taken in 
the construction of the sample to reduce the number of erroneous extreme values.  
However, as discussed below, where distributions still contained extreme outliers 
these were examined in more detail to identify any errors: in two cases it became 
apparent from examining the data for individual firms that the extreme values were 
misleading, and the variables were constructed in a different way as a result.  
4.3.1 Construction of Corporate Risk Measures 
The standard deviation of ROA was calculated as the sample standard deviation of 
ROA (FAME field 138 – “Return on Total Assets”) over a five-year period.  Note that 
as ROA is included as a measure of operational efficiency, of primary relevance to the 
managers of firms; profit before tax is used as the numerator rather than the more 
usual profit after tax.    It is considered that there is no value in including variance of 
ROA in addition to the standard deviation; and there is no clear theoretical basis to 
justify the inclusion of a trend standard deviation of ROA.   Given the important 
issues highlighted by a number of authors (Marsh and Swanson (1984), Henkel 
(2009)) with the use of standard deviations based on very small samples of data 
drawn from left-skewed populations; the median absolute deviation (MAD) of ROA is 
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calculated as well to provide a measure of dispersion robust to outliers.  The first-
order root-lower-partial-moment (RLPM) of ROA is also calculated using the previous 
year’s ROA as the target (the second-order root-lower-partial-moment (RLPM) is not 
included as the two measures were found to be highly correlated (Miller and Leibein 
(1996)).  The RLPM of order α, measured over n35 periods, is defined as follows: 
RLPM = {1/n. Σδα}1/α      (4.1) 
Where δ is the shortfall (if any) from the target each year.   
A similar set of three measures (sample standard deviation, MAD and RLPM) is 
constructed for ROE; however there were a total of 380 firm-year observations in the 
sample (involving 143 firms) where book value of equity was negative, resulting in 
meaningless values of ROE.  Not only would the exclusion of these observations have 
significantly reduced the overall sample size; but these firms with negative book 
value of equity are clearly at particularly high risk of financial distress, and thus of 
great interest in this particular study.  This issue is simply not mentioned in any of 
the previous studies that have used the standard deviation of ROE (Fiegenbaum & 
Thomas (1988), Miller & Bromiley (1990), Alessandri & Khan (2006)) or variance of 
ROE (Bowman (1980)) as a risk measure; suggesting that a number of high risk firms 
may have been excluded from these analyses.  The ROE values used to construct 
these measures were therefore calculated by dividing profit before tax (FAME field 
14) by the market value of equity (Datastream field MV – “Market Value (Capital)”).  
The MAD of ROE is used as the robust measure of dispersion instead of ‘true’ (Marsh 
and Swanson (1984)) or ‘corrected’ (Henkel (2009)) variance of ROE (indeed 
‘corrected variance’ cannot be calculated for such short time periods because of the 
need to estimate higher moments).   
                                                          
35 α = 1; n = 5 for all periods except for 2003-07 where n=4. 
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Beta is calculated as the slope coefficient from the regression of 60 monthly stock 
returns (Datastream field P – “Price (Adjusted – Default)”) against the FTSE AIM All-
Share index (“FTAI”); whereas “downside beta” is calculated as the slope coefficient 
from the regression of these monthly stock returns against the FTSE AIM All-Share 
index only during months when the index return is negative.  Correlations between 
the returns of different assets could potentially vary with the state of the market so, 
in order to mitigate the influence of any extreme months, a “robust beta” is also 
calculated by conducting a median regression over the same period.  Unsystematic 
risk is calculated as the residual standard error from the regression of monthly stock 
returns against the FTSE AIM All-Share index.  Following Bali et al (2009) ‘value at 
risk’ is defined as the lowest monthly return during each five-year period36.  It is not 
practical to use Miller & Bromiley’s (1990) or Bromiley’s (1991) definition of standard 
deviation of analysts' forecasts, as the I/B/E/S database that they used only covers a 
limited number of listed UK firms.  An alternative measure of the dispersion in 
people’s expectations: share turnover ratio (Ben-Zion and Shalit (1975)) is therefore 
used.  This is calculated by dividing the annual sum of daily shares traded 
(Datastream field VO – “Volume”) by the number of shares outstanding at the end of 
each year (Datastream field NOSH – “Number of Shares”).   
Two separate debt-to-equity measures were used: debt-to-book-value-of-equity and 
debt-to-market-value-of-equity.  These were calculated as follows: short term loans 
and overdrafts (FAME field 52) plus long term liabilities (FAME field 85), divided by 
book value of equity (FAME field 93 – “Shareholders’ Funds”)37; and short term loans 
and overdrafts (FAME field 52) plus long term liabilities (FAME field 85), divided by 
the market capitalisation (Datastream field MV – “Market Value (Capital)”).  Both 
                                                          
36 This equates to the VAR for a holding period of one month at the 98.4 percentile. 
37 FAME field 113 - “Gearing” was not used as a debt-to-equity measure as there is an in-built 
cut-off. 
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ratios were calculated annually and then averaged over each five-year period.  As 
mentioned previously, a number of firms have negative values for book value of 
equity in some years, resulting in negative values for debt-to-book-value-of-equity: 
these negative values were omitted from the calculation of five-year averages.  Debt 
to book value of equity is, of course, a key component of Altman’s Z (Altman (1968)); 
one further component of Altman’s Z is also included as a risk measure: liquidity, 
calculated as current assets minus current liabilities38 (FAME field 67 – “Net Current 
Assets”), divided by total assets (FAME field 70).  Once again, this ratio was 
calculated annually and averaged over each five-year period. 
Capital intensity was initially calculated by dividing tangible assets not including land 
and buildings (FAME field 34 - “Plant and Vehicles”) by turnover (FAME field 1) for 
each year in the period.  Initially this ratio was calculated annually but, even when 
the resulting ratio was averaged over a five-year period, this led to a distribution 
with a skewness of over 20.   These extreme values of (average) capital intensity are 
driven by occasional huge changes in reported turnover (up to three orders of 
magnitude from year to year), principally in the oil and gas and mining industries; 
resulting in spuriously high values of capital intensity for individual years.  Capital 
intensity was therefore recalculated by taking the mean value of tangible assets over 
each five-year period and dividing by the mean value of turnover.  Many firms had 
missing data for tangible assets in individual years: these missing values were not 
included in the calculation of the averages.  However, where a firm had no data for 
any year, the value for capital intensity is set to zero.   
R&D intensity was initially calculated in the standard way by dividing R&D spending 
(FAME field 28 – “Research & Development”) in each year by turnover (FAME field 
                                                          
38 Negative values are included. 
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1); however, this also resulted in a distribution with a skewness of nearly 20.  Further 
analysis revealed that a small number of extremely high values were due to 
companies that appeared to be in the start-up phase; within this group of firms, 
turnover is very low (typically tens or hundreds of thousands of pounds) and R&D 
expenditure may be orders of magnitude higher.  Whilst these firms are inherently 
risky, and this should be captured in the risk measure; R&D as a proportion of 
turnover is an irrelevant measure in this context as the activity is actually funded by 
cash from equity investors.  R&D spending as a proportion of book value of equity 
(FAME field 93 – “Shareholders’ Funds”) is therefore used as an alternative; and this 
ratio was calculated annually.  As mentioned previously, a number of firms have 
negative values for book value of equity in some years, resulting in negative values of 
R&D intensity: these negative values were omitted from the calculation of five-year 
averages.  
Finally, two additional risk measures, which had not been used in any of the studies 
listed in section 4.2.3, were included.  Variability of cashflows is an important risk 
measure as it is both an indicator of the ability to service debt obligations and the 
ability to invest in value-creating opportunities when they become available (Minton 
and Schrand (1999)).  It has also been found to be a significant driver of the adoption 
of enterprise risk management (Pagach and Warr (2011)).  It was originally intended 
to use the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by mean) of cashflow 
as the measure of volatility (as per Minton and Schrand (1999)) but this led to very 
skewed distributions (skewness of greater than 50 in some cases).  An alternative 
measure was therefore constructed by dividing the standard deviation of cash flow 
(FAME field 103 – “Net (De)Increase in Cash and Equiv.”) for each five-year period by 
the average total assets (FAME field 70) over the five-year period.  The MAD of 
113 
 
cashflow divided by average total assets was also included to provide a robust 
measure of dispersion.  The risk measures used are summarised in table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2 – Summary of Corporate Risk Measures 
Risk Measure Definition 
SD of ROE 
Sample SD of return on market value of equity over each 
five-year period. 
SD of ROA Sample SD of ROA over each five-year period. 
MAD of ROE 
Mean absolute deviation of return on market value of 
equity over each five-year period. 
MAD of ROA 
Mean absolute deviation of ROA over each five-year 
period. 
RLPM of ROE Root lower partial moment of order 1 of ROE/ROA, over 
each five-year period, using the previous year’s value as 
the target. 
RLPM of ROA 
Beta 
Slope coefficient from OLS regression of 60 monthly stock 
returns on returns of FTSE AIM All-Share index. 
Downside Beta 
Slope coefficient from OLS regression of 60 monthly stock 
returns on returns of FTSE AIM All-Share index in months 
where index is negative. 
Robust Beta 
Slope coefficient from quantile regression of 60 monthly 
stock returns on returns of FTSE AIM All-Share index. 
Unsystematic Risk 
Residual standard error from the regression of 60 
monthly stock returns on the FTSE AIM All-Share index. 
Value at Risk Lowest monthly return over 60 months 
Share Turnover Ratio 
Volume of shares traded over a year / number of shares 
outstanding at the end of each year.  Ratio averaged over 
each five-year period. 
Debt to BVE 
(Short term loans and overdrafts + long term liabilities) / 
book value of equity at the end of each year.  Ratio 
averaged over each five-year period. 
Debt to MVE 
(Short term loans and overdrafts + long term liabilities) / 
market capitalisation at the end of each year.  Ratio 
averaged over each five-year period. 
Liquidity 
(Current assets - current liabilities) / total assets at the 
end of each year.  Ratio averaged over each five-year 
period. 
Capital Intensity 
Tangible assets (averaged over each five-year period) / 
average turnover for five-year period. 
R&D Intensity 
R&D expenditure / book value of equity at the end of 
each year.  
Ratio averaged over each five-year period. 
SD of Cashflow 
Sample SD of cashflow over five-year period / average 
total assets for five-year period. 
MAD of Cashflow 
Mean absolute deviation of cashflow over five-year 
period / average total assets for five-year period. 
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4.3.2 Data Availability  
In the period 2008-12, 282 firms were dropped from the overall sample of 1300 (see 
section 3.2) because they did not have accounting data going back as far as 2008, or 
because they had irregular accounting periods; and the necessary data on cash flow 
could not be found (either on the FAME database or through direct searches for 
company reports on the internet) for a further 12 firms.  A further two firms were 
excluded because it was not possible to calculate a value for the robust beta39; and 
the requirement for book value of equity to be positive at least once in the period 
excluded another ten firms: the sample size for 2008-12 was therefore 994 firms.  As 
shown in table 4.3, earlier periods had progressively smaller samples of firms: this is 
principally due to an increasing number of gaps in the FAME database.  
Table 4.3 – Sample Sizes by Time Period 
Period Sample Size 
2008-12 994 
2007-11 981 
2006-10 879 
2005-09 702 
2004-08 573 
2003-07 519 
   
Only about a quarter of the sample had any data on R&D spending over each five-
year period but this could largely be explained by the fact that R&D is not carried out 
in many industries so this is not necessarily a data quality issue.  Also, more than a 
quarter of firms had no data in any year for plant and equipment; once again this 
may well be an accurate reflection of reality and is not necessarily a data quality 
issue.      
  
                                                          
39 The linear programming methods used to calculate quantile regressions do not work if 
there are a high proportion of zeros in the dependent variable. 
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4.3.3 Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for the nineteen risk measures in the period 2008-12 are shown 
in table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4 – Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Risk Measures (2008-12) 
 N Mean Median Min Max SD MAD40 Skewness Kurtosis 
SD of ROE 994 0.389 0.123 0.00143 55.5 2.07 0.129 21.3 534 
SD of ROA 994 0.128 0.063 0.000462 4.03 0.268 0.0640 9.73 127 
MAD of ROE 994 0.0782 0.0278 0.000424 4.59 0.216 0.0304 12.9 233 
MAD of ROA 994 0.0411 0.0177 0.000270 1.94 0.0898 0.0195 12.1 224 
RLPM of ROE 994 0.194 0.0685 0 25.6 0.957 0.0723 21.1 530 
RLPM of ROA 994 0.0661 0.0340 0 1.89 0.123 0.0351 8.08 96.5 
Beta 994 0.682 0.605 -0.491 4.13 0.462 0.406 1.30 7.34 
Downside Beta 994 0.652 0.611 -2.97 2.64 0.480 0.434 0.180 6.73 
Robust Beta 994 0.561 0.526 -0.201 2.05 0.391 0.386 0.646 3.46 
Unsystematic Risk 994 0.128 0.105 0.0179 1.86 0.108 0.0598 8.20 119 
Value at Risk 994 0.319 0.296 0.0772 0.902 0.149 0.148 0.815 3.45 
Stock Turnover Ratio 994 0.447 0.272 0.0000937 8.64 0.542 0.285 5.12 60.4 
Debt to BVE 994 1.16 0.336 0 83.1 3.88 0.460 11.8 184 
Debt to MVE 994 0.923 0.275 -0.130 51.3 2.93 0.382 9.62 126 
Liquidity 994 0.130 0.100 -5.06 0.909 0.276 0.170 -6.54 129 
Capital Intensity 994 0.111 0.00628 0 8.40 0.465 0.00931 12.3 194 
R&D Intensity 994 0.0413 0 0 2.75 0.158 0 8.14 87.9 
SD of Cashflow 994 0.0813 0.0523 0.000353 0.834 0.0975 0.0440 3.36 18.4 
MAD of Cashflow 994 0.0421 0.0244 0.0000766 0.580 0.0578 0.0236 4.21 28.7 
 
                                                          
40 The constant b in the calculation of median absolute deviation is set to 1.4826 to ensure consistency between estimators for standard deviation and median absolute 
deviation (see Chapter 3). 
118 
 
It is clear from table 4.4 that the distribution of many of the risk measures departs 
significantly from the normal; in particular, all of the measures of variability in 
profitability (ROE and ROA) are very positively skewed and contain a number of 
extreme outliers.  The profit and loss data for a sample of firms with such extreme 
values were investigated in more detail and it was found that the variations in profit-
before-tax arose directly from variations in the cost of sales and administrative 
expenses, and not from any sort of exceptional items.  These extreme values would 
therefore appear to be capturing a real element of risk so it would be quite wrong to 
remove them.  There is a single noticeable outlier on the right hand side of the 
distribution for unsystematic risk: more detailed analysis of the evolution of the 
firm’s share price reveals nothing apart from the fact that it is extremely volatile.  
Despite the specific construction of the risk measure for capital intensity (described 
in section 4.3.1 above), the distribution still exhibits very high positive skewness.  
This is due to a number of very high values, mostly for firms in the extraction and 
energy sectors: once again these high values would appear to be a valid indicator of a 
certain type of risk inherent to those sectors.  In order to illustrate these departures 
from normality further, quantile plots of the standard deviation of ROE, debt to book 
value of equity and capital intensity are shown in figs. 4.1 to 4.3.  
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Fig. 4.1 – Quantile Plot of Standard Deviation of ROE 
 
Fig. 4.2 – Quantile Plot of Debt to Book Value of Equity 
 
Fig. 4.3 – Quantile Plot of Capital Intensity 
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To further illustrate the issue of extreme outliers, various percentiles of the 
distributions of the standard deviation of ROE, debt to book value of equity and 
capital intensity are shown in table 4.5; expressed in terms of median absolute 
deviations from the median.  The customary measure of standard deviations from 
the mean is not appropriate as neither of these estimators are themselves robust to 
outliers.  As discussed in detail in Chapter Three, the extreme outliers in these 
distributions have the potential to significantly influence the estimations of variance 
and covariance that are central to the conduct of a standard PCA. 
Table 4.5 – Quantiles of Standard Deviation of ROE, Debt to Book Value of Equity and 
Capital Intensity (Expressed in Median Absolute Deviations from the Median) 
 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 95% 96% 97% 98% 99% 
SD of 
ROE 
-0.889 -0.865 -0.847 -0.824 -0.816 7.65 8.97 11.2 15.0 36.6 
Debt to 
BVE 
-0.730 -0.730 -0.730 -0.730 -0.730 7.20 8.60 11.5 16.9 34.5 
Capital 
Intensity 
-0.675 -0.675 -0.675 -0.675 -0.675 47.2 59.4 70.6 99.0 208 
 
Pair-wise correlation coefficients for the nineteen corporate risk measures in the 
period 2007-11 are shown in table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6 – Pearson Correlation of Corporate Risk Measures (2007-11) 
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SD of ROE 1                   
SD of ROA 0.24 1                  
MAD of ROE 0.31 0.25 1                 
MAD of ROA 0.14 0.61 0.30 1                
RLPM of ROE 1 0.25 0.35 0.15 1               
RLPM of ROA 0.24 0.96 0.27 0.61 0.26 1              
Beta 0.21 0.05 0.19 0.02 0.22 0.03 1             
Downside Beta 0.21 0.05 0.15 0.04 0.21 0.03 0.66 1            
Robust Beta 0.17 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.17 0.06 0.79 0.62 1           
Unsystematic Risk 0.16 0.29 0.21 0.15 0.17 0.32 0.40 0.13 0.20 1          
Value at Risk 0.33 0.23 0.35 0.15 0.34 0.23 0.53 0.44 0.41 0.54 1         
Stock Turnover 
Ratio 
0.07 0.14 0.04 0.40 0.09 0.20 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.07 1        
Debt to BVE 0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.00 0.04 0.10 1       
Debt to MVE 0.36 -0.06 0.20 -0.07 0.37 -0.06 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.06 0.21 0.08 0.40 1      
Liquidity -0.06 -0.31 -0.08 -0.38 -0.06 -0.27 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.13 -0.13 1     
Capital Intensity -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.018 -0.00 0.00 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.09 1    
R&D Intensity 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.10 0.08 -0.02 0.15 -0.05 0.07 -0.00 1   
SD of Cashflow 0.04 0.35 0.09 0.38 0.04 0.36 0.08 0.05 -0.00 0.35 0.25 0.14 -0.08 -0.13 0.22 0.15 0.26 1  
MAD of Cashflow 0.03 0.26 0.06 0.27 0.03 0.27 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.28 0.22 0.01 -0.08 -0.12 0.24 0.09 0.29 0.74 1 
1. Table 4.6 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between each pair of variables over the period 2007-11.   
2. For this sample size significance levels are as follows: │r│ > 0.063, p < .05; │r│ >   0.082, p < 0.01; │r│ >   0.10, p < 0.001. 
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It is clear from table 4.6 that there are a number of clusters of corporate risk 
measures that are highly correlated with each other, for example different measures 
of variability in ROE; and different measures of volatility in share prices.  These 
clusters may arise because the measures in each cluster relate to the same 
underlying dimension of risk; but it is also possible that these clusters simply arise 
from a shared relationship between the risk measures in a cluster and some other 
characteristic of the firm (eg size).  In order to investigate the latter explanation, that 
there is a trivial explanation for the clusters observed amongst the Pearson 
correlation coefficients in table 4.6, a set of nineteen seemingly-unrelated 
regressions were estimated as follows: 
 yi = Xiβ + εi       (4.2) 
Where y is a column consisting of the nineteen corporate risk measures; X is a matrix 
of regressors with the same three variables in each row; and ε is a column of error 
terms that are assumed to have zero mean and to be independent across firms but, 
for a given firm, may be correlated across equations.  If the error terms are not 
correlated, it would indicate that the correlations observed in table 4.6 can be 
explained by a common association with one or more of the three regressors.  The 
three regressors used are as follows: the natural log of turnover (FAME Field 1) is 
used as a measure of firm size; market power of each firm is proxied by its market 
share, which is calculated as the proportion of turnover (FAME field 1) within the 
relevant industry sector41; and the Herfindahl Index is used as a measure of 
concentration within each industry sector40.  The pair-wise correlation coefficients 
for the error terms for each risk measure are shown in table 4.7, using data from the 
period 2007-11. 
                                                          
41 Based on the 21 sections in the 2007 SIC, and using the largest 12000 firms in the FAME 
database as at November 2013. 
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Table 4.7 – Correlation of Errors in Seemingly-Unrelated Regression (2007-11) 
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SD of ROE 1                   
SD of ROA 0.24 1                  
MAD of ROE 0.31 0.21 1                 
MAD of ROA 0.14 0.57 0.26 1                
RLPM of ROE 1 0.25 0.35 0.15 1               
RLPM of ROA 0.24 0.96 0.23 0.58 0.26 1              
Beta 0.22 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.23 0.03 1             
Downside Beta 0.21 0.06 0.18 0.07 0.22 0.05 0.63 1            
Robust Beta 0.18 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.19 0.13 0.77 0.59 1           
Unsystematic Risk 0.16 0.24 0.19 0.10 0.17 0.27 0.40 0.12 0.23 1          
Value at Risk 0.33 0.20 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.21 0.51 0.42 0.40 0.52 1         
Stock Turnover 
Ratio 
0.08 0.18 0.06 0.45 0.09 0.25 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.07 1        
Debt to BVE 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.04 0.07 0.07 1       
Debt to MVE 0.38 0.02 0.25 -0.01 0.39 0.02 0.19 0.16 0.08 0.11 0.25 0.06 0.37 1      
Liquidity -0.07 -0.36 -0.10 -0.43 -0.07 -0.32 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.11 -0.11 1     
Capital Intensity -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.08 1    
R&D Intensity 0.01 0.07 -0.00 0.16 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.09 -0.01 0.16 -0.04 0.08 -0.01 1   
SD of Cashflow 0.03 0.25 0.03 0.31 0.03 0.25 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.30 0.22 0.20 0.00 -0.05 0.21 0.11 0.26 1  
MAD of Cashflow 0.02 0.16 0.00 0.20 0.02 0.17 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.22 0.19 0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.23 0.06 0.29 0.70 1 
1. Table 4.7 reports the Pearson correlation of the error terms (ε) between each pair of dependent variables in the estimation of equation (2) using seemingly unrelated regression.   
2. For this sample size significance levels are as follows: │r│ > 0.063, p < .05; │r│ >   0.082, p < 0.01; │r│ >   0.10, p < 0.001. 
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Significant correlation between errors within the previously-observed clusters can 
still be seen, indicating that the clusters cannot be explained by a trivial association 
of these corporate risk measures with firm size, market power or industry 
concentration.  This gives some confidence that the clusters arise because a number 
of different measures relate to the same underlying dimensions of risk.     
Because of the very high (positive) skewness and kurtosis of a number of variables, a 
non-parametric (Spearman) correlation analysis was also performed.  The pair-wise 
correlation results for the nineteen risk measures, using data from 2007-11, are 
presented in table 4.8; and can be seen to be very similar to the results of the 
Pearson correlation in table 4.6.  
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Table 4.8 – Spearman Correlation of Corporate Risk Measures (2007-11) 
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SD of ROE 1                   
SD of ROA 0.72 1                  
MAD of ROE 0.76 0.56 1                 
MAD of ROA 0.52 0.76 0.62 1                
RLPM of ROE 0.96 0.70 0.73 0.51 1               
RLPM of ROA 0.69 0.90 0.53 0.67 0.75 1              
Beta 0.32 0.15 0.25 0.17 0.31 0.13 1.             
Downside Beta 0.21 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.21 0.10 0.71 1            
Robust Beta 0.20 0.08 0.15 0.11 0.21 0.08 0.84 0.63 1           
Unsystematic Risk 0.34 0.22 0.33 0.27 0.29 0.14 0.50 0.29 0.32 1          
Value at Risk 0.44 0.26 0.38 0.27 0.41 0.23 0.59 0.45 0.43 0.81 1         
Stock Turnover 
Ratio 
-0.15 -0.16 -0.09 -0.05 -0.14 -0.14 0.27 0.19 0.39 0.05 0.09 1        
Debt to BVE -0.06 -0.34 -0.00 -0.23 -0.08 -0.33 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.33 1       
Debt to MVE 0.16 -0.29 0.20 -0.21 0.13 -0.25 0.24 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.87 1      
Liquidity -0.14 0.04 -0.11 0.09 -0.14 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.19 0.08 -0.11 -0.34 -0.35 1     
Capital Intensity -0.19 -0.28 -0.10 -0.17 -0.19 -0.28 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.25 0.18 0.21 0.37 0.34 0.10 1    
R&D Intensity -0.18 -0.05 -0.11 0.01 -0.19 -0.11 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.09 0.08 0.05 -0.05 0.23 0.28 1   
SD of Cashflow 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.33 0.10 0.26 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.37 0.26 -0.17 -0.29 -0.33 0.44 0.01 0.17 1  
MAD of Cashflow 0.07 0.28 0.07 0.29 0.06 0.22 0.01 -0.02 -0.07 0.31 0.23 -0.16 -0.28 -0.32 0.38 0.00 0.17 0.82 1 
 
1. Table 4.8 reports the Spearman correlation coefficients between each pair of variables over the period 2007-11.   
2. For this sample size significance levels are as follows: │r│ > 0.063, p < .05; │r│ >   0.082, p < 0.01; │r│ >   0.10, p < 0.001. 
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4.4 Principal Component Analysis – Method and Results 
4.4.1 Determination of Component Structure 
An exploratory principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted on the 19 
corporate risk measures listed in table 4.2 for each five-year period in the dataset.  
As described in Chapter Three, PCA is based on calculating the eigenvectors of the 
variance-covariance matrix which can be strongly influenced by outliers; and it was 
previously noted (see section 4.3.3) that many of the risk measures had extreme 
outliers.  The PCA was therefore conducted using Winsorized samples from the 2008-
12 time period, where observations with the highest and lowest x% of values of 
standard deviation of ROE, debt to book value of equity and capital intensity were 
excluded.  The loadings for the two components with the highest eigenvalues are 
shown in table 4.9 for the three different samples: it is clear from the table that, as 
suspected, the results are very strongly affected by extreme values.   
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Table 4.9 – Component Structures from PCA with Winsorized Samples (2008-12) 
 Component 1 Component 2 
 Full 
Sample 
Winsorized 
(1%) 
Winsorized 
(2.5%) 
Full 
Sample 
Winsorized 
(1%) 
Winsorized 
(2.5%) 
SD of ROE 0.23 0.33 0.32 0.40 -0.04 -0.02 
SD of ROA 0.28 0.31 0.28 -0.24 -0.29 -0.31 
MAD of ROE 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.01 -0.01 
MAD of ROA 0.27 0.27 0.26 -0.24 -0.26 -0.28 
RLPM of ROE 0.23 0.33 0.32 0.40 -0.02 -0.01 
RLPM of ROA 0.28 0.32 0.29 -0.24 -0.30 -0.32 
Beta 0.32 0.27 0.29 0.03 0.37 0.32 
Downside 
Beta 
0.23 0.16 0.22 0.07 0.34 0.32 
Robust Beta 0.24 0.19 0.22 0.06 0.38 0.34 
Unsystematic 
Risk 
0.31 0.27 0.27 -0.07 0.10 0.06 
Value at Risk 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.01 0.19 0.16 
Stock 
Turnover 
0.11 0.08 0.07 0.15 0.28 0.23 
Debt to BVE 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.23 0.25 
Debt to MVE 0.17 0.09 0.12 0.44 0.28 0.30 
Liquidity -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 -0.06 0.04 0.07 
Capital 
Intensity 
0.09 0.05 0.05 -0.02 0.07 0.16 
R&D Intensity 0.12 0.12 0.12 -0.15 -0.14 -0.16 
SD of 
Cashflow 
0.25 0.22 0.22 -0.31 -0.21 -0.24 
MAD of 
Cashflow 
0.22 0.19 0.17 -0.30 -0.20 -0.23 
       
Communality 0.58 0.59 0.59    
KMO 0.66 0.69 0.70    
1. Table 4.9 reports the results of principal component analyses in Stata using the pca function. 
2. The communality is calculated using the Stata estat smc post-estimation routine and 
averaging over the 19 variables. 
3. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was calculated using the Stata 
estat kmo post-estimation routine.  Low values indicate that the variables have too little in 
common to warrant a PCA; results can be interpreted as follows (Kaiser (1974)): 
0 – 0.49  Unsatisfactory 
0.50 – 0.59 Middling  
0.60 – 0.69 Mediocre 
0.70 – 0.79 Middling 
0.80 – 0.89 Meritorious 
0.90 – 1.00 Marvellous 
4. Component loadings with an absolute value greater than or equal to 0.16 are significant at 
p=.01 (Stevens (2002, p.394)). 
5. Component loadings with an absolute value greater than or equal to 0.30 are shown in bold. 
6. All results are given to two decimal places. 
128 
 
Given the sensitivity of the PCA results to outliers, and the underlying desire not to 
simply discard extreme observations; an alternative method of PCA, based on the 
transformation of a robust covariance matrix was therefore employed (see Chapter 
Three for a detailed discussion of this technique).  Hereinafter, any reference to 
“PCA” relates specifically to this robust technique.  PCAs were conducted for each of 
the six time periods: the number of components with eigenvalues > 1 (Kaiser’s (1960) 
criterion for retaining components) is shown in table 4.10.  An alternative criterion 
for determining how many components to retain, the scree test (Cattell (1966)), was 
also applied and the results are also shown in the table.  
Table 4.10 – Component Structures from Robust PCA 
Period 
Number of 
Components with 
Eigenvalues > 1 
Percentage 
Variation 
Explained 
Number of 
Components to 
be Retained 
(Scree Test) 
Percentage 
Variation 
Explained 
2008-12 6 75% 4 64% 
2007-11 5 72% 3 59% 
2006-10 5 73% 3 60% 
2005-09 5 73% 3 60% 
2004-08 5 73% 3 59% 
2003-07 5 67% 4 61% 
 
1. Table 4.10 reports the results of principal component analyses in Stata using the user-written 
function mcd (Verardi and Croux (2009))), followed by the standard function pcamat. 
2. The size of the sub-samples is 0.75n and 1014 sub-samples were used.  
3. All results are given to two decimal places. 
 
By way of illustration of the different component structures, the scree plots for 2008-
12 and 2007-11 time periods are shown in figs. 4.4 and 4.5 respectively for 
comparison.  In 2008-12 a point of inflection can clearly be seen at the fifth point 
from the left, so four components are retained; in 2007-11 it occurs at the fourth 
point from the left so only three components are retained. 
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Fig. 4.4 – Scree Plot 2008-12 
 
Fig. 4.5 – Scree Plot 2007-11 
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Given the relatively low communalities reported in table 4.9, the scree test is the 
preferred criterion for determining how many components to retain (Stevens (2002, 
p.390)); as can be seen from table 4.10, this always results in a smaller number of 
components being retained. 
4.4.2 Rotation of Components 
A varimax rotation was then performed with each set of retained components; the 
results are presented in tables 4.11 and 4.12.  Contrary to the findings of Miller and 
Bromiley (1990), the component structures for periods 2003-07 and 2008-12 are 
very different to the intervening periods, and to each other.   
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Table 4.11 – Component Loadings after Varimax Rotation (2003-07 and 2008-12) 
 Components (2003-07) Components (2008-12) 
 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
SD of ROE 0.44 0.11 0.04 -0.01 0.47 -0.01 0.15 -0.07 
SD of ROA 0.39 -0.11 -0.02 0.05 0.49 0.02 -0.06 0.05 
MAD of ROE 0.40 0.06 0.05 -0.04 0.10 -0.12 0.55 -0.04 
MAD of ROA 0.36 -0.07 0.04 -0.00 0.07 -0.05 0.43 0.16 
RLPM of ROE 0.43 0.10 -0.02 -0.03 0.48 0.00 0.14 -0.07 
RLPM of ROA 0.39 -0.10 -0.07 0.03 0.47 0.04 -0.09 0.05 
Beta -0.01 -0.05 0.14 0.58 0.02 0.53 -0.00 0.01 
Downside Beta 0.04 -0.02 -0.15 0.38 0.03 0.49 -0.04 -0.01 
Robust Beta -0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.58 0.02 0.52 -0.07 -0.02 
Unsystematic 
Risk 
-0.00 0.16 0.52 0.16 -0.10 0.20 0.39 0.11 
Value at Risk 0.03 0.14 0.52 0.16 -0.01 0.29 0.30 0.08 
Stock Turnover -0.07 0.29 -0.05 0.14 -0.11 0.24 -0.01 -0.17 
Debt to BVE -0.02 0.52 0.04 -0.06 -0.15 -0.02 0.23 -0.40 
Debt to MVE 0.07 0.57 0.06 -0.10 -0.09 -0.02 0.32 -0.40 
Liquidity -0.07 -0.11 0.23 0.02 -0.11 0.04 0.03 0.37 
Capital 
Intensity 
-0.08 0.28 0.04 -0.06 -0.11 0.04 0.14 -0.08 
R&D Intensity -0.03 0.14 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.03 
SD of Cashflow -0.01 -0.23 0.41 -0.22 -0.06 -0.02 0.15 0.49 
MAD of 
Cashflow 
-0.00 -0.23 0.41 -0.20 -0.06 -0.03 0.12 0.46 
 
1. Table 4.11 reports the results of principal component analyses in Stata using the user-written 
function mcd (Verardi and Croux (2009))), followed by the standard function pcamat with 
varimax rotation of four components. 
2. The size of the sub-samples is 0.75n and 1014 sub-samples were used.   
3. Component loadings with an absolute value greater than or equal to 0.23 (2003-07) and 0.16 
(2008-12) are significant at p=.01 (Stevens (2002, p.394)). 
4. Component loadings with an absolute value greater than or equal to 0.3 are shown in bold. 
5. All results are given to two decimal places. 
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Table 4.12 – Component Loadings after Varimax Rotation (2004-08, 2005-09, 2006-10 and 2007-11) 
 Components (2004-08) Components (2005-09) Components (2006-10) Components (2007-11) 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
SD of ROE 0.39 0.08 -0.07 0.39 0.07 -0.04 0.39 0.09 -0.04 0.39 0.07 -0.06 
SD of ROA 0.42 0.01 0.01 0.40 -0.01 0.00 0.41 -0.01 0.00 0.42 -0.02 0.02 
MAD of ROE 0.35 0.01 -0.02 0.35 0.01 -0.02 0.35 0.03 -0.04 0.35 0.04 -0.02 
MAD of ROA 0.35 0.02 0.09 0.35 -0.01 0.02 0.37 0.02 0.03 0.36 0.00 0.06 
RLPM of ROE 0.41 0.02 -0.05 0.39 0.06 -0.04 0.40 0.05 -0.05 0.40 0.05 -0.06 
RLPM of ROA 0.41 -0.01 0.01 0.40 -0.01 0.01 0.41 -0.04 -0.01 0.42 -0.03 0.00 
Beta 0.03 0.50 -0.01 0.05 0.49 -0.03 0.05 0.47 -0.02 0.05 0.48 -0.03 
Downside Beta 0.05 0.47 -0.07 0.06 0.44 -0.06 0.07 0.41 -0.03 0.06 0.40 -0.02 
Robust Beta 0.02 0.45 -0.05 0.05 0.44 -0.11 0.05 0.43 -0.07 0.05 0.43 -0.06 
Unsystematic Risk -0.11 0.28 0.21 -0.12 0.37 0.19 -0.09 0.37 0.20 -0.10 0.38 0.19 
Value at Risk -0.04 0.42 0.15 -0.05 0.43 0.17 -0.02 0.41 0.16 -0.02 0.43 0.14 
Stock Turnover -0.06 0.17 -0.24 -0.10 0.11 -0.27 -0.10 0.19 -0.23 -0.07 0.15 -0.21 
Debt to BVE -0.16 0.03 -0.33 -0.17 0.04 -0.34 -0.17 0.10 -0.32 -0.14 0.12 -0.34 
Debt to MVE -0.09 0.13 -0.35 -0.12 0.14 -0.32 -0.12 0.18 -0.28 -0.08 0.19 -0.32 
Liquidity -0.09 0.06 0.33 -0.09 0.05 0.35 -0.08 0.05 0.40 -0.10 0.03 0.38 
Capital Intensity -0.16 0.08 -0.11 -0.14 0.08 -0.11 -0.13 0.13 -0.13 -0.14 0.13 -0.12 
R&D Intensity -0.09 0.07 0.02 -0.11 -0.00 0.02 -0.08 0.05 -0.08 -0.07 0.04 -0.03 
SD of Cashflow -0.04 0.03 0.51 -0.04 0.03 0.50 -0.02 0.05 0.52 -0.02 0.07 0.51 
MAD of Cashflow -0.03 0.01 0.49 -0.04 0.02 0.49 -0.04 0.03 0.49 -0.02 0.06 0.50 
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1. Table 4.12 reports the results of principal component analyses in Stata using the user-written 
function mcd (Verardi and Croux (2009))), followed by the standard function pcamat with 
varimax rotation of three components. 
2. The size of the sub-samples is 0.75n and 1014 sub-samples were used.   
3. Component loadings with an absolute value greater than or equal to 0.21 (2004-08), 0.19 
(2005-09), 0.17 (2006-10) and 0.16 (2007-11) are significant at p=.01 (Stevens (2002, p.394)). 
4. Component loadings with an absolute value greater than or equal to 0.3 are shown in bold. 
5. All results are given to two decimal places. 
An oblimax oblique rotation was also performed: the results were almost identical, 
as shown in table 4.13 for the period 2008-12.  As oblique rotation introduces further 
issues concerning the validity and interpretation of the results of the PCA, it is not 
pursued further. 
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Table 4.13 – Comparison of Component Loadings after Varimax and Oblimax 
Rotation (2008-12) 
 Varimax Components Oblimax Components 
 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
SD of ROE 0.47 -0.01 0.15 -0.07 0.47 -0.00 0.15 -0.07 
SD of ROA 0.49 0.02 -0.06 0.05 0.48 0.02 -0.06 0.05 
MAD of ROE 0.10 -0.12 0.55 -0.04 0.10 -0.11 0.55 -0.04 
MAD of ROA 0.07 -0.05 0.43 0.16 0.07 -0.04 0.43 0.16 
RLPM of ROE 0.48 0.00 0.14 -0.07 0.48 0.01 0.14 -0.07 
RLPM of ROA 0.47 0.04 -0.09 0.05 0.47 0.04 -0.09 0.05 
Beta 0.02 0.53 -0.00 0.01 0.02 0.53 0.02 -0.00 
Downside Beta 0.03 0.49 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.49 -0.03 -0.02 
Robust Beta 0.02 0.52 -0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.52 -0.05 -0.02 
Unsystematic 
Risk 
-0.10 0.20 0.39 0.11 -0.09 0.20 0.40 0.11 
Value at Risk -0.01 0.29 0.30 0.08 -0.01 0.30 0.31 0.08 
Stock Turnover -0.11 0.24 -0.01 -0.17 -0.11 0.24 -0.00 -0.17 
Debt to BVE -0.15 -0.02 0.23 -0.40 -0.14 -0.01 0.22 -0.40 
Debt to MVE -0.09 -0.02 0.32 -0.40 -0.08 -0.01 0.31 -0.40 
Liquidity -0.11 0.04 0.03 0.37 -0.11 0.03 0.04 0.37 
Capital 
Intensity 
-0.11 0.04 0.14 -0.08 -0.11 0.04 0.14 -0.08 
R&D Intensity -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.03 
SD of Cashflow -0.06 -0.02 0.15 0.49 -0.06 -0.03 0.17 0.49 
MAD of 
Cashflow 
-0.06 -0.03 0.12 0.46 -0.06 -0.03 0.13 0.46 
 
1. Table 4.13 reports the results of principal component analyses in Stata using the user-written 
function mcd (Verardi and Croux (2009))), followed by the standard function pcamat with 
varimax/oblimax rotation of four components.   
2. The size of the sub-samples is 0.75n and 1014 sub-samples were used.   
3. Component loadings with an absolute value greater than or equal to 0.16 (2008-12) are 
significant at p=.01 (Stevens (2002, p.394)). 
4. Component loadings with an absolute value greater than or equal to 0.3 are shown in bold.   
5. All results are given to two decimal places. 
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4.5 Discussion 
Recalling the original motivation for this chapter, that better corporate risk measures 
are needed for both academic research and practical risk management; the robust 
principal component analysis identified a compact set of components in each time 
period which account for the majority of the variation (at least 59% in each case).  
Consistent with both Miller and Bromiley (1990) and Alessandri and Khan (2006), in 
the period 2003-07 there are components based upon variability in profitability and 
variability in share price.  Consistent with Miller and Bromiley (1990) there is also a 
component that captures leverage/liquidity42.  In addition, in this period, there is a 
fourth component based on variability in cashflow; which was simply not considered 
in the previous analyses.  The analysis also made the striking finding that, contrary to 
Miller and Bromiley’s (1990) results, the component structure changes markedly 
over time: from 2004-08 to 2007-11 only three components are retained and their 
composition is different to the components in 2003-07.  It is argued that this change 
in component structure is a result of a step-change in the levels of environmental 
uncertainty which occurred with the onset of the financial crisis.  In the period 2008-
12 four components are retained once again, but their composition is different to the 
components in any previous period.  This section begins by interpreting the 
individual components in each time period; this is followed by an assessment of the 
usefulness of these components as corporate risk measures; and the section 
concludes with a discussion of how changing levels of environmental uncertainty 
impacts on individual risk measures and on the overall component structure.      
  
                                                          
42 Alessandri and Khan (2006) used only a single variable leverage/liquidity measure, 
“bankruptcy risk”, which loads onto their “returns risk” component. 
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4.5.1 Component Structures 
The component structures for the four time periods with three components (2004-
08, 2005-09, 2006-10 and 2007-11) are all very similar to each other.  Component 1 
can be characterised as “profit risk”, as all the measures of variability in profitability 
(including the specific robust and downside measures) load onto this component; it 
is similar to Miller and Bromiley’s (1990, p.763) “income stream risk” construct and 
Alessandri and Khan’s (2006, p.1107) “returns risk” construct.  All the measures of 
share-price variability load onto component 2, so it can be characterised as “market 
risk” (as per Miller and Bromiley (1990) and Alessandri and Khan (2006)); as with 
component 1, explicitly robust and downside risk measures load onto this factor.  
Component 3 can best be characterised as “cashflow risk” as it has high factor 
loadings for both measures of volatility in cashflows; but, surprisingly, this 
component also has significant negative loadings for both measures of debt to equity 
and positive loading for liquidity.  It is argued that this is an example of reverse 
causality, in that firms with high volatility of cashflows choose not to, or are unable 
to, borrow heavily; and also have to maintain higher levels of liquidity.   
The component structure for the two time periods with four components (2003-07 
and 2008-12) are different to each other, so will be discussed individually.  The 
component structure for the time period 2008-12 is broadly similar to those time 
periods with three components.  Component 1 can still be characterised as “profit 
risk”, however the robust measures of variability in profit ratios do not load onto this 
component but appear instead in component 3, along with unsystematic risk and 
value at risk.  Component 2 can best be characterised as “systematic market risk”; 
and component 4 is essentially the same as the “cashflow risk” defined previously, 
with significant negative loadings for both measures of debt to equity and a positive 
loading for liquidity.  Component 3 is labelled “robust profit risk”, but its precise 
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interpretation is somewhat unclear.  The component structure for 2003-07 is quite 
different to that for all other time periods.  Component 1 is the same as the “profit 
risk” construct observed in those time periods with three components; whilst 
component 4 is similar to the “systematic market risk” observed in the period 2008-
12.  Component 2 is unique to this time period and can be characterised as “distress 
risk” with high loadings for both measures of debt to equity (and a small negative 
loading for liquidity).  This component corresponds very roughly to Miller and 
Bromiley’s (1990) “strategic risk” construct, which had high loadings for debt-to-
equity, capital intensity and R&D intensity (negative loading); although component 2 
has a positive loading for R&D intensity.  Component 3 can again be characterised as 
“cashflow risk”; but it is very different from the equivalent constructs observed in 
other time periods, with lower loadings for the cashflow variables and very high 
loadings for unsystematic market risk and value at risk. The interpretation of the 
different risk components in each time period is summarised in table 4.14.   
Table 4.14 – Interpretation of Varimax Rotated Components 
 
2003-07 2004-08 2005-09 2006-10 2007-11 2008-12 
Component 1 Profit Risk Profit Risk Profit Risk Profit Risk Profit Risk Profit Risk 
Component 2 
Distress 
Risk 
Market 
Risk 
Market 
Risk 
Market 
Risk 
Market 
Risk 
Systematic 
Market 
Risk 
Component 3 
Cashflow 
Risk 
Cashflow 
Risk 
Cashflow 
Risk 
Cashflow 
Risk 
Cashflow 
Risk 
Robust 
Profit Risk 
Component 4 
Systematic 
Market 
Risk 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Cashflow 
Risk 
 
Whilst most of the nineteen corporate risk measures used in the PCA load onto one 
or other of the components discussed above, it is important to note that two of the 
proposed risk measures do not have a high loading onto any components in any time 
period: R&D intensity and stock turnover.  Notwithstanding the possible issue of 
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poor data quality for R&D intensity, the failure to load onto any component would 
suggest that it is fundamentally not a particularly useful risk measure: as highlighted 
previously, competing theories see R&D as either a source of risk (March (1991)) or 
as a means of mitigating risk (Miller and Bromiley (1990)).  Stock turnover was 
specifically included as an ex-ante measure of risk, but it does not have a high 
loading onto any component in any time period either: this contrasts with the results 
of Miller and Bromiley’s (1990) analysis, where the variation in analysts’ forecasts 
loaded onto their “income stream risk” factor.  As with R&D intensity, this would 
suggest that stock turnover is not a useful measure of risk.  It is also interesting to 
note that the inclusion of specific robust and downside measures of risk added little 
to the analysis as (with the exception of the median absolute deviation of ROE and 
ROA in 2008-12) they always loaded onto the same component as the equivalent 
measure based on standard deviation.   
4.5.2 Applying the Components as Corporate Risk Measures  
As stated above, the PCA identified a small number of components in each time 
period which can account for the majority of the variation (at least 59%).  In each 
time period there is a component relating to each of the following dimensions of risk: 
variability in profitability; variation in share price and variability of cashflows.  In 
addition, in the time period 2003-07, there is a component capturing leverage and 
liquidity, which relates to the probability of financial distress.  The principal 
component analysis has the added advantage of ensuring that these components are 
orthogonal to each other, so they are potentially very useful to both researchers and 
practitioners as a set of risk measures.  It is important to reiterate though that the 
relationships between risk measures are not static (this is discussed in more detail in 
section 4.5.3), so a component is only of use as a risk measure during the specific 
time period over which it was constructed.  In order to gauge their usefulness as 
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corporate risk measures, the components are discussed below in the context of the 
desirable properties for risk measures introduced in section 4.2.2. 
It follows from the mapping of the components to specific dimensions of risk that all 
the components relate quite naturally to specific stakeholder groups, which was 
previously argued to be a desirable property for a risk measure.  Miller and Bromiley 
(1990, p.763) argued that variation in profitability is “generally believed to be the 
measure of risk most relevant to general managements”; market risk is clearly of 
interest to investors; cashflow risk is likely to be of interest to both managers (as 
cash is needed to exploit value-creating opportunities) and lenders (as cash is 
required to service debt); and distress risk captures the risk perspective of lenders.  It 
was also argued that it is desirable for risk measures to be forward-looking.  In 
essence, the components occupy the same position on the forward-
looking/backward-looking continuum as the individual risk measures that load most 
heavily onto them; so profit risk and cashflow risk are more rearward-looking than 
market risk.   
The principal drawback of the use of components, rather than individual risk 
measures, is the loss of resolution; as the resolution of every component is limited by 
the lowest resolution risk measure in the study.  This presents a particular problem 
with the market risk component, as measures of market risk generally have very high 
resolution.  However, if a higher resolution measure of risk from an investor 
perspective is required, the individual risk measure with the highest loading (in this 
case beta) can be used instead of the component.  Finally, composed as they are of 
linear combinations of risk measures which are (with one exception) subadditive, 
these components will essentially satisfy the criteria of subadditivity.   
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4.5.3 The Effect of Environmental Uncertainty  
Whilst the results for 2008-12 can potentially be seen as a perturbation to the 
general pattern, there was clearly a fundamental change in the component structure 
from 2003-07 to 2004-08; with the market risk component now having the second 
largest eigenvalue and the distress risk component becoming buried amongst the 
other components that are not retained.  This is very different to the results of Miller 
and Bromiley (1990); who found near identical component structures for the periods 
1978-82 and 1983-8743 (the coefficients of congruence were greater than 0.98 for all 
three factors).  It is argued that the explanation for this difference lies in a very sharp 
increase in environmental uncertainty that occurred with the onset of a worldwide 
recession in 2007: much previous work finds such increases in uncertainty, 
howsoever measured, during recessions (see Bloom (2014) for a detailed review).   
Three explanations are suggested for the observed increase in uncertainty (Bloom 
(2014)): lower trading activity reduces the flow of information about firms and hence 
increases uncertainty; forecasting is harder during recessions because people have 
less experience of such conditions; and there is greater likelihood of political 
experimentation in the economy with uncertain outcomes.  All three of these 
explanations are clearly pertinent to the financial crisis beginning in 2007, especially 
the issue of political experimentation.  By way of comparison, the period 1978-87 
studied by Miller and Bromiley (1990) contained four “stock-market volatility shocks” 
(Bloom (2009)): OPEC II; Afghanistan and the Iran hostages; the US monetary cycle 
turning point; and ‘Black Monday’.  However, none of these led to either the same 
level of political experimentation or such a reduction in trade activity as the financial 
crisis of 2007; this lack of a major discontinuity in environmental uncertainty could 
                                                          
43 As well as being almost identical to each other, Miller and Bromiley’s (1990) component 
structures were also similar to the structure observed in this study in the period 2003-07. 
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well explain why the authors found no changes in the relationships between risk 
measures from the first half to the second half of the period of their study.  
Table 4.15 shows two standard measures of environmental uncertainty (Bloom 
(2014)) from 1983-2012: the standard deviation in UK quarterly GDP growth; and the 
standard deviation of the FTSE All-Share Index (“FTAS”) 44.  The median standard 
deviations of ROE and ROA for the firms in the study for each time period are also 
included as alternative measures of environmental uncertainty. 
Table 4.15 – Measures of Environmental Uncertainty 
Period 
SD of Quarterly 
GDP Growth 
SD of FTSE 
Monthly Returns 
Median SD of 
ROE 
Median SD of 
ROA 
2008-12 0.84% 4.9% 12.3% 6.3% 
2007-11 0.95% 5.0% 12.4% 6.9% 
2006-10 0.96% 4.8% 12.5% 7.2% 
2005-09 1.01% 4.5% 12.3% 6.5% 
2004-08 0.93% 3.8% 13.8% 6.4% 
2003-07 0.42% 2.8% 7.9% 5.5% 
1983-2002 0.60% 4.8%   
 
As predicted, the financial crisis beginning in late 2007 appears to have resulted in a 
marked increase in environmental uncertainty, regardless of the specific measure 
used.  This step-change will have impacted differentially on each corporate risk 
measure; and the individual effects on some specific risk measures are discussed in 
detail in the next paragraph.  Equally importantly though, the step-change also 
appears to have altered the relationships between the different risk measures.  This 
can be illustrated by plotting beta against the standard deviation of cashflows in the 
periods 2003-07 and 2004-08 respectively in figs. 4.6 and 4.7. 
  
                                                          
44 The FTSE AIM All-Share index could not be used here as data are only available from 2000 
onwards. 
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Fig. 4.6 – Beta vs Standard Deviation of Cashflows (COVCASH) in the Period 2003-07 
 
Fig. 4.7 – Beta vs Standard Deviation of Cashflows (COVCASH) in the Period 2004-08 
 
 
A positive association between beta and the standard deviation of cashflows can be 
discerned in 2003-07 (fig. 4.6), but not in 2004-08 (fig. 4.7); this change in the 
relationship between the risk measures can also be seen from the Spearman 
correlation coefficient, which falls from 0.07 (p=0.10) to 0.04 (p=0.39).  It is argued 
that this change arises because the rearward-looking measure of the standard 
deviation of cashflow is still based on pre-crisis data; but the forward-looking beta 
has already factored in the very changed environment.  A similar argument would 
apply to all relationships between rearward-looking and forward-looking risk 
measures in the presence of such a major discontinuity.  In these conditions, 
forward-looking risk measures become much more useful, as evidenced by the 
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sudden increase in the proportion of variance explained by the market risk 
component from 11.8% in 2003-07 to 17.8% in 2004-08.       
As regards the effect of environmental uncertainty on individual corporate risk 
measures, the analysis suggested that the measures of unsystematic market risk, 
leverage and liquidity all cease to be effective measures of risk in conditions of high 
environmental uncertainty; these measures are discussed in turn below.  The various 
measures of systematic market risk are highly correlated with each other in all time 
periods; initially (2003-07) they are not correlated with measures of unsystematic 
market risk, but between 2004-08 and 2007-11 they are.  This strongly suggests that 
the measures for systematic and unsystematic risk are differentially impacted by the 
increase in environmental uncertainty that occurs between 2003-07 and 2004-08.  
Judging by the positive correlation of unsystematic risk measures with standard 
deviation of cashflows in 2003-07, it would appear that in this period these measures 
are actually measuring something about the idiosyncratic risk to the firm’s 
stakeholders.  However, after the increase in environmental uncertainty from 2004-
08, it appears that they are just capturing the heteroscedasticity in the regression of 
individual firms returns on the market return and really have no value as risk 
measures.  As environmental uncertainty begins to fall in the period 2008-12, the link 
between systematic and unsystematic market risk measures breaks down again and 
the measures of unsystematic risk form a new component, together with the robust 
measures of variability in profitability: as in the period 2003-07, it would appear that 
these measures are providing some real information about the risk to the firm’s 
stakeholders.  Turning to consider the measures of leverage and liquidity, in 2003-07 
these measures loaded onto a distress risk component; but, from 2004-08 onwards, 
the distress risk component disappears and these measures load onto the cashflow 
risk component.  Moreover, the loading on cashflow risk was in the opposite 
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direction than expected (ie leverage has a negative loading and liquidity is positive).  
As discussed previously it would appear that, in an environment of very high 
uncertainty, leverage and liquidity are not actually acting as corporate risk measures; 
rather firms with higher variability in cashflow are unwilling or unable to borrow 
heavily and have to maintain liquidity.   
4.5.4 Limitations and Directions for Further Research 
The main limitation of this analysis is that, because of the requirement for market 
data, the sample only includes publicly-listed firms: it is therefore not possible to 
generalise the findings to other firms.  In particular, it is not possible to say anything 
about the risks to the stakeholders in smaller firms.  It would be perfectly possible to 
conduct a PCA using only the twelve risk measures that are based on accounting 
data; which would allow for a much larger, and more diverse, sample comprising 
both listed and unlisted firms.  However, as discussed in the next chapter, the 
components derived from this process would be incomplete in that they would not 
be capturing the risk to the owners of the firm, a key stakeholder group.  This 
prompts another interesting research question: how does one construct risk 
measures relevant to owners of firms that are not quoted; particularly in closely-held 
firms, where the dividend policy may be determined by unobservable personal 
preferences of the owners?   
The extent to which the results can be generalised is also limited by the unusual, and 
rapidly changing, environmental conditions during the course of the study.  It would 
therefore be very useful to continue the study longitudinally and observe how the 
relationships between corporate risk measures continue to change as 
macroeconomic conditions evolve (potentially returning towards historic norms).  In 
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particular this might help in interpreting the, as yet unexplained, component 
structure for the period 2008-12.   
Historically, the main motivation behind the measurement of risk at the firm level in 
academic research has been to study the relationship between risk and performance, 
and it would be very interesting to see how the corporate risk measures derived in 
this chapter can be applied to this question: this is the topic of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five - The Relationship between Corporate Risk 
and Performance 
5.1 Introduction 
Ever since Bowman’s (1980) finding that, contrary to the predictions of the Capital 
Assets Pricing Model (Sharpe (1964)), accounting-based measures of risk and 
performance at the firm level were negatively related; there has been significant 
interest in analysing such risk-return relationships and numerous empirical studies 
have been published.  However these studies, using a number of different methods 
and data from different periods of time; have produced divergent and often 
contradictory results.  Whilst many of the methodological flaws in earlier studies 
have now been addressed, progress has continued to be limited by “confusion over 
the meaning and measurement of risk” (Palmer and Wiseman (1999, p.1037)); 
misspecification of regression models; and the failure to deal appropriately with the 
presence of extreme outliers in the distributions of many risk measures.  This study 
seeks to address the first of these limitations by using a novel set of risk measures at 
the firm level; critically these measures include a “cashflow risk” component that has 
not been used in previous studies.  Misspecification in the regression analysis is 
eliminated by including a number of control variables and by the removal of firm 
fixed effects45; and the failure of previous studies to adequately consider how to deal 
with outliers is addressed by using a range of different robust techniques.   
This chapter takes two complementary approaches to investigating the relationship 
between corporate risk and performance: simple, univariate tests to directly address 
Bowman’s (1980) “paradox”; and regression analysis to gain a deeper understanding 
of the relationship between the multiple dimensions of corporate risk and firm 
                                                          
45 However, as discussed in Chapter One, this has the effect of removing the firms’ risk 
management capability; this issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven. 
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performance.  The analysis uses risk measures constructed over five overlapping five-
year time-periods from 2003-07 to 2007-11: it is important to highlight that this 
timeframe includes the global financial crisis, beginning in 2007/08.  The main 
contribution of this chapter is the finding that the relationship between risk and 
return, measured with both accounting and market-based measures, is contingent 
on environmental conditions.  In particular, in the environment of stability and 
growth that existed immediately prior to the onset of the financial crisis, there was a 
significant positive relationship between the standard deviation of ROA and 
subsequent ROA; contrary to the findings of Bowman (1980) and many subsequent 
studies.    
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows.  The next section reviews the existing 
literature on the relationship between risk and performance at the firm level, with a 
particular focus on previous empirical work; this is followed in section 5.3 by a brief 
explanation of the specific hypotheses to be tested.  Section 5.4 describes, in detail, 
the data used in all the subsequent analysis.  The method and results of both 
univariate tests and cross-sectional regression analyses are then presented 
sequentially in section 5.5, and the chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
findings.      
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5.2 Risk and Return 
Chapter Two rehearsed various, sometimes contradictory, arguments about how risk 
and performance (both measured in a variety of ways) are related: this section 
begins by summarising the key points.  The discussion is then extended to consider 
how the relationship between risk and future performance may be mediated by past 
performance; and the persistence of profits literature is briefly introduced.  The 
section continues with a detailed review of the previous empirical studies that are 
most relevant to the approach adopted in this chapter; and concludes by 
summarising how it is intended to improve upon prior work in the current study.  
5.2.1 The Relationship Between Corporate Risk and Performance 
Arguments based on risk aversion have been applied to predict relationships 
between both market risk and return, and accounting risk and return.  In the context 
of market risk and return, the CAPM model of Sharpe (1964) predicted a very simple 
positive relationship between systemic risk (beta) and expected return; however, 
subsequent empirical work (eg Fama and French (1992)) led to the model being 
modified to include additional idiosyncratic terms.  More fundamentally, Pettengill et 
al (1995) noted that when realised (as opposed to expected) returns are used, the 
relationship becomes conditional on the overall performance of the market; with a 
positive relationship between beta and returns when market excess returns are 
positive and a negative relationship between beta and returns when market excess 
returns are negative.  Similar risk aversion arguments predict that higher expected 
accounting returns are required to invest in projects where outcomes are uncertain, 
leading to a positive relationship between profit risk and profitability at the firm 
level; but this completely omits to consider the quality of managerial decision 
making (Andersen et al (2007)) and other firm-specific capabilities.  It is also 
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important to consider the direct costs of increased profit risk, such as increased tax 
charges, increased cost of debt and underinvestment (Smith and Stultz (1985), 
Shapiro and Titman (1986), Lessard (1990) and Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993)).  
Cashflow risk is not believed to be such a salient factor in decision making but is still 
accompanied by direct costs. 
5.2.2 The Mediating Effect of Prior Performance on the Relationship Between Risk and 
Performance 
There are a number of reasons to believe that the relationship between risk and 
future performance may be contingent upon current performance, arguments 
include: the behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and March (1992)); agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling (1976)); and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979).  
These three theories are briefly discussed in turn below, followed by a summary of 
the empirical evidence.    
Cyert and March (1992) argue that the managers of poorly performing firms may be 
driven to take on additional risk, without the appropriate compensating increase in 
expected return, as a result of “problemistic search” for solutions to their poor 
performance.  Sustained poor performance may also influence risk-taking indirectly 
through the depletion of “slack resources”: a lack of sufficient “slack resources” to 
absorb exogenous shocks to the firm tending to make managers more risk-seeking.  
These predictions receive some support from March and Shapira’s (1987 p.1409) 
study of managerial perspectives on risk; which find that managers “…believe that 
fewer risks should, and would, be taken when things are going well.  They expect 
riskier choices to be made when an organization is failing.”  However, the surveys 
analysed by March and Shapira (1987 p.1410) also found that “Over 90% of the 
executives interviewed by Shapira said they would not take risks where a failure 
could jeopardize the survival of the firm”; so as managers in firms close to 
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bankruptcy will tend to be very risk averse.  Conversely to this survival hypothesis, 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling (1976)) makes the specific prediction that the 
managers of firms in danger of bankruptcy will tend to be risk-seeking as the 
shareholders, whose interests they should represent, have little left to lose (and 
potentially much to gain).   
Theories of behavioural decision making at the individual level have fundamentally 
challenged the use of expected utility theory.  In particular Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979, p.263) developed “an alternative theory of choice…in which value is assigned 
to gains and losses rather than final assets…the value function is normally concave 
for gains, commonly convex for losses, and is generally steeper for losses than for 
gains.”   In the context of this discussion, the crucial point in their alternative 
“Prospect Theory” of choice is that, in the domain of losses, people are generally 
risk-seeking; hence people’s decisions are very much dependent on whether they 
frame a given outcome as a gain or a loss.  Building on this, Thaler and Johnson 
(1990, p.657) proceeded to look in detail at how past gains or losses affected 
subsequent decisions and identified a “break-even effect” in which people who had 
suffered a loss found a gamble that offered the chance of recovering to their 
previous state particularly attractive.  However, they also cautioned that “Perhaps 
the most important conclusion to be reached from this research is that making 
generalizations about risk-taking preferences is difficult” (p. 660).  Directly applying 
such theories to the managers of firms, suggests once again that the relationship 
between risk and performance is contingent on whether the firm is a high or low 
performer relevant to a reference point; as managers of low performing firms would 
tend to be more risk-seeking, particularly if they are presented with an opportunity 
to break even.  However, such an extension of a theory of individual decision making 
to the firm level has not been rigorously justified; and there are particular problems 
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with defining appropriate performance reference points in order to test these 
theories empirically. 
Cyert and March’s (1992) argument received some early empirical support from 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988), who found a negative association between risk and 
performance for firms whose performance fell below the median, and a positive 
relationship for high-performers46; and Bromiley (1991), who found that poor 
performance tends to drive increased risk-taking.  However, more recent and specific 
tests have produced varying results.  Miller and Chen (2004) conducted a direct test 
of March and Shapira’s (1987) predictions by studying firms in three groups: firms 
close to bankruptcy; firms that were not at high risk of bankruptcy but were 
performing below aspirations; and firms performing above aspirations.  Contrary to 
March and Shapira’s (1987) prediction of a focus on survival for firms close to 
bankruptcy, and consistent with agency theory, it was found that risk (measured as 
the standard deviation of ROA) decreased as performance improved within this 
group.  It was also found that risk decreased as performance improved for firms 
performing above aspirations, contrary to their predictions.  In summary, the 
empirical evidence appears to support a generally negative relationship between the 
performance of firms and risk-seeking behaviour by managers, which mediates the 
relationship between risk and performance; but this general trend may not apply to 
the highest and lowest-performing firms.   
Before proceeding to review some previous empirical tests of the relationship 
between risk and performance at the firm-level; it is necessary to briefly consider the 
theoretical predictions and empirical evidence for persistence of profits, and this is 
the topic of the next paragraph.  
                                                          
46 However, see section 5.2.4 for a critique of Fiegenbaum and Thomas’s (1988) methodology. 
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5.2.3 Persistence of Profits 
The majority of studies of the relationship between risk and performance at the firm 
level use some measure of profitability, usually ROE and ROA, as the dependent 
variable (see table 1 below).  In view of this, it is important to briefly review the 
literature on the persistence of profits; starting with the two quite distinct 
explanations for why a firm may enjoy sustained high or low profitability.  At the 
industry level, structural issues such as exit and entry barriers may enable the firms 
within that sector to maintain persistently high or low profitability (Porter (1980)).  
However, inter-firm heterogeneity in resources and capabilities may also result in 
individual firms within an industry consistently out-performing or under-performing 
their peer group: this is the focus of the RBV, which was discussed in detail in 
Chapter Two.  Furthermore, “market power” (Porter (1981)), chance events and 
“cumulative advantage” (Denrell et al (2013)) may all lead to sustained superior 
performance, even in the absence of any competitive advantage.   
A number of early studies focused on the performance differences between different 
sectors and, in particular, found a significant correlation between industry 
concentration and average performance over subsequent years: Brozen (1970) 
provides a detailed review of these studies.  Mueller (1977) departed from this 
approach, being possibly the first study to explore persistence at the firm-level47.  His 
method was quite similar to the earlier studies though, in that he grouped firms 
based on their profitability in the first year of the study and then followed their 
performance over the next 23 years.  The results lent support to the persistence of 
profits within sectors: he found that the estimated long-term profitability of firms 
that started in the group with highest profitability was 46% above the mean; 
                                                          
47 Although there had been specific studies of the relationship between firm size and 
performance such as Hall and Weiss (1967). 
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whereas that of firms which started in the lowest group was 24% below the mean.  
Hawawini et al (2003), using a random-effects ANOVA method, explicitly examined 
whether performance is driven more by industry or firm-specific effects and 
concluded that, whilst the performance of a small number of outliers within each 
sector is driven by firm-specific effects; when these firms are removed, the principal 
variation is between industry sectors.  More recent work has generally been based 
on the use of auto-regressive models for profitability as a function of time, typically 
an AR(1) model of the form: 
πit =αi +λiπit−1 +εit       (5.1) 
Where: πit is the profit rate of firm i at time t; αi and λi are firm-specific parameters 
to be estimated and μit is an error term with constant variance and mean zero.  This 
body of work has lent further support to the existence of the phenomenon, and 
provided more detailed insights into the drivers of persistence.  For instance 
McMillan and Wohar (2011) found that 89% of their sample of UK firms had positive 
estimates for λi in equation (5.1); and that 26% had estimates between 0.5 and 1.  
They also found that the estimates for λi were greater for high-performing firms than 
low-performing firms.  Similarly, Gschwandtner and Cuaresma (2013) found a highly 
significant average λi of 0.667 for their sample of 151 US firms; they also found that 
industry concentration had a significant positive effect on persistence, but that firms’ 
market share had a negative impact.  It is important to note that both of these 
studies used ROA as the measure of profitability; but it is possible that similar effects 
may be observed if ROE is used48.  The way in which some different empirical studies 
of the relationship between risk and performance have attempted to compensate for 
the persistence of profits is discussed in the next section.  
                                                          
48 McMillan and Wohar (2011, p.517) state that “(return on equity was also consider[ed] with 
similar results)”; but they do not specify if the denominator was book value of equity or 
market value of equity.  
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5.2.4 Empirical Work on the Relationship Between Risk and Return at the Firm Level 
Bowman’s (1980) original study took an entirely non-parametric, contingency-table, 
approach, based on dividing firms into high (above median) and low groups based on 
their average ROE and variance in ROE over the same five-year period.  The analysis 
was initially conducted at the firm-level for each of nine industry sectors: eight 
industries showed a negative association (although not necessarily significant) 
between performance and risk.  The analysis was then repeated with 85 industry 
sectors using data over a nine-year period: a negative relationship was found in 56 
industries.  The analysis was repeated again using firm-level data from all industry 
sectors, and using averaged firm-level data for each of the 85 industry sectors; but 
no relationships were observed.  Bowman’s (1980) method was severely criticised by 
Marsh and Swanson (1984, p.37); beginning with “even If his contingency table tests 
were correctly specified, we could, at most, conclude that if firm A’s mean ROE is 
above the median for companies in its industry, then it is slightly more likely that its 
ROE variance will be below the industry median.  Hence...his results are not 
‘parametric’ enough to lend much support to decision makers.”   The authors then 
proceeded to explain why the tests are not correctly specified, most importantly they 
highlight that the negative skewness of the distribution of profitability49 leads to an 
inherent negative correlation between the estimated mean and variance; 
Shanmugam (2007, p.409) derives the following formula:  
Corr [X¯ , S2] = (│Sk/(Ku – 1 + 2/(n-1))│)½, n ≥ 2   (5.2) 
where Sk is the sample skewness and Ku the kurtosis.  More recently, Henkel (2009) 
quantified this spurious negative correlation between the estimated mean and 
                                                          
49 There is a realistic upper bound on the profit that a firm can generate but no corresponding 
lower bound.  
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variance, finding that it accounts for much of the observed correlation in these early 
studies.   
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988), once again using variance of ROE as their measure 
of risk, used a very similar approach to Bowman (1980) with two improvements: 
Spearman correlation tests were conducted as well as contingency-table tests in 
order to provide more ‘parametric’ results; and tests were conducted separately on 
high and low-performing firms.  The authors found a negative association between 
risk and performance at both firm and industry-level for poor performers; but a 
positive relationship for high performers.  Whilst this result is very interesting, the 
authors failed to address the critical methodological problems identified by Marsh 
and Swanson (1984) so their results cannot be considered reliable.  Shortly 
afterwards their whole approach, and that of Bowman (1980), was undermined 
when Ruefli (1990) pointed out that, because mean and variance are both functions 
of the same variable (eg ROE), the method suffers from a particularly severe form of 
the identification problem.  In many instances of the identification problem (eg trying 
to calculate both demand and supply curves from data on quantity and price), the 
problem can be solved if additional variables can be found that enter only one of the 
equations, but this is simply not possible in this instance; as a result “the computed 
mean-variance relationship cannot be identified in distinction to the effects of shifts 
in the relationship over time – without additional information or assumptions” 
(Ruefli (1990, p.372).  Ruefli (1990) goes on to demonstrate, by construction, that a 
series of positive mean-variance relationships in each sub-period could give rise to an 
overall negative relationship (and vice versa); so as a relationship calculated in one 
time period cannot be generalised to any other time period. 
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Miller and Bromiley (1990) not only addressed the identification problem highlighted 
by Ruefli (1990), but also made the important advances of considering multiple risk 
measures and allowing for persistence of profits.  The authors conducted a principal 
component analysis on nine measures of firm-level risk that had been widely used in 
strategic management research up to that point, this yielded three components 
which they named: “income stream risk”, “stock returns risk” and “strategic risk” 
(see previous chapter for further discussion of the method and results of the 
principal component analysis).  They then conducted an OLS regression with these 
three risk components and performance, calculated over a five-year period, as 
explanatory variables; and performance over the subsequent five-year period as the 
dependent variable.  Their key findings were that both income stream risk and 
strategic risk were negatively associated with subsequent performance.  Whilst this 
study represents a significant advance on previous work, there are still two 
methodological concerns.  Firstly, the regression model is mis-specified as 
performance is modelled to be based solely on the three risk components and prior 
performance, without controlling for firm size, industry sector or any other possible 
drivers of performance.  Secondly, the authors acknowledge the potential impact of 
outliers on the regression results stating that “We eliminated outliers in the annual 
data by deleting the observations with values in the bottom or top 2 percent of each 
variable’s distribution” (p.760); but do not discuss the nature of these outliers, or 
consider any alternative techniques that are robust to outliers.  As discussed in detail 
in Chapter Three, in the context of risk research, simply deleting outliers may destroy 
the most valuable data.   
157 
 
Most subsequent empirical work has followed the same general methodology of 
regressing performance on lagged measures of risk and performance, but a number 
of different measures of risk have been used.  Bromiley (1991) used variance of 
analysts’ forecasts as a measure of risk and, applying a panel approach with GLS 
regression, found that increased risk resulted in lower performance (ROA).  This 
study is particularly interesting as an example of the use of an ex-ante measure of 
risk, which more naturally fits with the strategic management literature’s interest in 
decision-making.  Applying the behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and March 
(1992)), Miller and Leiblein (1996) constructed a measure of “downside risk” (p. 101), 
based on failure to meet annual ROA targets.  In common with Miller and Bromiley 
(1990), the risk measure was constructed over one five year period and performance 
was measured over the next five years.  This study also investigated the effect of 
prior performance on risk, although the regressions for risk and return were 
estimated separately (unlike Bettis’s (1982) simultaneous equation model).  The 
regression with performance as the dependent variable found that their downside 
risk construct “demonstrated more consistent significant relations with return [ROA] 
than did returns standard deviation”, and that contrary to previous studies, 
“consistent with the behavioural theory of the firm, the results support a positive 
effect of downside risk on performance” (p. 117)50.  Meanwhile, the regressions with 
downside risk as the dependent variable found a negative association with prior 
performance, also in support of the behavioural theory of the firm.  As with Miller 
and Bromiley (1990), Miller and Leiblein (1996, p.104) acknowledge the presence of 
outliers in their sample “Firms with returns...beyond three standard deviations from 
the annual mean across all firms were considered outliers and eliminated from that 
                                                          
50 It is also interesting to note the recent interest in downside risk measures in the financial 
economics literature with the use of constructs such as: ‘downside beta’ (Ang, Chen and Xing 
(2006)); value at risk (Bali et al (2009)); and ‘idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk’ (Gemmill and 
Keswani (2011)) used to explain variation in performance.   
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year’s data set”.  Subsequently, further observations (up to 8.9% in one regression) 
were deleted because of their high influence (based on DFFITS values (Belsley, Kuh 
and Welsch (1980))); however, “A comparison of the regression results before and 
after elimination of outliers indicated no substantive differences in the signs or 
magnitudes of the estimated coefficients” (p.105).  There is no consideration of any 
robust techniques.  
Some key features in the design of the studies discussed are summarised in table 5.1
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Table 5.1 – Previous Studies of Risk and Performance 
Study Timeframe 
Dependent 
Variable 
Method Results 
Bowman 
(1980) 
Five years (1972-76) 
Nine years (1968-76) 
ROE 
Contingency tables at firm and industry-level, 
conducted by industry sector and aggregated. 
Negative risk-return relationship in most 
industry sectors; no relationship for 
aggregated data. 
Bettis (1982) Five years (1973-77) ROA 
Regression analysis using simultaneous 
equation model. 
Parameter estimate for risk is positive in 
single-equation model but becomes negative 
(ns) in simultaneous equation model. 
Marsh and 
Swanson 
(1984) 
24 years (1958-1981) ROE 
Bespoke measure of association to correct for 
autocorrelation and cross-sectional 
interdependence, applied by industry sector 
and aggregated. 
No significant relationship between risk and 
return. 
Fiegenbaum 
and Thomas 
(1988) 
20 Years (1960-79); 
analysis also 
conducted over 5 and 
10-year sub-periods 
ROE 
Contingency tables and Spearman correlation at 
firm and industry-level, conducted by industry 
sector and aggregated. 
Negative risk-return relationship for firms 
performing below median; positive 
relationship for those above. 
Miller and 
Bromiley 
(1990) 
Two five-year periods 
(1978-82 and 1983-
87) 
ROE and 
ROA 
OLS regression analysis using five-year lag 
structure.  
Also investigated effect of performance on risk. 
Both income stream risk and strategic risk 
are negatively associated with performance. 
Bromiley 
(1991) 
12 years (1976-87) ROA 
Panel data (GLS) approach using one-year lag 
structure (only nine data points because of 
need for IVs). 
Increased risk leads to lower performance. 
Miller and 
Leiblein 
(1996) 
Four five-year periods 
(1972-76, 1977-81, 
1982-86 and 1987-91) 
ROA 
OLS regression analysis using five-year lag 
structure. 
Downside risk is positively associated with 
performance. 
160 
 
5.2.5 Summary 
Building on the discussions in Chapter Two, concerning the relationship between risk 
and performance; this section went on to consider how the relationship between risk 
and future performance may be mediated by past performance, and the persistence 
of profits literature was briefly introduced.  This was followed by a discussion of 
some of the challenges in conducting empirical tests of these theoretical predictions; 
and the section concluded by summarising how it is intended to improve upon prior 
empirical work in this chapter.  The starting point for the design of the regression 
models used in the current study is Miller and Bromiley (1990), as their approach 
simultaneously: addresses the identification problem; acknowledges the existence of 
alternative measures of risk with relevance to different stakeholder groups; and 
allows for the persistence of profits.  However their model is mis-specified: there are 
no control variables (eg for firms size), and the model takes no account of the 
mediating effect of prior performance on the relationship between risk and return.  
Furthermore, their model cannot distinguish between true persistence of profits and 
firm fixed effects.   
The current study is motivated by a desire to directly address these methodological 
shortcomings, in order to make a contribution to our understanding of the 
relationship between risk and performance.  A number of additional variables, 
including an interaction term between profit risk and a dummy variable indicating 
whether prior profitability has been high or low (above or below the median), are 
therefore added to the regression model; first-differencing is used to remove firm 
fixed effects; and, as previously mentioned, a novel cashflow risk measure is used.  In 
addition, cross-sectional analyses are conducted over multiple time-periods to 
examine if the relationships between risk and performance are stable over time.  The 
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regression model is discussed in more detail in the next section, after the specific 
hypotheses to be tested are outlined.   
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5.3 Hypothesis Development 
Drawing on the various theoretical strands outlined in the previous section, four 
specific hypotheses will be tested in the regression analyses.  As summarised in 
section 5.2.1, Sharpe (1964), predicts a very simple positive relationship between the 
systematic risk (beta) and returns to shareholders; however Pettengill et al (1995) 
argued, and demonstrated empirically, that the relationship is actually contingent on 
the performance of the market.   
Hypothesis 1a: Increased market risk is associated with higher future returns 
to shareholders when returns on the market portfolio are above the risk-free 
rate. 
Hypothesis 1b: Increased market risk is associated with lower future returns 
to shareholders when returns on the market portfolio are below the risk-free 
rate. 
Section 5.2.1 also summarised numerous arguments for both positive and negative 
relationships between profit risk and future profitability (ROE and ROA); and, as 
discussed in section 5.2.4, empirical tests have yielded very mixed results.  By 
contrast, cashflow risk has not been considered in previous studies of the risk-return 
relationship; and, in so much as it has previously been considered as a risk measure, 
it has been in the context of the risk of financial distress and thus primarily of 
interest to lenders.  There is therefore no reason to believe that it is a salient factor 
in managerial decision-making about projects, and hence no reason to expect a 
positive relationship between cashflow risk and return.  However, variability in 
cashflows may reduce future income as the firm is unable to exploit value-creating 
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opportunities as and when they arise51; and uncertainty in future cashflows may 
increase the cost of debt as lenders perceive a greater probability of default.  One of 
the advantages of the PCA approach adopted in the last chapter is that the varimax 
rotation attempts to load a small number of variables highly onto each component.  
The fact that the cashflow risk construct captures elements of risk that have a purely 
negative association with return, therefore makes it likely that those elements of risk 
loading onto profit risk will be more positively associated with return. 
Hypothesis 2: Increased profit risk is associated with higher future 
profitability. 
Hypothesis 3: Increased cashflow risk is associated with lower future 
profitability. 
Section 5.2.2 outlined a number of reasons to suspect that the relationship between 
risk and performance is contingent on whether the firm has been a high or low 
performer; as risk-seeking behaviour by managers would tend to increase profit risk 
without a commensurate increase in expected profits.  The theoretical predictions 
are not all consistent with each other, but the empirical evidence appears to support 
the argument that low performance tends to lead to risk-seeking behaviour by 
managers, resulting in the final hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: The effect of profit risk on profitability is less positive (or indeed 
negative) for lower-performing firms. 
Following the approach of Miller and Bromiley (1990) to allow for persistence of 
profits, a dynamic model of the following form will be used to test hypotheses 2 to 4:  
Performancei = α L.Performancei + xTiβ + μi + εi   (5.3) 
                                                          
51 Minton and Schrand (1999) found that cash flow volatility was negatively associated with 
both average capital expenditures and spending on R&D and advertising. 
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Where performance is based on measures of profitability; α is a constant to be 
estimated; x is a column of regressors (including both explanatory and control 
variables); β is a column of coefficients to be estimated; μ is a firm-specific effect 
that does not vary over time52; and εit is a random error term.  Hypothesis 1 can be 
tested using a simpler, static version of the model, as follows:    
Performancei = xTiβ + μi + εi     (5.4) 
Where performance is measured by returns to shareholders. 
 
  
                                                          
52 Amongst other things, this addresses the concern that the tests are just separating well-run 
and poorly-run firms (Bowman (1980), Andersen et al (2007)).  However, as noted in Chapter 
One, the removal of firm-fixed effects in this way also precludes any examination of the 
impact of risk management on the relationship between risk and performance in this model; 
this is discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven.   
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5.4 Data 
The regression analysis is based on the same sample of firms that was used for the 
principal component analyses in the previous chapter.  Definitions of the dependent 
and explanatory variables for the study are given in section 5.4.1, with a summary in 
table 5.2; this is followed by summary statistics in section 5.4.2. 
5.4.1 Variable Definitions  
5.4.1.1 Dependent Variables 
Bowman (1980, p.19) chose ROE53 as his measure of profitability, stating “Not only 
does ROE tend to normalize for trends, but it is the variable of interest here.  Return 
on equity is not only the profit measure of primary interest to most managers and 
strategic planners, it is one of the more common measures of profits used in 
economic research.”  However, Marsh and Swanson (1984) caution that ROE is very 
susceptible to noise, and more recent studies (eg Miller and Bromiley (1990), Miller 
and Chen (2004)) have usually included ROA as a profitability measure instead of, or 
as well as, ROE.  Both the return on the book value of equity, hereinafter abbreviated 
to RBVE, and ROA are used as profitability measures in this chapter; the return on 
market value of equity, hereinafter abbreviated to RMVE, is also used54.  In addition, 
annual returns to shareholders is included as a more forward-looking measure of 
performance, and in order to test hypotheses 1a and 1b.  RBVE is calculated by 
dividing profit before tax (FAME field 14) by book value of equity (FAME field 93 – 
“Shareholders’ Funds”): firm-year observations where book value of equity is 
negative are omitted.  ROA is taken directly from FAME field 138 – “Return on Total 
Assets”; and RMVE is calculated by dividing profit before tax (FAME field 14) by 
                                                          
53 The precise definition used for ROE is not clear from the article; but it is presumed that the 
denominator was book value of equity. 
54 The reason for this is explained in section 5.5.2.3. 
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market value of equity (Datastream field MV – “Market Value (Capital)”.  Annual 
returns to shareholders are calculated from Datastream field RI – “Total Return 
Index”, which includes both capital appreciation and dividends paid during the year 
and is calculated as follows: 
RIt = RIt-1 . (Pt + DDt) / Pt-1     (5.5) 
Where: P is the (adjusted) share price; DD are the (adjusted) dividends paid during 
the year (based on ex-dividend dates); and RI0 = 100.  Annual returns to shareholders 
(RTS) are then calculated as follows: 
RTSt = (RIt - RIt-1) / RIt-1      (5.6) 
The dependent variables are generally values for a single year (the year following the 
five-year period over which the explanatory variables are calculated) but, for one 
particular univariate analysis (see section 5.5.1), ROA is averaged over a five-year 
period: this is denoted by MROA. 
There is clearly the potential for a sample selection bias in this approach in that, if a 
firm performs very badly and goes out of business, no data will be available.  
However, there were no firms in the sample for which the explanatory variables 
were available but for which there were no performance data55.   
5.4.1.2 Explanatory Variables 
The key explanatory variables in this study are the three risk components that were 
observed in each time period in the previous chapter: profit risk, market risk and 
cashflow risk.  However, because of the need to first-difference variables (in order to 
remove firm fixed effects), the risk measure with the highest loading on each 
                                                          
55 As can be seen from table 5.3, the ROA value is missing for one firm-year and returns to 
shareholders data are missing for ten firm-years; as discussed in section 4.3 there are a large 
number of missing values for RBVE.   
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component is used as a proxy for the actual components, these are respectively: 
standard deviation of ROA, beta and standard deviation of cashflow.  All variable 
definitions are identical to the ones used in Chapter Four.   
A number of other explanatory variables are included in this study in addition to 
those defined in Chapter Four, and these are described below.  As originally 
hypothesised by Baumol (1957), and subsequently shown empirically by Hall and 
Weiss (1967); large firms have all the options of small firms plus additional options 
not available to smaller firms so should be more profitable.  Therefore firm size is 
included as an explanatory variable; defined as the natural log of the average 
turnover (FAME field 1) over each five-year period56.  Market power is also included, 
and is proxied by market share; which is calculated as the proportion of turnover 
(FAME field 1) within the relevant industry section in the 2007 SIC, using the largest 
12000 firms in the FAME database as at November 201357.  Industry dummies were 
not included as these would be removed in the first-differencing process (see section 
5.5.2 below).  In order to test hypothesis 4, a dummy variable for “high ROE” is 
interacted with the standard deviation of ROA.  The high ROE dummy is “1” if RMVE 
averaged over the five-year estimation period was above the median and “0” 
otherwise.  As discussed in section 2.4.1.1 above, Fama and French (1992) found that 
the cross-sectional variation in returns to shareholders was explained by size and the 
book-to-market ratio: the (natural log of the) book-to-market ratio is therefore 
included in the regressions with returns to shareholders as the dependent variable.  
This was calculated by dividing book value of equity (FAME field 93 – “Shareholders’ 
                                                          
56 The natural log of total assets was used as an alternative measure of firm size in some 
regressions as a robustness test but the results were almost identical so these are not 
reported.  Both measures of size were deflated to 2013 values using ONS GDP deflators (June 
2014).  
57 In each time period a very small number of firms (less than five in all cases) had to be 
removed from the sample because of the absence of a SIC code.   
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Funds”)58 by the market capitalisation (Datastream field MV – “Market Value 
(Capital)”) annually, averaging over each five-year period (negative and zero values 
of the ratio are not included in the average) and taking the natural log.    
Definitions of all variables are summarised in table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 – Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables 
RBVE Profit before tax / book value of equity for a single year. 
ROA Return on total assets for a single year. 
RMVE Profit before tax / market value of equity for a single year. 
RTS (Capital appreciation + dividends paid in a single year) / 
share price at start of the year. 
MROA Return on total assets averaged over a five-year period. 
Explanatory Variables 
Size Ln (turnover averaged over five-year period). 
Power Turnover averaged over five-year period / total turnover 
for relevant sector in 2013. 
High RMVE 
Dummy variable = “1” if RMVE averaged over a five-year 
period is above the median. 
Ln[Book-to-Market 
Value] 
Ln[Book value of equity / market value of equity].  Ratio 
calculated annually, averaged over five-year period and 
natural log taken. 
SD of ROA Sample SD of ROA over five-year period. 
Beta 
OLS regression of 60 monthly stock returns on returns of 
FTSE AIM All-Share index. 
SD of Cashflow 
Sample SD of cashflow over five-year period / average 
total assets over five-year period. 
 
Summary statistics for the dependent variables in the pooled sample and each five-
year period are shown in table 5.3. 
  
                                                          
58 FAME field 113 - “Gearing” was not used as a debt-to-equity measure as there is an in-built 
cut-off. 
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5.4.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 5.3 – Summary Statistics (Dependent Variables) 
 N Mean Median Min Max SD MAD Skewness 
Panel A – Pooled Sample 
RBVE 3859 -0.0245 0.0707 -119 29.1 2.33 0.114 -37.5 
ROA 3952 -0.0122 0.0323 -7.58 2.92 0.332 0.0759 -9.39 
RMVE 3953 -0.0915 0.0568 -125 11.7 2.18 0.0977 -48.0 
RTS 3943 0.135 0.0758 -0.965 27.1 0.770 0.415 13.5 
Panel B – 2012 
RBVE 982 0.0273 0.0563 -6.91 7.36 0.666 0.0984 -3.43 
ROA 1006 -
0.000459 
0.0307 -2.54 1.16 0.246 0.0659 
-4.40 
RMVE 1007 -0.141 0.0472 -125 11.7 4.01 0.0791 -29.7 
RTS 1004 0.201 0.168 -0.941 5.62 0.444 0.307 2.52 
Panel C – 2011 
RBVE 875 0.0728 0.0675 -8.84 29.1 1.18 0.0966 16.3 
ROA 892 -0.00167 0.0331 -5.31 2.92 0.354 0.0644 -9.10 
RMVE 892 -0.0543 0.0557 -22.6 3.51 0.983 0.0908 -16.3 
RTS  890 -0.0644 -0.0921 -0.965 4.56 0.397 0.285 2.80 
Panel D – 2010 
RBVE 764 0.0466 0.0813 -27.0 9.91 1.23 0.0948 -13.6 
ROA 779 0.00344 0.0354 -4.88 0.381 0.320 0.0601 -10.5 
RMVE 779 -0.00109 0.0593 -7.97 0.884 0.458 0.0742 -10.7 
RTS 777 0.321 0.206 -0.806 27.1 1.13 0.338 17.5 
Panel E – 2009 
RBVE 649 -0.0899 0.0860 -50.8 15.3 2.34 0.130 -16.2 
ROA 671 -0.00871 0.0392 -7.58 0.446 0.426 0.0919 -11.5 
RMVE 671 0.00227 0.0698 -3.56 1.21 0.347 0.115 -4.42 
RTS 669 0.559 0.367 -0.902 12.9 0.944 0.421 5.67 
Panel F -2008 
RBVE 589 -0.276 0.0601 -119 5.43 4.97 0.194 -23.4 
ROA 604 -0.0711 0.0229 -2.96 0.357 0.317 0.125 -3.90 
RMVE 604 -0.285 0.0654 -18.5 1.39 1.55 0.262 -8.12 
RTS 603 -0.392 -0.417 -0.955 1.46 0.301 0.283 1.23 
 
It is clear that the dependent variables have some extreme outliers and are all very 
skewed; in order to illustrate this further, quantile plots of the four dependent 
variables from the pooled sample are shown in figs. 5.1 to 5.4. 
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Fig. 5.1 – Quantile Plot of RBVE 
 
Fig. 5.2 – Quantile Plot of ROA 
 
Fig. 5.3 – Quantile Plot of RMVE 
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Fig. 5.4 – Quantile Plot of Returns to Shareholders 
 
 
To further illustrate the issue of extreme outliers, various percentiles of the 
distributions are tabulated below, expressed in terms of median absolute deviations 
from the median.  The customary measure of standard deviations from the mean is 
not appropriate as neither of these estimators are themselves robust to outliers. 
Table 5.4 – Quantiles of RBVE, ROA, RMVE and Returns to Shareholders (Expressed 
as Median Absolute Deviations from the Median) 
 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 95% 96% 97% 98% 99% 
RBVE -21.2 -13.3 -9.87 -7.56 -6.43 3.56 4.03 4.50 6.06 11.1 
ROA -15.2 -9.67 -7.47 -6.22 -5.62 2.30 2.57 2.91 3.26 3.88 
RMVE -28.1 -15.2 -10.4 -8.75 -7.03 2.39 2.73 3.30 3.85 5.54 
RTS -2.19 -2.04 -1.90 -1.83 -1.73 2.30 2.59 3.14 3.91 5.46 
 
As discussed In Chapter Three, outlying values of the dependent variable such as 
these can cause problems for regression estimates in one of two ways, depending on 
whether they are “good leverage points” or “vertical outliers” (Rousseeuw and Leroy 
(1987)), as illustrated in the simple two-variable regression example shown in fig. 
5.5. 
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Fig. 5.5 – Definition of Vertical Outliers and Good Leverage Points 
 
 
Good leverage points do not directly affect the estimated parameters but are a 
concern because they deflate the estimated standard errors.  Vertical outliers are 
even more problematic as they do directly influence the parameter estimates: it is 
therefore very important to take steps to limit the impact of these outliers.    
Summary statistics for the explanatory and control variables in the pooled sample 
and each five-year period are shown in table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5 – Summary Statistics (Explanatory and Control Variables) 
 N Mean Median Min Max SD MAD Skewness 
Panel A – Pooled Sample 
Size 3953 10.8 10.6 1.39 19.3 2.86 2.90 0.0110 
Power 3938 0.00338 0.0000898 4.24 x 10-9 0.240 0.0145 1. 31 x 10-4 8.60 
Ln[Book-to-Market] 3942 -0.300 -0.184 -5.73 7.10 0.953 0.749 0.903 
SD of ROA 3953 0.134 0.0667 0.000453 3.91 0.252 0.0661 7.89 
Beta 3953 0.625 0.569 -2.45 4.87 0.434 0.366 1.33 
SD of Cashflow 3953 0.0860 0.0519 .0000205 1.27 0.111 0.0460 3.85 
Panel B - 2007-11 
Size 1007 10.7 10.5 1.41 19.4 2.87 2.90 0.0438 
Power 1004 0.00331 0.0000707 4.24x10-9 0.240 0.0157 1.03 x 10-4 9.60 
Ln[Book-to-Market] 1002 -0.230 -0.0720 -5.73 4.90 0.897 0.741 -0.546 
SD of ROA 1007 0.143 0.0687 0.000482 3.91 0.302 0.0683 7.92 
Beta 1007 0.693 0.620 -2.20 4.50 0.468 0.389 1.16 
SD of Cashflow 1007 0.0910 0.0517 0.000205 1.20 0.121 0.0470 3.74 
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Table 5.5 (Cont.) 
 N Mean Median Min Max SD MAD Skew 
Panel C – 2006-10 
Size 892 10.8 10.6 1.44 19.3 2.86 2.96 0.0323 
Power 889 0.00324 0.0000845 4.24x10-9 0.211 0.0145 1.23 x 10-4 9.14 
Ln[Book-to-Market] 889 -0.331 -0.190 -4.51 3.31 0.866 0.751 -0.904 
SD of ROA 892 0.145 0.0737 0.000453 3.65 0.269 0.0755 7.46 
Beta 892 0.689 0.630 -2.45 4.45 0.467 0.393 1.12 
SD of Cashflow 892 0.0899 0.0535 0.000808 0.853 0.109 0.0477 3.19 
Panel D - 2005-09 
Size 779 11.0 10.9 1.44 19.3 2.83 2.87 0.00408 
Power 776 0.00352 0.000100 4.24x10-9 0.199 0.0145 1.46 x 10-4 8.23 
Ln[Book-to-Market] 778 -0.381 -0.232 -4.74 3.16 0.858 0.745 -0.927 
SD of ROA 779 0.140 0.0693 0.000551 3.21 0.241 0.0694 7.08 
Beta 779 0.680 0.621 -0.201 4.87 0.442 0.364 1.90 
SD of Cashflow 779 0.0861 0.0530 0.000593 1.16 0.109 0.0471 3.98 
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Table 5.5 (Cont.) 
 N Mean Median Min Max SD MAD Skew 
Panel E – 2004-08 
Size 671 11.0 10.9 1.44 19.1 2.87 2.94 -0.0513 
Power 668 0.00346 0.000102 4.24x10-9 0.165 0.0134 1.50 x 10-4 7.19 
Ln[Book-to-Market] 670 -0.254 -0.130 -4.75 6.88 1.02 0.731 0.771 
SD of ROA 671 0.132 0.0645 0.00157 3.15 0.228 0.0640 6.97 
Beta 671 0.598 0.584 -0.269 2.28 0.330 0.316 0.594 
SD of Cashflow 671 0.0805 0.0528 0.000673 0.977 0.100 0.0456 3.68 
Panel F - 2003-07 
Size 604 11.0 11.0 1.44 19.0 2.86 2.89 -0.0570 
Power 601 0.00342 0.000101 4.24x10-9 0.141 0.0134 1.48 x 10-4 6.71 
Ln[Book-to-Market] 603 -0.321 -0.360 -4.75 7.10 1.17 0.824 1.15 
SD of ROA 604 0.0943 0.0543 0.00131 2.06 0.150 0.0509 6.77 
Beta 604 0.374 0.343 -0.712 1.76 0.107 0.0399 0.747 
SD of Cashflow 604 0.0779 0.0463 0.000462 1.27 0.299 0.221 4.91 
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5.5 Empirical Tests 
This section describes both the methods and results of a series of empirical tests.  
The analysis begins with various univariate tests in order to make a direct 
comparison with earlier work that was based on such methods (eg Bowman (1980), 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988)); this is followed by cross-sectional regression 
analyses to explore the effect of multiple risk components on performance.   
5.5.1 Univariate Tests 
Early studies of the relationship between risk and performance used simple non-
parametric tests, such as Bowman’s (1980) 2x2 contingency tables and Fiegenbaum 
and Thomas’s (1988) correlation tests; based on mean ROE and standard deviation of 
ROE values calculated over the same five-year period.  However, given both the 
comments referred to in section 5.4.1.1 about ROE being susceptible to noise and 
the issues discussed in section 4.3 about the large number of firm-year observations 
with negative book value of equity; ROA and the standard deviation of ROA are used 
in this study instead.  The overall approach of both Bowman (1980) and Fiegenbaum 
and Thomas (1988) is replicated below using both Pearson (table 5.6) and Spearman 
(table 5.7) correlation tests to calculate corr [MROA(t-5, t-1), SD of ROA(t-5, t-1)].  Note 
that, in order to allow for comparison, the same samples of firms are used in all tests 
in this section.  
Table 5.6 – Pearson Correlation Coefficients (corr [MROA(t-5, t-1), SD of ROA(t-5, t-1)]) 
t N ρ 
Pooled 2941 -0.788*** 
2012 887 -0.786*** 
2011 779 -0.810*** 
2010 671 -0.817*** 
2009 604 -0.732*** 
2008 604 -0.769*** 
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1. Table 5.6 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between MROA and the standard 
deviation of ROA. 
2. MROA and the standard deviation of ROA are calculated over five-year periods from 2003-07 
to 2007-11. 
3. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
Table 5.7 – Spearman Correlation Coefficients (corr [MROA(t-5, t-1), SD of ROA(t-5, t-1)]) 
t N ρ 
Pooled 2941 -0.528*** 
2012 887 -0.632*** 
2011 779 -0.557*** 
2010 671 -0.442*** 
2009 604 -0.455*** 
2008 604 -0.251*** 
 
1. Table 5.7 reports the Spearman correlation coefficients between MROA and the standard 
deviation of ROA. 
2. MROA and the standard deviation of ROA are calculated over five-year periods from 2003-07 
to 2007-11. 
3. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
 
The Pearson correlation coefficients may be unreliable, due to the extreme skewness 
of the data; but the Spearman coefficients are also universally negative and highly 
significant, in keeping with Bowman’s (1980) observed “paradox”.  However, as 
discussed in section 5.2.4: Marsh and Swanson (1984) pointed out that there is an 
inherent negative correlation between mean and variance for a skewed distribution 
such as this; and Ruefli (1990) demonstrated that results obtained from this mean-
variance approach could not be generalised because of an identification problem.  In 
order to address both these issues, Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients 
were calculated using ROA values for the year following the end of the five-year 
period over which the standard deviation of ROA was calculated; ie corr [ROAt, SD of 
ROA(t-5, t-1)]; the results are shown in tables 5.8 and 5.9. 
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Table 5.8 – Pearson Correlation Coefficients (corr [ROAt, SD of ROA(t-5, t-1)]) 
t N ρ 
Pooled 2941 -0.207*** 
2012 887 -0.0608 
2011 779 -0.155*** 
2010 671 -0.293*** 
2009 604 -0.431*** 
2008 604 -0.297*** 
 
1. Table 5.8 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between ROA and the standard 
deviation of ROA. 
2. ROA values are for individual years from 2008 to 2012, the standard deviation of ROA is 
calculated over the preceding five-year period. 
3. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
Table 5.9 – Spearman Correlation Coefficients (corr [ROAt, SD of ROA(t-5, t-1)])  
t N ρ 
Pooled 2941 -0.302*** 
2012 887 -0.379*** 
2011 779 -0.410*** 
2010 671 -0.337*** 
2009 604 -0.0378 
2008 604 -0.288*** 
 
1. Table 5.9 reports the Spearman correlation coefficients between ROA and the standard 
deviation of ROA. 
2. ROA values are for individual years from 2008 to 2012, the standard deviation of ROA is 
calculated over the preceding five-year period. 
3. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
 
Once again, the use of Pearson correlation coefficients may be problematic because 
of outliers.  However, the Spearman correlation coefficients are still universally 
negative (and significant in all but one case).  Following the discussion in section 
5.2.5 about the need to remove firm fixed effects; correlation coefficients were then 
calculated using first-differenced values of the variables, as follows: 
∆(ROAt) = ROAt - ROAt-1      (5.7) 
∆(SD of ROA(t-5, t-1)) = SD of ROA(t-5, t-1)  - SD of ROA(t-6, t-2)  (5.8) 
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Table 5.10 – Pearson Correlation Coefficients (corr [∆(ROAt), ∆(SD of ROA(t-5, t-1))]) 
t N ρ 
Pooled 2941 0.534*** 
2012 887 0.465*** 
2011 779 0.456*** 
2010 671 0.643*** 
2009 604 0.556*** 
 
1. Table 5.10 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between (first-differenced) ROA and 
the (first-differenced) standard deviation of ROA. 
2. The (first-differenced) ROA values are for individual years from 2009 to 2012, the (first-
differenced) standard deviation of ROA is calculated over the preceding five-year period. 
3. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
Table 5.11 – Spearman Correlation Coefficients (corr [∆(ROAt), ∆(SD of ROA(t-5, t-1))])  
t N ρ 
Pooled 2941 0.148*** 
2012 887 -0.0214 
2011 779 0.0253 
2010 671 0.101** 
2009 604 0.476*** 
 
1. Table 5.11 reports the Spearman correlation coefficients between (first-differenced) ROA and 
the standard deviation of ROA. 
2. The (first-differenced) ROA values are for individual years from 2009 to 2012, the (first-
differenced) standard deviation of ROA is calculated over the preceding five-year period. 
3. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
A completely different pattern is observed when first-differenced variables are used, 
with all correlation coefficients either significantly positive or insignificant.  Focusing 
on the results of the Spearman correlation, as the more robust technique, there are 
now positive and highly significant correlation coefficients for the pooled sample and 
in the first two time periods; but insignificant correlation coefficients in later time 
periods.  This result is important not only in explaining Bowman’s (1980) paradox, 
and highlighting the need to remove firm fixed effects; but it also suggests that risk-
return relationships may be contingent upon environmental conditions, and hence 
cross-sectional regressions should be used in the next section rather than a panel 
regression. 
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5.5.2 Cross-Sectional Regression 
5.5.2.1 Outline 
The two regression models to be estimated were introduced in section 5.3.  Because 
of possible persistence of profits, a dynamic model is required where accounting 
measures of performance are used; as per equation 5.3, which is reproduced below: 
Performancei = α L.Performancei + xTiβ + μi + εi    
Where, following previous studies, performance is measured in two different ways 
(RBVE and ROA); α is a constant to be estimated; x is a column of regressors 
including both risk measures and control variables (estimated over a five-year 
period); β is a column of coefficients to be estimated; μ is a firm-specific effect that 
does not vary over time; and ε is a random error term which, it is assumed, is 
uncorrelated across firms but may be correlated over time. 
However, a static model can be used when market measures of performance 
(returns to shareholders) are used; as per equation 5.4, which is reproduced below:  
Performancei = xTiβ + μi + εi  
Section 5.5.2.2 describes the estimation of the dynamic regression model (equation 
5.3) with RBVE and ROA as dependent variables.  However, estimation of this model 
is complicated by an endogeneity issue, so instrumental variable techniques are 
required: no valid instruments can be identified so it is not possible to pursue this 
approach further.  The dynamic regression model is therefore estimated with RMVE 
as the dependent variable in section 5.5.2.3: valid instruments are available and, 
critically, it turns out that the lagged dependent variable is not required.  Section 
5.5.2.4 then presents the results of estimating the static model (equation 5.4) with 
both RMVE and returns to shareholders as the dependent variable; using OLS, 
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median, M-estimator and MM-estimator regressions.  The results of all the 
regressions are summarised in section 5.5.2.5     
5.5.2.2  Dynamic Regression Model (Dependent Variables RBVE and ROA) 
The inclusion of a firm-specific effect in equation 5.3, which was missing in previous 
models (eg Miller and Bromiley (1990)), is necessary in order to capture any 
unobservable characteristics of individual firms which could affect performance.  
However, in order to estimate the regression, these firm-specific effects need to be 
removed59.  One method of achieving this is first differencing as follows:   
∆Performancei = α ∆(L.Performancei) + ∆xTiβ + ∆εi   (5.9) 
But: 
∆(L.Performancei)  = (L.Performancei – L2.Performancei) = α (L2.Performancei 
– L3.Performancei) + (L.xTi – L2.xTi)β + (L.εi – L2.εi)   (5.10) 
Hence there is an issue of endogeneity: corr [∆(L.Performancei), ∆εi] ≠ 0, as both 
∆(L.Performancei) and ∆εi contain the term L.εi .  However, it may be possible to use 
further lags of performance as instruments for L.Performance, so long as the errors 
are not serially correlated.  There are alternative methods of removing firm-specific 
effects of which de-meaning, ie subtracting the estimated mean over all observations 
for the firm from each observation, is the most common (eg in the estimation of 
fixed-effects static panel models).  However, the endogeneity issue here is less 
tractable as each lagged value of the dependent variable will now contain the term εi¯ 
so there are no available instruments.  The same argument applies to Bramati and 
Croux’s (2007) robust method of removing fixed effects by subtracting the median 
                                                          
59 Asymptotic theory for short panels relies on N →∞, but as N →∞ so does the number of μi 
to be estimated; this is called the incidental-parameters problem. 
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(again estimated over all observations for that firm) from each value: all lagged 
values of the dependent variable will contain median(εi). 
Serial correlation in the error term was tested for using Woolridge’s (2002) test for 
serial correlation in panel data; the results are shown in table 5.12.  
Table 5.12 – Results of Wooldridge’s (2002) Test for Serial Correlation in Panel Data 
Dependent Variable RBVE ROA 
Woolridge Test F(1, 663) = 9.41 F(1, 666) = 13.3 
p>F 0.002 0.000 
 
1. Table 5.12 reports the results of Woolridge’s (2002) test for serial correlation in panel data.   
2. The test was conducted using the Stata xtserial function which, by default, adjusts for 
clustering and is robust to heteroskedacity. 
3. The null hypothesis of the test is that there is no first-order correlation. 
The null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation can clearly be rejected in the 
case of both RBVE and ROA as the dependent variable, so L2.RBVE (L2.ROA) cannot be 
used as an instrument for L.RBVE (L.ROA) but further lags of RBVE (ROA) may be valid 
instruments.  In order to test if valid instruments for L.RBVE (L.ROA) are available, 
equation 5.9 was estimated with (first-differenced) RBVE (ROA) in 2012 as the 
dependent variable; and (first-differenced) values of RBVE (ROA) in 2009 and 2008 as 
instruments for (first-differenced) RBVE (ROA) in 2011.  Estimating the model is 
complicated by the skewed distributions of data, with some extreme outliers (see 
Figs. 5.1-5.3).  Because of the requirement to use instrumental variables, it is not 
possible to use more advanced robust techniques (eg median regression, M-
estimator, or MM-estimator regression) so Winsorization is used; specifically, the 
observations below the 1st (2.5th) percentile and above the 99th (97.5th) percentile for 
RBVE (ROA) will be removed.  The results of the specification tests are shown in table 
5.13 and 5.14. 
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Table 5.13 – Results of Specification Tests for IV Regressions (Dependent Variable 
First-Differenced RBVE in 2012) 
 Full Sample Winsorized (1%) Winsorized (2.5%) 
K-P Statistic 1.04 1.58 1.59 
Hansen-J 0.614 0.741 0.646 
Chi-square p-val 0.43 0.39 0.42 
C-Test 1.52 0.291 0.392 
Chi-square p-val 0.22 0.59 0.53 
 
1. Table 5.13 reports the results of specification tests for the estimation of equation 5.9 using 
instrumental variables regression (GMM).   
2. The sample period for (first-differenced) RBVE is described above; the sample period for all 
other (first-differenced) explanatory and control variables is 2007-11. 
3. IV regression was estimated using the user-written Stata function ivreg2 (Baum et al (2007)). 
4. The Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic is the appropriate test for weak instruments where 
heteroskedastic errors are suspected; critical values for size are as follows (Stock and Yogo 
(2005)): 
0.1 19.93 
0.15 11.59 
0.2 8.75 
0.25 7.25  
5. The Hansen J-test is used because of possible heteroskedacity; the null hypothesis is that all 
instruments are valid. 
6. The null hypothesis of the C-test (Eichenbaum (1988)) is that the instrumented variable is 
actually exogenous. 
Table 5.14 – Results of Specification Tests for IV Regressions (Dependent Variable 
First-Differenced ROA in 2012) 
 Full Sample Winsorized (1%) Winsorized (2.5%) 
K-P Statistic 2.53 0.068 0.064 
Hansen-J 0.000 0.809 0.129 
Chi-square p-val 0.99 0.37 0.72 
C-Test 1.32 0.009 0.405 
Chi-square p-val 0.25 0.93 0.52 
 
1. Table 5.14 reports the results of specification tests for the estimation of equation 5.9 using 
instrumental variables regression (GMM).   
2. The sample period for (first-differenced) ROA is described above; the sample period for all 
other (first-differenced) explanatory and control variables is 2007-11. 
3. See also notes to table 5.13 
The results of these specification tests strongly suggest that any results from these 
regressions will not be reliable.  In all cases the instruments are very weak; and the 
null hypothesis of the C-test (instrumented variable is exogenous) cannot be 
rejected, even though it is known that the lagged dependent variable is correlated 
with the error term in this model.  Equation 5.9 was re-estimated with (first-
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differenced) RBVE (ROA) in 2011 as the dependent variable; and (first-differenced) 
values of RBVE (ROA) in 2008 and 2007 as instruments for (first-differenced) RBVE 
(ROA) in 2010.  The results are shown in table 5.15 and 5.16: once again there are 
very significant concerns about weak instruments. 
Table 5.15 – Results of Specification Tests for IV Regressions (Dependent Variable 
First-Differenced ROA in 2011) 
 Full Sample Winsorized (1%) Winsorized (2.5%) 
K-P Statistic 0.792 1.16 1.13 
Hansen-J 1.17 0.981 1.02 
Chi-square p-val 0.28 0.32 0.31 
C-Test 0.006 0.016 0.000 
Chi-square p-val 0.94 0.90 0.99 
 
1. Table 5.15 reports the results of specification tests for the estimation of equation 5.9 using 
instrumental variables regression (GMM).   
2. The sample period for (first-differenced) RBVE is described above; the sample period for all 
other (first-differenced) explanatory and control variables is 2006-10.   
3. See also notes to table 5.13. 
Table 5.16 – Results of Specification Tests for IV Regressions (Dependent Variable 
First-Differenced ROA in 2011) 
 Full Sample Winsorized (1%) Winsorized (2.5%) 
K-P Statistic 2.10 2.61 2.79 
Hansen-J 0.151 0.221 0.251 
Chi-square p-val 0.70 0.64 0.62 
C-Test 0.756 0.019 0.057 
Chi-square p-val 0.38 0.89 0.81 
 
1. Table 5.16 reports the results of specification tests for the estimation of equation 5.9 using 
instrumental variables regression (GMM).   
2. The sample period for (first-differenced) ROA is described above; the sample period for all 
other (first-differenced) explanatory and control variables is 2006-10.   
3. See also notes to table 5.13.  
As it is not possible to pursue any further analysis with RBVE or ROA as the 
dependent variable, a dynamic model with an alternative dependent variable, RMVE, 
is estimated in the next sub-section.     
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5.5.2.3 Regression Results with a Dynamic Model (Dependent Variable RMVE) 
It may make the estimation of equation 5.9 more tractable if a hybrid 
accounting/market profitability measure, RMVE, is used as the dependent variable: 
the market value of equity will evolve in response to shocks and may therefore 
reduce serial correlation.  However, the use of such a hybrid measure introduces 
complications in the interpretation of the results of the regression, as (unlike RBVE, 
ROA and returns to shareholders) it cannot be attributed to a single stakeholder 
group.  This point will be explored in more detail when the results are discussed in 
section 5.6.1.4.  
The same empirical approach was followed as in the previous section, beginning with 
Wooldridge’s (2002) test for serial correlation in panel data; the results are shown in 
table 5.17. 
Table 5.17 – Results of Wooldridge’s (2002) Test for Serial Correlation in Panel Data 
Dependent Variable RMVE 
Woolridge Test F(1, 666) = 0.594 
p>F 0.44 
 
1. Table 5.17 reports the results of Woolridge’s (2002) test for serial correlation in panel data.   
2. The test was conducted using the Stata xtserial function which, by default, adjusts for 
clustering and is robust to heteroskedacity. 
3. The null hypothesis of the test is that there is no first-order correlation. 
The null hypothesis of no first-order correlation cannot be rejected, so equation 5.9 
was estimated with (first-differenced) RMVE in 2012 as the dependent variable; and 
(first-differenced) values of RMVE in 2010 and 2009 as instruments for (first-
differenced) RMVE in 2011.  GMM is used throughout, as this is more efficient in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity60.  As in section 5.5.2.2, the equation was estimated 
with three different samples; the results are shown in table 5.18. 
  
                                                          
60 Results using 2SLS were very similar and are reproduced at Appendix 1. 
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Table 5.18 – Results of Cross-Sectional IV Regression (Dependent Variable First-
Differenced RMVE in 2012) 
 Full Sample Winsorized (1%)  Winsorized (2.5%) 
∆(L.RMVE) 
14.637 0.001 -0.182 
(0.54) (0.00) (-0.64) 
∆(Size) 
-2.300 -0.085* -0.074* 
(-0.62) (-2.17) (-2.10) 
∆(Power) 
-266.819 -7.304+ -6.010+ 
(-0.48) (-1.71) (-1.65) 
∆(SD of ROA) 
29.384 2.090* 1.748* 
(0.57) (2.39) (2.08) 
∆(Beta) 
26.391 0.449 0.210 
(0.78) (1.22) (0.79) 
∆(SD of Cashflow) 
2.484 0.167 0.100 
(0.56) (1.03) (0.71) 
High RMVE * ∆(SD 
of ROA) 
-28.052 -1.590+ -1.255 
(-0.58) (-1.82) (-1.52) 
Constant 
0.247 0.035** 0.031** 
(0.24) (2.68) (2.69) 
    
N 665 656 637 
Wald Test of Joint 
Significance 
F(7,657)=0.12 F(7,648)=3.51 F(7,629)=5.68 
p>F 0.997 0.001 0.0000 
K-P Statistic 0.189 9.91 3.26 
Hansen-J 0.072 0.010 0.055 
Chi-square p-val 0.79 0.92 0.82 
C-Test 0.998 9.51 8.27 
Chi-square p-val 0.32 0.002 0.004 
 
1. Table 5.18 reports the results of the estimation of equation 5.9 using instrumental variables 
regression (GMM).   
2. All variable definitions are given in section 5.4.1 and summarised in table 5.2.   
3. The sample period for (first-differenced) RMVE is described above; the sample period for all 
other (first-differenced) explanatory and control variables is 2007-11. 
4. IV regression was estimated using the user-written Stata function ivreg2 (Baum et al (2007)). 
5. R2 values are omitted as they have no meaningful interpretation in IV regression. 
6. Heteroscedastic-robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses (2 decimal places)  
7. Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
8. The Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic is the appropriate test for weak instruments where 
Heteroscedastic errors are suspected; critical values for size are as follows (Stock and Yogo 
(2005)):  
0.1 19.93 
0.15 11.59 
0.2 8.75 
0.25 7.25   
9. The Hansen J-test is used because of possible heteroscedasticity; the null hypothesis is that all 
instruments are valid. 
10. The null hypothesis of the C-test (Eichenbaum (1988)) is that the instrumented variable is 
actually exogenous. 
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Equation 5.9 was then estimated with (first-differenced) RMVE in 2011 as the 
dependent variable; and (first-differenced) values of RMVE in 2009 and 2008 as 
instruments for (first-differenced) RMVE in 2010.  As before, three different samples 
were used; the results are shown in table 5.19. 
Table 5.19 – Results of Cross-Sectional IV Regression (Dependent Variable First-
Differenced RMVE in 2011) 
 Full Sample Winsorized (1%)  Winsorized (2.5%) 
∆(L.RMVE) 
-0.246 0.030 0.035 
(-1.56) (0.50) (0.71) 
∆(Size) 
0.017 0.010 0.015 
(0.48) (0.32) (0.52) 
∆(Power) 
-3.040 0.582 0.246 
(-0.94) (0.46) (0.21) 
∆(SD of ROA) 
1.233* 2.139*** 2.078*** 
(2.31) (5.75) (8.78) 
∆(Beta) 
0.425 -0.184 -0.086 
(0.92) (-1.24) (-0.80) 
∆(SD of Cashflow) 
-0.815+ -0.126 -0.067 
(-1.66) (-0.40) (-0.24) 
High RMVE * ∆(SD 
of ROA) 
-1.363* -1.934*** -1.910*** 
(-2.19) (-3.74) (-3.98) 
Constant 
-0.043+ 0.005 0.007 
(-1.75) (0.42) (0.82) 
    
N 601 591 575 
Wald Test of Joint 
Significance 
F(7,593)=4.62 F(7,583)=5.83 F(7,567)=15.7 
p>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
K-P Statistic 15.9 13.5 12.4 
Hansen-J 1.03 1.72 0.332 
Chi-square p-val 0.31 0.19 0.56 
C-Test 0.580 8.28 10.3 
Chi-square p-val 0.45 0.004 0.001 
 
1. Table 5.19 reports the results of the estimation of equation 5.9 using instrumental variables 
regression (GMM).     
2. The sample period for (first-differenced) RMVE is described above; the sample period for all 
other (first-differenced) explanatory and control variables is 2006-10.   
3. See also notes to table 5.18.  
Equation 5.9 was also estimated with (first-differenced) RMVE in 2010 as the 
dependent variable; and (first-differenced) values of RMVE in 2008 and 2007 as 
instruments for (first-differenced) RMVE in 2009; the results are shown in table 5.20. 
188 
 
Table 5.20 – Results of Cross-Sectional IV Regression (Dependent Variable First-
Differenced RMVE in 2010)  
 Full Sample Winsorized (1%) Winsorized (2.5%) 
∆(L.RMVE) 
0.030 0.030 0.016 
(1.42) (1.42) (0.77) 
∆(Size) 
-0.305 -0.020 -0.008 
(-1.47) (-0.29) (-0.12) 
∆(Power) 
7.009 0.340 -0.059 
(1.39) (0.18) (-0.03) 
∆(SD of ROA) 
0.746* 0.633* 0.604* 
(2.35) (2.56) (2.56) 
∆(Beta) 
0.063 0.101 0.127 
(0.31) (0.76) (0.94) 
∆(SD of Cashflow) 
0.633 0.292 0.365 
(1.20) (1.09) (1.37) 
High RMVE * ∆(SD 
of ROA) 
0.464 0.054 0.366 
(0.38) (0.05) (0.37) 
Constant 
-0.011 0.001 0.009 
(-0.43) (0.08) (0.80) 
    
N 601 592 576 
Wald Test of Joint 
Significance 
F(7,593)=2.08 F(7,584)=1.99 F(7,568)=1.97 
p>F 0.04 0.05 0.06 
K-P Statistic 1190 1150 888 
Hansen-J 1.39 1.25 1.21 
Chi-square p-val 0.24 0.26 0.27 
C-Test 12.8 11.8 10.6 
Chi-square p-val 0.0004 0.001 0.001 
 
1. Table 5.20 reports the results of the estimation of equation 5.9 using instrumental variables 
regression (GMM).   
2. The sample period for (first-differenced) ROE is described above; the sample period for all 
other (first-differenced) explanatory and control variables is 2005-09.   
3. See also notes to table 5.18.  
Finally, equation 5.9 was estimated with (first-differenced) RMVE in 2009 as the 
dependent variable; and (first-differenced) values of RMVE in 2007 and 2006 as 
instruments for (first-differenced) RMVE in 2008; the results are shown in table 5.21. 
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Table 5.21 – Results of Cross-Sectional IV Regression (Dependent Variable First-
Differenced RMVE in 2009) 
 Full Sample  Winsorized (1%) Winsorized (2.5%) 
∆(L.RMVE) 
0.361 0.307 0.356+ 
(0.47) (0.40) (1.66) 
∆(Size) 
-0.474 -0.506 -0.505 
(-0.81) (-0.88) (-1.39) 
∆(Power) 
-2.650 -1.957 -1.479 
(-0.20) (-0.16) (-0.17) 
∆(SD of ROA) 
9.005 8.893 9.545*** 
(1.39) (1.31) (3.57) 
∆(Beta) 
0.969 0.871 0.880* 
(1.21) (1.15) (2.09) 
∆(SD of Cashflow) 
-0.748 -0.650 -0.533 
(-0.53) (-0.48) (-0.61) 
High RMVE * ∆(SD 
of ROA) 
-1.018 -2.016 -2.652 
(-0.18) (-0.33) (-0.66) 
Constant 
-0.071 -0.054 -0.055 
(-0.45) (-0.37) (-0.52) 
    
N 555 545 526 
Wald Test of Joint 
Significance 
F(7,547)=2.02 F(7,537)=2.03 F(7,518)=5.22 
p>F 0.05 0.05 0.0000 
K-P Statistic 1.58 1.99 16.3 
Hansen-J 0.847 0.961 1.81 
Chi-square p-val 0.36 0.33 0.18 
C-Test 2.98 1.17 1.65 
Chi-square p-val 0.08 0.28 0.20 
 
1. Table 5.21 reports the results of the estimation of equation 5.9 using instrumental variables 
regression (GMM).   
2. The sample period for (first-differenced) RMVE is described above; the sample period for all 
other (first-differenced) explanatory and control variables is 2004-08.   
3. See also notes to table 5.18.  
With the exception of 2009, there is at least one regression in each time period 
where: the parameter estimates are jointly significant; the instruments are not 
unduly weak; the instruments are valid; and the null hypothesis of the C-test (that 
the instrumented variable, lagged RMVE, is actually exogenous) can be rejected, as 
expected.  In each of these cases, the parameter estimates for lagged RMVE are 
insignificant; indeed the parameter estimates for lagged RMVE are insignificant in all 
of the regressions.  It is therefore argued that it is possible to conduct regressions 
with RMVE as the dependent variable using a static model.  This might appear to be 
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at variance with the persistence of profits literature but, to reiterate, RMVE is a 
hybrid measure of profitability: arguments based on market efficiency would suggest 
that the market value of equity would evolve to remove any persistence. 
5.5.2.4 Regression Results with a Static Model (Dependent Variables RMVE and Returns 
to Shareholders) 
Given that the lagged RMVE term is consistently insignificant in the dynamic models 
above, and it has already been argued that there is no need for a lagged returns to 
shareholders term; it is possible to estimate instead the simpler, static model shown 
below: 
Performancei = xTiβ + μi + εi     (5.11) 
Where performance is measured in two different ways (RMVE and returns to 
shareholders).  Equation 5.9 can be written in first-differenced form as follows: 
∆Performancei = ∆xTiβ + ∆εi     (5.12) 
As instrumental variables are no longer required, it is possible to use more 
sophisticated methods of dealing with outliers: equation 5.12 was estimated in each 
of the four time periods using OLS, median regression; regression using M-
estimators; and regression using MM-estimators61.  Regression results with (first-
differenced) RMVE as the dependent variable are shown in tables 5.22 to 5.25; and 
results with (first-differenced) returns to shareholders as the dependent variable are 
shown in tables 5.26 to 5.29.   
  
                                                          
61 All of these, with the exception of OLS, are robust to vertical outliers and good leverage 
points but, in addition, the latter two techniques are robust to bad leverage points (see 
Chapter Three for a more detailed discussion). 
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Table 5.22 – Results of OLS Regression (Dependent Variables First-Differenced RMVE 
in 2012, 2011, 2010 and 2009) 
 
∆(RMVE in 
2012) 
∆(RMVE in 
2011) 
∆(RMVE in 
2010) 
∆(RMVE in 
2009) 
∆(Size) 
-0.342 0.058 -0.231* -0.159 
(-0.68) (0.53) (-2.09) (-0.42) 
∆(Power) 
-5.490 -1.895 5.191 -3.359 
(-0.06) (-0.13) (0.47) (-0.14) 
∆(SD of ROA) 
2.782+ 1.202*** 0.682*** 7.574*** 
(1.90) (3.81) (3.51) (16.27) 
∆(Beta) 
12.224*** 0.477 0.124 0.699*** 
(6.30) (1.63) (1.18) (4.28) 
∆(SD of 
Cashflow) 
1.296 -0.623 0.641 -0.538 
(0.54) (-0.89) (1.49) (-0.63) 
High RMVE * 
∆(SD of ROA) 
-3.323 -1.634 0.739 -1.089 
(-0.77) (-0.86) (0.71) (-0.85) 
Constant 
-0.188 -0.062+ -0.004 -0.083 
(-1.25) (-1.87) (-0.17) (-1.29) 
     
R2 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.40 
N 885 776 668 555 
Wald Test of 
Joint 
Significance 
F(6,878)=7.69 F(6,769)=2.83 F(6,661)=4.15 F(6,548)=60.1 
p>F 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.0000 
 
1. Table 5.22 reports the results of the estimation of equation 5.12 using OLS regression.   
2. All variable definitions are given in section 5.4.1 and summarised in table 5.2.   
3. The sample periods for (first-differenced) RMVE are 2012, 2011, 2010 and 2009; and the 
corresponding sample periods for (first-differenced) explanatory and control variables are 
2007-11, 2006-10, 2005-09 and 2004-08. 
4. Heteroscedastic-robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses (2 decimal places).  
5. Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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Table 5.23 – Results of Median Regression (Dependent Variables First-Differenced 
RMVE in 2012, 2011, 2010 and 2009) 
 
∆(RMVE in 
2012) 
∆(RMVE in 
2011) 
∆(RMVE in 
2010) 
∆(RMVE in 
2009) 
∆(Size) 
-0.016 -0.005 -0.009 -0.188 
(-0.93) (-0.90) (-0.29) (-1.47) 
∆(Power) 
-3.424 0.269 -0.701 2.819 
(-1.08) (0.22) (-0.28) (0.87) 
∆(SD of ROA) 
0.158 0.161 0.235 5.552*** 
(0.38) (0.27) (0.54) (6.79) 
∆(Beta) 
-0.086+ 0.084* 0.037 -0.052 
(-1.66) (2.52) (1.12) (-1.03) 
∆(SD of 
Cashflow) 
0.014 -0.143 0.050 0.003 
(0.23) (-1.07) (0.44) (0.01) 
High RMVE * 
∆(SD of ROA) 
0.093 -0.014 0.246 -1.970* 
(0.23) (-0.03) (0.50) (-2.16) 
Constant 
-0.003 0.007* -0.000 -0.003 
(-1.28) (2.17) (-0.04) (-0.21) 
     
Pseudo-R2 0.002 0.005 0.01 0.21 
N 885 776 668 555 
Wald Test of 
Joint 
Significance 
F(6,878)=1.28 F(6,769)=1.55 F(6,661)=0.91 F(6,548)=30.9 
p>F 0.27 0.16 0.49 0.0000 
 
1. Table 5.23 reports the results of the estimation of equation 5.12 using median regression.   
2. All variable definitions are given in section 5.4.1 and summarised in table 5.2.   
3. The sample periods for (first-differenced) RMVE are 2012, 2011, 2010 and 2009; and the 
corresponding sample periods for (first-differenced) explanatory and control variables are 
2007-11, 2006-10, 2005-09 and 2004-08. 
4. Median regression was performed using the Stata qreg function. 
5. t-statistics are shown in parentheses (2 decimal places) based on boot-strapped standard 
errors (100 replications). 
6. Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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Table 5.24 – Results of M-Estimator Regression (Dependent Variables First-
Differenced RMVE in 2012, 2011, 2010 and 2009) 
 
∆(RMVE in 
2012) 
∆(RMVE in 
2011) 
∆(RMVE in 
2010) 
∆(RMVE in 
2009) 
∆(Size) 
-0.016** -0.006 0.020 -0.238** 
(-2.58) (-0.84) (0.92) (-2.77) 
∆(Power) 
-1.097 0.677 -0.915 2.461 
(-1.06) (0.74) (-0.42) (0.45) 
∆(SD of ROA) 
-0.121*** 0.068* 0.438*** 4.755*** 
(-6.81) (2.36) (11.61) (41.71) 
∆(Beta) 
-0.067** 0.047* 0.029 -0.126*** 
(-2.79) (2.57) (1.43) (-3.33) 
∆(SD of 
Cashflow) 
-0.056+ -0.090* 0.091 -0.007 
(-1.93) (-2.07) (1.09) (-0.04) 
High RMVE * 
∆(SD of ROA) 
0.314*** 0.118 0.387+ -1.877*** 
(5.98) (0.99) (1.91) (-6.37) 
Constant 
-0.011*** 0.009*** 0.001 0.022 
(-5.85) (4.48) (0.18) (1.47) 
     
R2 0.08 0.02 0.19 0.78 
N 884 775 668 554 
Wald Test of 
Joint 
Significance 
F(6,877)=13.3 F(6,768)=3.07 F(6,661)=26.0 F(6,547)=327 
p>F 0.0000 0.006 0.0000 0.0000 
  
1. Table 5.24 reports the results of the estimation of equation 5.12 using M-estimator 
regression.   
2. All variable definitions are given in section 5.4.1 and summarised in table 5.2.   
3. The sample periods for (first-differenced) RMVE are 2012, 2011, 2010 and 2009; and the 
corresponding sample periods for (first-differenced) explanatory and control variables are 
2007-11, 2006-10, 2005-09 and 2004-08. 
4. M-estimator regression was performed using the Stata rreg function. 
5. t-statistics are shown in parentheses (2 decimal places) based on pseudo-values.  
6. Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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Table 5.25 – Results of MM-Estimator Regression (Dependent Variables First-
Differenced RMVE in 2012, 2011, 2010 and 2009) 
 
∆(RMVE in  
2012) 
∆(RMVE in 
2011) 
∆(RMVE in 
2010) 
∆(RMVE in  
2009) 
∆(Size) 
-0.009 -0.006 0.007 -0.174 
(-0.79) (-1.36) (0.13) (-0.82) 
∆(Power) 
-5.812*** 0.533 -0.710 2.153 
(-7.67) (1.45) (-0.58) (0.76) 
∆(SD of ROA) 
-0.194*** 0.121** 0.055 4.432*** 
(-5.50) (3.00) (1.58) (7.64) 
∆(Beta) 
-0.092* 0.088** 0.047 -0.118* 
(-2.42) (3.05) (1.43) (-2.56) 
∆(SD of 
Cashflow) 
-0.060 -0.094 0.053* -0.009 
(-0.82) (-1.55) (2.13) (-0.09) 
High RMVE * 
∆(SD of ROA) 
0.254*** 0.064 0.467 -1.321+ 
(3.50) (0.68) (1.55) (-1.68) 
Constant 
-0.010*** 0.010*** 0.000 0.007 
(-6.50) (5.29) (0.01) (0.42) 
     
N 885 776 668 555 
Wald Test of 
Joint 
Significance 
F(6,878)=22.46 F(6,769)=6.57 F(6,661)=3.27 F(6,548)=25.41 
p>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.004 0.0000 
  
1. Table 5.25 reports the results of the estimation of equation 5.12 using MM-estimator 
regression.   
2. All variable definitions are given in section 5.4.1 and summarised in table 5.2.   
3. The sample periods for (first-differenced) RMVE are 2012, 2011, 2010 and 2009; and the 
corresponding sample periods for (first-differenced) explanatory and control variables are 
2007-11, 2006-10, 2005-09 and 2004-08. 
4. MM-estimator regression was performed using the user-defined mmregress function (Verardi 
and Croux (2009)). 
5. t-statistics are shown in parentheses (2 decimal places).  
6. Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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Table 5.26 – Results of OLS Regression (Dependent Variables First-Differenced 
Returns to Shareholders in 2012, 2011, 2010 and 2009) 
 ∆(RTS in 2012) ∆(RTS in 2011) ∆(RTS in 2010) ∆(RTS in 2009) 
∆(Size) 
-0.325 -0.138 -0.132 0.325 
(-1.62) (-1.40) (-0.47) (1.31) 
∆(Power) 
-16.311** -1.643 4.359 -7.744 
(-3.16) (-0.12) (0.52) (-0.82) 
∆(SD of ROA) 
0.381+ 0.029 1.526 0.526* 
(1.78) (0.08) (1.25) (2.36) 
∆(Beta) 
1.436** -4.368+ -2.014*** 0.869*** 
(2.64) (-1.73) (-4.60) (4.68) 
∆(SD of 
Cashflow) 
-1.097 1.002 0.687 -0.469 
(-1.63) (0.97) (1.49) (-0.89) 
∆(Ln[Book to 
Market]) 
0.980*** 1.484*** 0.054 0.270* 
(5.79) (4.06) (1.20) (2.19) 
Constant 
0.179*** -0.423*** -0.081 0.660*** 
(7.22) (-10.38) (-1.26) (13.66) 
     
R2 0.15 0.21 0.09 0.13 
N 880 771 665 599 
Wald Test of 
Joint 
Significance 
F(6,873)=9.87 F(6,764)=3.94 F(6,658)=3.84 F(6,592)=6.26 
p>F 0.0000 0.001 0.001 0.0000 
∆(FTSE 
Returns)62  
12.5% -18.1% -13.6% 58.7% 
 
1. Table 5.26 reports the results of the estimation of equation 5.12 using OLS regression.   
2. All variable definitions are given in section 5.4.1 and summarised in table 5.2.   
3. The sample periods for (first-differenced) returns to shareholders are 2012, 2011, 2010 and 
2009; and the corresponding sample periods for (first-differenced) explanatory and control 
variables are 2007-11, 2006-10, 2005-09 and 2004-08. 
4. Heteroscedastic-robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses (2 decimal places).  
5. Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
 
  
                                                          
62 Based on the FTSE All-Share Index (“FTAS”). 
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Table 5.27 – Results of Median Regression (Dependent Variables First-Differenced 
Returns to Shareholders in 2012, 2011, 2010 and 2009) 
 ∆(RTS in 2012) ∆(RTS in 2011) ∆(RTS in 2010) ∆(RTS in 2009) 
∆(Size) 
-0.084 -0.130 -0.067 0.481+ 
(-1.60) (-1.51) (-0.37) (1.77) 
∆(Power) 
-20.370* -3.183 4.151 -18.733 
(-2.23) (-0.22) (0.34) (-1.56) 
∆(SD of ROA) 
0.191 -0.000 0.184 0.706** 
(0.88) (-0.00) (0.41) (2.94) 
∆(Beta) 
1.807*** -1.309*** -1.294*** 0.775*** 
(5.56) (-4.52) (-8.56) (6.10) 
∆(SD of 
Cashflow) 
-0.333 0.411 0.653 -0.677 
(-0.84) (1.23) (1.06) (-0.86) 
∆(Ln[Book to 
Market]) 
0.827*** 0.821*** 0.023 0.266+ 
(5.97) (3.44) (0.87) (1.88) 
Constant 
0.187*** -0.332*** -0.107*** 0.536*** 
(12.68) (-12.75) (-4.87) (12.83) 
     
Pseudo-R2 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.09 
N 880 771 665 599 
Wald Test of 
Joint Significance 
F(6,873)=14.7 F(6,764)=7.06 F(6,658)=12.7 F(6,592)=12.5 
p>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
∆(FTSE Returns) 12.5% -18.1% -13.6% 58.7% 
 
1. Table 5.27 reports the results of the estimation of equation 5.12 using median regression.   
2. All variable definitions are given in section 5.4.1 and summarised in table 5.2.   
3. The sample periods for (first-differenced) returns to shareholders are 2012, 2011, 2010 and 
2009; and the corresponding sample periods for (first-differenced) explanatory and control 
variables are 2007-11, 2006-10, 2005-09 and 2004-08. 
4. Median regression was performed using the Stata qreg function. 
5. t-statistics are shown in parentheses (2 decimal places) based on boot-strapped standard 
errors (100 replications). 
6. Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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Table 5.28 - Results of M-Estimator Regression (Dependent Variables First-
Differenced Returns to Shareholders in 2012, 2011, 2010 and 2009) 
 ∆(RTS in 2012) ∆(RTS in 2011) ∆(RTS in 2010) ∆(RTS in 2009) 
∆(Size) 
-0.080 -0.123* -0.110 0.387* 
(-1.61) (-2.39) (-1.05) (2.18) 
∆(Power) 
-15.663* 1.773 4.081 -10.900 
(-1.98) (0.26) (0.39) (-0.93) 
∆(SD of ROA) 
0.186 0.100 0.278 0.743*** 
(1.44) (0.69) (1.53) (3.60) 
∆(Beta) 
1.535*** -1.224*** -1.242*** 0.726*** 
(8.48) (-8.34) (-12.45) (9.54) 
∆(SD of 
Cashflow) 
-0.367 0.416 0.809* -0.889* 
(-1.62) (1.27) (1.98) (-2.26) 
∆(Ln[Book to 
Market]) 
0.807*** 0.791*** 0.003 0.255*** 
(10.19) (7.32) (0.09) (6.03) 
Constant 
0.177*** -0.334*** -0.130*** 0.544*** 
(11.24) (-20.58) (-5.83) (18.04) 
     
R2 0.18 0.15 0.20 0.24 
N 879 770 665 599 
Wald Test of 
Joint Significance 
32.1 22.4 27.0 30.5 
p>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
∆(FTSE Returns)  12.5% -18.1% -13.6% 58.7% 
 
1. Table 5.28 reports the results of the estimation of equation 5.12 using M-estimator 
regression.   
2. All variable definitions are given in section 5.4.1 and summarised in table 5.2.   
3. The sample periods for (first-differenced) returns to shareholders are 2012, 2011, 2010 and 
2009; and the corresponding sample periods for (first-differenced) explanatory and control 
variables are 2007-11, 2006-10, 2005-09 and 2004-08. 
4. M-estimator regression was performed using the Stata rreg function. 
5. t-statistics are shown in parentheses (2 decimal places) based on pseudo-values.  
6. Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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Table 5.29 - Results of MM-Estimator Regression (Dependent Variables First-
Differenced Returns to Shareholders in 2012, 2011, 2010 and 2009) 
 ∆(RTS in 2012) ∆(RTS in 2011) ∆(RTS in 2010) ∆(RTS in 2009) 
∆(Size) 
-0.076* -0.100 -0.091 0.249 
(-2.01) (-1.40) (-0.66) (1.25) 
∆(Power) 
-15.043** 9.206 2.502 -12.327* 
(-2.90) (0.85) (0.53) (-2.44) 
∆(SD of ROA) 
0.180* 0.058 0.075 1.021*** 
(2.11) (0.79) (0.51) (6.23) 
∆(Beta) 
1.563*** -1.099*** -1.186*** 0.659*** 
(3.68) (-5.16) (-8.67) (5.46) 
∆(SD of 
Cashflow) 
-0.405+ 0.410* 0.798*** -1.352*** 
(-1.68) (1.97) (4.08) (-3.84) 
∆(Ln[Book to 
Market]) 
0.776*** 0.814*** -0.001 0.428*** 
(7.59) (3.69) (-0.06) (3.75) 
Constant 
0.181*** -0.320*** -0.110*** 0.498*** 
(10.78) (-14.10) (-5.50) (16.13) 
     
N 880 771 665 599 
Wald Test of 
Joint 
Significance 
F(6,873)=13.9 F(6,764)=5.77 F(6,658)=17.0 F(6,592)=30.7 
p>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
∆(FTSE 
Returns)  
12.5% -18.1% -13.6% 58.7% 
 
1. Table 5.29 reports the results of the estimation of equation 5.12 using MM-estimator 
regression.   
2. All variable definitions are given in section 5.4.1 and summarised in table 5.2.   
3. The sample periods for (first-differenced) returns to shareholders are 2012, 2011, 2010 and 
2009; and the corresponding sample periods for (first-differenced) explanatory and control 
variables are 2007-11, 2006-10, 2005-09 and 2004-08. 
4. MM-estimator regression was performed using the user-defined mmregress function (Verardi 
and Croux (2009)). 
5. t-statistics are shown in parentheses (2 decimal places).  
6. Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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5.5.2.5 Summary 
The possibility of persistence of profits led to the use of a dynamic mode for 
regressions with accounting performance measures as the dependent variable, 
which required the use of instrumental variable techniques; however it turned out to 
be impossible to find instruments for lagged RBVE and ROA in order to estimate the 
model.  RMVE was therefore used as an alternative dependent variable, noting that 
the use of such a hybrid measure of profitability introduces complications in the 
interpretation of any results from these regressions.  Not only was it possible to 
instrument lagged RMVE, but the regression results indicated that the lagged RMVE 
term could be dropped and a simpler static model used (the results of which are 
discussed in the next paragraph).  The results from the IV regression need to be 
treated with caution as there is a finite-sample bias and the only way to reduce the 
influence of outliers is by Winsorization; but the parameter estimates for the 
standard deviation of ROA were universally positive, and significant for at least one 
sample in each time period.    
Results from the different static models are broadly consistent, but: the median 
regression lacks power (as would be expected from its lower theoretical efficiency – 
see Chapter Three); and there are a number of differences in the signs and 
significance of parameter estimates between the OLS regression and the robust (M-
estimator and MM-estimator) regressions, suggesting that outliers can unduly 
influence the results.  The following discussion will therefore focus on the results of 
the M-estimator and MM-estimator regressions using the static model (tables 5.24, 
5.25, 5.28 and 5.29).  The first observation is that the model with RMVE as the 
dependent variable appears to work very well in the first time-period (first-
differenced RMVE in 2009), with high values of (pseudo) R2 and highly-significant F-
values from the Wald test, but the fit is much poorer in subsequent time periods; 
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indeed the F-values from the median regression are insignificant in all other time 
periods.  This finding is consistent with the discussions in previous chapters about a 
step-change in environmental uncertainty following the onset of the financial crisis in 
2007/08: the model appears to have good explanatory power in stable conditions 
but loses much of this when the system is subjected to major shocks.  The model 
with returns to shareholders as the dependent variable works somewhat better in 
the first two time-periods; but there is no sudden breakdown as noted above. 
Looking first at the results from the model with RMVE as the dependent variable 
(tables 5.24 and 5.25), it appears from both the M-estimator and MM-estimator 
regressions that the parameter estimates for the risk variables change over time.  In 
the first period the parameter estimates for standard deviation of ROA are positive 
and highly significant; in the middle two periods they are still positive but reduced in 
significance; and in the final period they are negative and highly significant.  
Meanwhile the parameter estimates for the interaction term of standard deviation 
of ROA with prior performance are negative and at least moderately significant in the 
first period; insignificant in the middle two periods and positive and highly significant 
in the final period.  The parameter estimates for standard deviation of cashflow vary 
between positive and negative, and are almost all non-significant.  No specific 
predictions were made about the relationship between beta and subsequent RMVE 
but the results from both the M-estimator and MM-estimator regressions show the 
same pattern: significant negative parameter estimates in the first and last time 
periods, and a significant positive parameter estimate in 2011.  As stated previously, 
considerable care must be taken in the interpretation of these results because of the 
hybrid nature of the dependent variable and these will be discussed in detail in 
section 5.6.1.4. 
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Turning to look at the results with returns to shareholders as the dependent variable 
both the M-estimator and MM-estimators regression techniques produce the same 
pattern of results for the parameter estimates of beta (see tables 5.28 and 5.29), 
with significant positive values in the first and last time period and significant 
negative values in the middle two periods.  No predictions were made about the 
relationship between standard deviation of ROA and subsequent returns to 
shareholders, but all four regression techniques give a positive and significant 
parameter estimate for standard deviation of ROA in the first period.  No predictions 
were made about the relationship between standard deviation of cashflow and 
subsequent returns to shareholders either, but the M-estimator and MM-estimator 
regressions both give a negative and at least moderately significant parameter 
estimate in the first time period and a significant positive parameter estimate in the 
second time period.  The parameter estimates for the natural log of the book-to-
market ratio were positive and significant in every time period except for 2010.     
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5.6 Discussion 
This section begins by discussing how the findings of both univariate tests and 
regression analyses contribute to the understanding of the relationship between risk 
and performance; section 5.6.2 then discusses some of the practical implications of 
the findings; and section 5.6.3 acknowledges the limitations of the study, and 
suggests some useful areas for future research.  
5.6.1 Developing the Theory of Risk and Return 
The combination of conducting analyses over multiple time periods; using a novel set 
of risk measures (including a cashflow risk construct); using multiple performance 
measures (including RMVE); removing unobservable firm fixed effects; and applying 
a selection of robust correlation and regression techniques has revealed a much 
more complex relationship between risks and performance, contingent on the 
prevailing economic conditions, than has emerged from previous studies.  Section 
5.6.1.1 describes the changes in environmental conditions over the course of the 
study, which form the context for the discussion of the evolution of risk-return 
relationships which follows.  The relationship between pure accounting measures of 
risk and return, derived from the univariate tests, is discussed in section 5.6.1.2; the 
relationships between the different risk components and returns to shareholders are 
discussed in section 5.6.1.3; and the relationships between the different risk 
components and a hybrid performance measure, RMVE, are discussed in section 
5.6.1.4.  The conclusions are summarised in section 5.6.1.5. 
5.6.1.1 Environmental Uncertainty and Growth 
Table 4.15 in Chapter Four showed how various measures of environmental 
uncertainty changed over the period of the study; two of these measures are 
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reproduced in table 5.30 (columns 2 and 3), together with two measures of growth: 
UK GDP growth and returns on the FTSE index. 
Table 5.30 – Measures of Uncertainty and Growth 
Period 
SD of Quarterly 
GDP Growth 
SD of FTSE19 
Monthly Returns 
GDP Growth 
 FTSE Returns19 
2008-12 0.84% 4.9% -3.0% 6.4% 
2007-11 0.95% 5.0% 0.6% -8.7% 
2006-10 0.96% 4.8% 1.4% 4.0% 
2005-09 1.01% 4.5% 3.7% 9.0% 
2004-08 0.93% 3.8% 6.2% -4.9% 
2003-07 0.42% 2.8% 16.1% 74.2% 
1983-200263 0.60% 4.8% 16.7% 45.8% 
 
In the discussion below, it is argued that the observed patterns in risk-return 
relationships are primarily due to changes in the growth environment (rather than 
changes in environmental uncertainty): annual figures for the two growth measures 
are plotted in fig. 5.6. 
Fig. 5.6 – FTSE Returns and GDP Growth 2003-12 (dashed lines show average over 
period 1983-2002) 
 
It can be seen from fig. 5.6 that the first four years of the study period are 
characterised by average GDP growth and above average FTSE returns.  FTSE returns 
were quicker to react to the financial crisis, turning negative in 2007 and 2008; and 
                                                          
63 Growth rates and returns are adjusted to five-year equivalents. 
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then oscillating about the long-term average for the final four periods.  GDP growth 
went negative in 2008 and 2009, before returning to low but fairly stable rates of 
growth in the final three periods.  It is also important to note that this period of low 
growth was accompanied by unusually low interest rates in the UK (and elsewhere).  
5.6.1.2 The Relationship Between Accounting Measures of Risk and Performance 
Whilst relatively crude, the univariate tests in section 5.5.1 are important because 
they provide the only opportunity to directly examine the relationship between pure 
accounting measures of risk and return; which have previously been argued to be the 
salient measures for the managers of firms (Miller and Bromiley (1990)). These tests 
are also important because they directly address Bowman’s (1980) “paradox”.  The 
results were both simple and striking: the significant negative correlations observed 
between the standard deviation of ROA and subsequent ROA disappear in all time 
periods once firm fixed effects are removed (by first-differencing).  Indeed, 
significant positive correlations between the standard deviation of ROA and 
subsequent ROA were observed in the first two time periods.  Following Bowman’s 
(1980) original argument about well-managed firms being able to combine high 
profitability and low variability in profits, and Andersen et al’s (2007) mathematical 
model of a “strategic responsiveness” capability; it would appear that the removal of 
such unobservable firm fixed effects is necessary to observe the underlying positive 
association between standard deviation of ROA and subsequent ROA (in support of 
hypothesis 2).  It is argued that this positive relationship reflects the cumulative 
effect of the managers of firms requiring higher expected returns to invest in riskier 
projects.   
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5.6.1.3 Risk and Returns to Shareholders 
In all of the regressions the regressions with (first-differenced) returns to 
shareholders as the dependent variable, the parameter estimates for market risk 
(beta) are positive and highly significant in both the first and last time period (when 
market returns are positive); and negative and highly significant in the middle two 
time periods (when market returns are negative).  These observations are entirely 
consistent with the empirical results of Pettengill et al (1995), Morelli (2011) and 
Cotter et al (2015).  Thus, even with the inclusion of a number of idiosyncratic risk 
measures; Pettengill et al’s (1995) central argument, that the relationship between 
market risk and return is contingent on the performance of the market (hypotheses 
1a and 1b), is supported.  It is interesting to note that a similar conditional 
relationship between beta and returns is observed even when raw (not first-
differenced) variables are used (see Appendix 2, table 5.38); although the parameter 
estimates for beta are insignificant in both 2010 and 2012 in these regressions. 
Significant parameter estimates were also observed in these regressions for: the 
standard deviation of ROA (2009 and 2012); the standard deviation of cashflow 
(2009 and 2010); and book-to-market value of equity (2009, 2011 and 2012).  
Relationships between such idiosyncratic measures and returns to shareholders have 
been observed in many previous studies but there are no definitive explanations.  
The positive relationship between profit risk and returns (2009 and 2012) and 
cashflow risk and returns (2010) is consistent with Malkiel and Xu’s (2002) version of 
the CAPM where investors are unable to diversify fully (due to structural, 
informational or behavioural constraints), which predicts a positive relationship 
between idiosyncratic risk and returns.  It is also consistent with the results of 
Malkiel and Xu (2002) and Cotter et al (2015).  The negative relationship between 
cashflow risk and returns in 2009 is more puzzling, although there are theoretical 
206 
 
models that predict this; eg Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (2006) argued that what is 
really being observed is the (negative) pricing of market volatility risk.  A positive 
relationship between book-to-market value of equity and returns to shareholders 
was first identified by Stattman (1980), and it was subsequently incorporated into 
Fama and French’s (1992) “three-factor” model; but there is still no clear 
understanding of its meaning (one of Fama and French’s (1992) suggestions is that it 
arises because market overreaction occurs and is subsequently corrected). 
5.6.1.4 Risk and Return on Market Value of Equity 
As explained in section 5.5.2.2, it was simply not possible to estimate equation 5.9 
with pure accounting performance measures, RBVE and ROA, as the dependent 
variables; a hybrid accounting-market measure of profitability, RMVE, was therefore 
used as the dependent variable.  However, this complicates the interpretation of the 
results of these analyses; as the denominator of the dependent variable is influenced 
by both the expected returns to and, critically, the risks to shareholders.  In the 
discussion that follows, consideration of the salience of each individual risk measure 
to particular stakeholder groups is therefore critical in understanding the observed 
relationships. 
The relationship between profit risk (the standard deviation of ROA) and subsequent 
profitability (RMVE) can best be understood in terms of the regimes of normal and 
low (or negative) GDP growth before and after the onset of the financial crisis 
respectively.  Concentrating on the first and last five-year time periods, as the 
clearest exemplars of the normal and low-growth regimes respectively; it is useful to 
rearrange the parameter estimates for standard deviation of ROA and for the 
interaction term between prior performance and standard deviation of ROA to give 
207 
 
separate parameter estimates for the standard deviation of ROA for high and low-
performing firms (above and below median), as shown in table 5.31.     
Table 5.31 – Parameter Estimates for First-Differenced Standard Deviation of ROA for 
High and Low-Performing Firms 
 
∆(RMVE in 2012) ∆(RMVE in 2009) 
M-Estimator 
Regression 
MM-Estimator 
Regression 
M-Estimator 
Regression 
MM-Estimator 
Regression 
Low-
Performing 
Firms 
-0.121*** -0.194*** 4.755*** 4.432*** 
High-
Performing 
Firms 
0.193*** 0.060 2.878*** 3.111*** 
 
1. Table 5.31 presents separate parameter estimates for the standard deviation of ROA for low-
performing and high-performing firms. 
2. The figure for low-performing firms is simply the parameter estimate for standard deviation of 
ROA, copied from tables 5.24 and 5.25. 
3. The figure for high-performing firms is the sum of the parameter estimates for standard 
deviation of ROA and for the interaction term with high performance, copied from tables 5.24 
and 5.25. 
4. Results for the median regression with first-differenced RMVE in 2012 as the dependent 
variable are not reported as the null hypothesis of the parameter estimates being jointly 
insignificant could not be rejected (see table 5.21). 
5.  Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 based on t-
statistics (low-performing firms) and on a Wald test (high-performing firms). 
 
In the conditions of normal growth that existed prior to the financial crisis 
(dependent variable first-differenced RMVE in 2009), there is a statistically significant 
positive relationship between profit risk (the standard deviation of ROA) and future 
profitability (RMVE) for all firms.  Given the salience of profit risk to the managers of 
firms (Miller and Bromiley (1990)), it is argued that this finding supports the 
prediction that the managers of firms make risk-return trade-offs in their allocation 
of resources (hypothesis 2).  However this study cannot differentiate between the 
competing explanations that managers make these trade-offs in the best interests of 
firm owners (Marsh and Swanson (1984)), or because of their own personal risk 
aversion (Bowman (1980)).  The association between profit risk and subsequent 
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RMVE is not only statistically significant but highly economically significant: an 
absolute increase of 1% in the standard deviation of ROA leads to a predicted 
absolute increase in future RMVE of between 3 and 5% (compared to a mean RMVE 
of 7% in 2009).  It appears then that in benign economic conditions, with many 
attractive opportunities for investment, there is an extremely high risk premium.  
However, there is no evidence for the hypothesised reduction in the magnitude of 
this positive association between profit risk and return for low-performing firms in 
this time period; indeed there is an unexpected and statistically significant increase.    
This finding of a positive risk-return relationship, at least in the first time period, is 
perhaps the most significant contribution of the study: whilst consistent with theory 
and the results of the univariate tests in section 5.5.1, it contradicts the results of 
almost all previous studies (eg Miller and Bromiley (1990), who found a significant 
negative association between their “income-stream risk” construct and subsequent 
RBVE).  It is therefore important to establish that this was not simply the result of the 
choice of RMVE as the dependent variable.  As a robustness test, a further MM-
estimator regression was conducted using raw (as opposed to first-differenced) 
variables.  The full results of this regression are shown in table 5.37 of Appendix 2 
and the key results are shown in table 5.32 below.   
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Table 5.32 – Comparison of Parameter Estimates for Standard Deviation of ROA for 
High and Low-Performing Firms with RMVE in 2009 and First-Differenced RMVE in 
2009 as the Dependent Variables 
 
∆(RMVE in 
2009) 
RMVE in 2009 
Low-
Performing 
Firms 
4.432*** -0.156*** 
High-
Performing 
Firms 
3.111*** 0.191 
 
1. Table 5.32 presents parameter estimates for standard deviation of ROA for low-performing 
and high-performing firms. 
2. Column 2 is derived from the estimation of equation 5.14 using MM-estimator regression. 
3. Column 3 is derived from the estimation of equation 5.13 using MM-estimator regression. 
4. The figure for low-performing firms is simply the parameter estimate for standard deviation of 
ROA, copied from tables 5.25 and 5.37. 
5. The figure for high-performing firms is the sum of the parameter estimates for standard 
deviation of ROA and for the interaction term with high performance, copied from tables 5.25 
and 5.37. 
6. MM-estimator regression was performed using the user-defined mmregress function (Verardi 
and Croux (2009)). 
7.  Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001 based on t-
statistics (low-performing firms) and on a Wald test (high-performing firms). 
 
It can be seen from table 5.32 that the use of the raw variables yields a statistically 
significant negative parameter estimate for low-performing firms and a non-
significant parameter estimate for high-performing firms: the use of RMVE as the 
dependent variable on its own does not result in a finding of a positive association 
between profit risk and profitability.  Rather, as was argued in section 5.6.1.2 in the 
context of the observed positive correlation between standard deviation of ROA and 
subsequent ROA; it would appear that the removal of unobservable firm fixed effects 
is necessary to observe the underlying positive association between profit risk and 
profitability.   
As noted in section 5.5.2.5, the regression model works considerably less well in later 
time periods, but it still produces some interesting results.  In the final period, 
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representing the best exemplar of the conditions of unusually low growth that 
obtained during and after the onset of the financial crisis, there is still a positive 
relationship between profit risk and future profitability for high-performing firms; 
but the magnitude of this effect is reduced by an order of magnitude, indeed the 
parameter estimate is not even statistically significant in the MM-estimator 
regression (see table 5.31).  Once again, based on the salience of profit risk to the 
managers of firms; it would appear that in such challenging conditions, where there 
are very limited opportunities for value-creating investments and interest rates close 
to zero, a much lower premium is required to invest in risky projects64.  In addition, 
consistent with the predictions of Cyert and March (1992) and March and Shapira 
(1987) (and in support of hypothesis 4); the parameter estimates for the interaction 
term between the standard deviation of ROA and previous high performance are 
positive (and statistically significant in both the M-estimator and MM-estimator 
regressions).  Indeed, the association between profit risk and future profitability is 
actually negative (and statistically significant) for poorly-performing firms.  It would 
appear that, in such extreme conditions, behavioural arguments are applicable: as a 
result of “problemistic search” (Cyert and March (1992)) at the firm level and/or the 
“break-even effect” (Thaler and Johnson (1990)) at an individual level, the managers 
of poorly performing firms will actually accept an increase in profit risk with no 
corresponding increase in expected returns. 
The M-estimator and MM-estimator regressions with (first-differenced) RMVE as the 
dependent variable (tables 5.24 and 5.25) both show the same pattern for beta: 
significant negative parameter estimates in the first and last time periods, and a 
significant positive parameter estimate in 2011.  Whilst beta is primarily of interest 
                                                          
64 This is different to Marsh and Swanson’s (1984) argument that managers simply mirror the 
market risk premium in their risk-return decisions; but the effect is similar (see Chapter Two 
for more details). 
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as a risk measure to shareholders, this pattern is a complete reversal of that which 
was observed in the regressions with returns to shareholders as the dependent 
variable; so it cannot be explained in terms of the normal risk-return preferences of 
investors.  However, if managers are also shareholders (or their pay is linked to the 
share price), the observed pattern can be understood by extending managers’ desire 
to avoid specific negative outcomes for the firm (as hypothesised by, for example, 
Libby and Fishburn (1977), Amihud and Lev (1981), and Oswald and Jahera (1991)) to 
avoidance of personal financial distress.  Managers in firms with higher values of 
beta experience greater loss to their personal wealth in the periods 2004-08 and 
2007-11, when the stock market is falling, than their peers in low-beta firms; and, it 
is argued, react by making risk-averse decisions in the running of the firm.  Given the 
positive relationship observed between profit risk and subsequent RMVE, this risk-
aversion tends to lead to lower average performance65.  Conversely, when the stock 
market is rising (2005-09 and 2006-10), managers in high-beta firms experience the 
greatest growth in their personal wealth; they therefore feel comfortable taking on 
more profit risk, and thereby achieve better average performance.   
5.6.1.5 Summary 
The results of regression analysis with returns to shareholders as the dependent 
variable support the prediction that increased market risk (beta) is associated with 
higher future returns to shareholders when returns on the market portfolio are 
above the risk-free rate (hypothesis 1a); and lower future returns  when returns on 
the market portfolio are below the risk-free rate (hypothesis 1b).  The results of 
univariate analysis support the prediction of a positive relationship between 
increased profit risk and future profitability (hypothesis 2), at least in the period prior 
                                                          
65 The possibility that managers’ personal risk aversion may (be allowed to) influence 
behaviour is explored more directly in the next chapter. 
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to the financial crisis, but only when variables are first-differenced to remove firm 
fixed effects.  The results of regression analysis with RMVE as the dependent variable 
also support this prediction but, once again, only when first-differenced variables are 
used.  In addition, the results of regression analysis with RMVE as the dependent 
variable support the prediction that the risk-return relationship is less positive for 
lower-performing firms (hypothesis 4), but only in the environment of low growth 
that existed after the onset of the financial crisis.  No evidence was found in support 
of the prediction that increased cashflow risk is associated with lower future 
profitability (hypothesis 3).   It was noticeable in both univariate tests and regression 
analyses that there were frequent differences between the results obtained from 
robust and non-robust techniques: this highlights the potential for outliers to affect 
correlation and regression results, and justifies the use of these robust techniques. 
5.6.2 Practical Implications 
The most obvious practical use of the model developed in this chapter would be to 
compute a benchmark profitability level (in terms of RMVE) for a firm, given the level 
of profit risk that managers have chosen to bear, against which historical managerial 
performance66 could be judged.  As Nekrasov and Shroff (2009) argue: “...if the 
source of value generation and therefore the source of risk reside in economic 
fundamentals such as earnings, then it would make sense to measure risk directly 
from fundamentals”; so, whilst still using market value of equity, this approach 
should be a more useful way of risk-adjusting managers’ performance than the use 
of beta or other risk measures derived purely from returns data.  The application of 
the model in a forward-looking context, in line with the growing interest in 
accounting–based risk measures for valuation purposes (eg Gebhardt et al (2001), 
                                                          
66 Note that individual firms deviating from the predictions of the model does not imply that 
the model in equation (5.6) was mis-specified, as firm-fixed effects such as managerial quality 
were deliberately removed by first-differencing. 
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Nekrasov and Shroff (2009), Toms (2012)); is not as straightforward, as the 
relationship between profit risk and profitability was demonstrated to be contingent 
on economic conditions.  However, a risk-return relationship derived from a previous 
period of similar growth could be used to compare the attractiveness of different 
investment opportunities in the present.   
5.6.3 Limitations and Directions for Further Research 
The principal limitation of the study design was that it was not possible to conduct 
regression analyses with a pure accounting measure of performance as the 
dependent variable, because of the inability to find instruments for the lagged 
dependent variable.  This may well represent a fundamental limitation on the utility 
of this approach: simply gathering more data is unlikely to mitigate the problem, so 
alternative methods may be required to make further progress.  In particular, it may 
not be possible to apply this approach to the analysis of privately-held firms because 
of the lack of market data.  In addition, the removal of firm-fixed effects precluded 
the direct examination of the effect of risk management, a long-term firm capability, 
on the relationship between risk and subsequent performance.  Understanding the 
effect of a firm’s risk management capability on performance is a question of both 
theoretical and practical interest and this will be discussed further in Chapter Seven.    
It is also important to recognise that the constant changes in environmental 
conditions over the period of the study reduces the overall power of the analysis, as 
parameters could not be estimated over multiple time periods.  It would therefore 
be very useful to continue the study longitudinally, in order to attempt to gather 
data over a prolonged period of comparative stability.  This is especially important 
for the model with RMVE as the dependent variable, as the explanatory power of the 
model was much reduced by the financial crisis.  In particular, it would be interesting 
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to further investigate the unexpected observation (in the first time period) that 
future RMVE was more positively associated with the standard deviation of ROA for 
low-performing firms.  In addition, continuing the study longitudinally would permit 
testing of the hypothesis developed in section 5.6.1.4 about the dependence of 
future RMVE on beta.  In the models with returns to shareholders as the dependent 
variable, continuing the study longitudinally would also permit a better 
understanding of the relationships between various measures of idiosyncratic risk 
and market performance (see section 5.6.1.3). 
Whilst not central to the study, it was surprising to see statistically significant, 
negative parameter estimates for firm size in the M-estimator regression with (first-
differenced) RMVE in 2009 and 2012 as the dependent variables (see table 5.24); 
although the parameter estimates were not significant in the corresponding median 
or MM-estimator regressions (see table 5.25).  As noted earlier, the data for this 
study were derived from a period of extraordinary market conditions around the 
financial crisis beginning in 2008, where the normal drivers of performance may not 
apply.  The relationship between size and performance during recessions seems to 
be a very under-researched area; however Picard and Rimmer (1999), in their study 
of the performance of US newspaper corporations during the recession of the early 
1990s, found that firm size was negatively correlated with growth in revenues during 
the recession and that larger firms recovered more slowly afterwards.  Given the 
very basic design of their study, and small sample size (15 firms), it is not possible to 
say with confidence what the underlying causes of the observed relationships might 
be; although the authors suggest, quite plausibly, that the results may be explained 
in part by the inertia of larger firms in reacting to changed macroeconomic 
circumstances.  It would also be very interesting to explore this issue in more detail.   
215 
 
Appendix 1 – IV (2SLS) Regression Results for Dynamic Models 
Equation 5.9 was estimated using IV (2SLS) regression with (first-differenced) RMVE 
in 2012 as the dependent variable; and (first-differenced) values of RMVE in 2010 
and 2009 as instruments for (first-differenced) RMVE in 2011.  The results are shown 
in table 5.33. 
Table 5.33 – Results of Cross-Sectional IV Regression (Dependent Variable First-
Differenced RMVE in 2012)  
 Full Sample Winsorized (1%) Winsorized (2.5%) 
∆(L.RMVE) 
13.913 0.004 -0.198 
(0.51) (0.02) (-0.68) 
∆(Size) 
-2.238 -0.086* -0.071+ 
(-0.60) (-2.15) (-1.95) 
∆(Power) 
-264.098 -7.364+ -5.839 
(-0.48) (-1.71) (-1.57) 
∆(SD of ROA) 
28.003 2.101* 1.709* 
(0.54) (2.39) (2.00) 
∆(Beta) 
26.878 0.443 0.227 
(0.79) (1.19) (0.82) 
∆(SD of Cashflow) 
2.393 0.167 0.099 
(0.54) (1.03) (0.71) 
High RMVE * ∆(SD 
of ROA) 
-26.889 -1.600+ -1.220 
(-0.56) (-1.82) (-1.46) 
Constant 
0.199 0.035** 0.030* 
(0.19) (2.58) (2.42) 
    
N 665 656 637 
Wald Test of Joint 
Significance 
F(7,657)=0.13 F(7,648)=3.49 F(7,629)=5.59 
p>F 0.996 0.001 0.0000 
K-P Statistic 0.189 9.91 3.26 
Hansen-J 0.072 0.010 0.055 
Chi-square p-val 0.79 0.92 0.82 
C-Test 0.998 9.51 8.27 
Chi-square p-val 0.32 0.002 0.004 
 
  
216 
 
1. Table 5.33 reports the results of the estimation of equation 5.9 using instrumental variables 
regression (2SLS).   
2. All variable definitions are given in section 5.4.1 and summarised in table 5.2.   
3. The sample period for (first-differenced) RMVE is described above; the sample period for all 
other (first-differenced) explanatory and control variables is 2007-11. 
4. IV regression was estimated using the user-written Stata function ivreg2 (Baum et al (2007)). 
5. R2 values are omitted as they have no meaningful interpretation in IV regression. 
6. Heteroscedastic-robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses (2 decimal places)  
7. Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
8. The Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic is the appropriate test for weak instruments where 
heteroscedastic errors are suspected; critical values for size are as follows (Stock and Yogo 
(2005)):  
0.1 19.93 
0.15 11.59 
0.2 8.75 
0.25 7.25   
9. The Hansen J-test is used because of possible heteroscedasticity; the null hypothesis is that all 
instruments are valid. 
10. The null hypothesis of the C-test (Eichenbaum (1988)) is that the instrumented variable is 
actually exogenous. 
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Equation 5.9 was then estimated with (first-differenced) RMVE in 2011 as the 
dependent variable; and (first-differenced) values of RMVE in 2009 and 2008 as 
instruments for (first-differenced) RMVE in 2010.  The results are shown in table 
5.34. 
Table 5.34 – Results of Cross-Sectional IV Regression (Dependent Variable First-
Differenced RMVE in 2011) 
 Full Sample Winsorized (1%) Winsorized (2.5%) 
∆(L.RMVE) 
-0.244 0.004 0.038 
(-1.55) (0.06) (0.77) 
∆(Size) 
0.020 0.011 0.015 
(0.55) (0.38) (0.52) 
∆(Power) 
-2.418 0.557 0.274 
(-0.73) (0.44) (0.23) 
∆(SD of ROA) 
1.151* 1.781*** 2.100*** 
(2.13) (3.86) (8.76) 
∆(Beta) 
0.350 -0.231 -0.092 
(0.75) (-1.51) (-0.84) 
∆(SD of Cashflow) 
-0.697 -0.171 -0.069 
(-1.38) (-0.54) (-0.25) 
High RMVE * ∆(SD 
of ROA) 
-1.288* -1.566** -1.910*** 
(-2.06) (-2.66) (-3.98) 
Constant 
-0.043+ 0.002 0.007 
(-1.74) (0.21) (0.85) 
    
N 601 591 575 
Wald Test of Joint 
Significance 
F(7,593)=3.82 F(7,583)=3.68 F(7,567)=15.6 
p>F 0.001 0.001 0.0000 
K-P Statistic 15.9 13.5 12.4 
Hansen-J 1.03 1.72 0.332 
Chi-square p-val 0.31 0.19 0.56 
C-Test 0.580 8.28 10.3 
Chi-square p-val 0.45 0.004 0.001 
 
1. Table 5.34 reports the results of the estimation of equation 5.9 using instrumental variables 
regression (2SLS).     
2. The sample period for (first-differenced) RMVE is described above; the sample period for all 
other (first-differenced) explanatory and control variables is 2006-10.   
3. See also notes to table 5.33.  
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Equation 5.9 was then estimated with (first-differenced) RMVE in 2010 as the 
dependent variable; and (first-differenced) values of RMVE in 2008 and 2007 as 
instruments for (first-differenced) RMVE in 2009.  The results are shown in table 
5.35. 
Table 5.35 – Results of Cross-Sectional IV Regression (Dependent Variable First-
Differenced RMVE in 2010) 
 Full Sample Winsorized (1%) Winsorized (2.5%) 
∆(L.RMVE) 
0.035 0.035 0.021 
(1.61) (1.62) (1.00) 
∆(Size) 
-0.330 -0.057 -0.040 
(-1.58) (-0.74) (-0.54) 
∆(Power) 
7.796 1.223 0.681 
(1.54) (0.60) (0.35) 
∆(SD of ROA) 
0.660* 0.547* 0.515* 
(2.02) (2.11) (2.06) 
∆(Beta) 
0.055 0.061 0.094 
(0.28) (0.44) (0.67) 
∆(SD of Cashflow) 
0.651 0.252 0.329 
(1.24) (0.93) (1.22) 
High RMVE * ∆(SD 
of ROA) 
0.438 0.022 0.334 
(0.35) (0.02) (0.34) 
Constant 
-0.018 -0.000 0.009 
(-0.71) (-0.00) (0.76) 
    
N 601 592 576 
Wald Test of Joint 
Significance 
F(7,593)=2.11 F(7,584)=1.89 F(7,568)=1.78 
p>F 0.04 0.07 0.09 
K-P Statistic 1190 1150 888 
Hansen-J 1.39 1.25 1.21 
Chi-square p-val 0.24 0.26 0.27 
C-Test 12.8 11.8 10.6 
Chi-square p-val 0.0004 0.001 0.001 
 
1. Table 5.35 reports the results of the estimation of equation 5.9 using instrumental variables 
regression (2SLS).   
2. The sample period for (first-differenced) RMVE is described above; the sample period for all 
other (first-differenced) explanatory and control variables is 2005-09.   
3. See also notes to table 5.33.  
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Equation 5.9 was then estimated with (first-differenced) RMVE in 2009 as the 
dependent variable; and (first-differenced) values of RMVE in 2007 and 2006 as 
instruments for (first-differenced) RMVE in 2008.  The results are shown in table 
5.36. 
Table 5.36 – Results of Cross-Sectional IV Regression (Dependent Variable First-
Differenced RMVE in 2009) 
 Full Sample Winsorized (1%) Winsorized (2.5%) 
∆(L.RMVE) 
1.158 1.067 0.415+ 
(1.00) (0.98) (1.89) 
∆(Size) 
-0.319 -0.399 -0.288 
(-0.52) (-0.69) (-0.72) 
∆(Power) 
-8.461 -6.383 -4.723 
(-0.59) (-0.49) (-0.54) 
∆(SD of ROA) 
16.127 16.108 10.799*** 
(1.60) (1.61) (3.81) 
∆(Beta) 
1.682 1.559 1.084* 
(1.51) (1.51) (2.42) 
∆(SD of Cashflow) 
-0.939 -0.829 -0.494 
(-0.65) (-0.60) (-0.56) 
High RMVE * ∆(SD 
of ROA) 
-3.368 -4.062 -2.622 
(-0.54) (-0.62) (-0.65) 
Constant 
-0.154 -0.146 -0.114 
(-0.85) (-0.84) (-1.00) 
    
N 555 545 526 
Wald Test of Joint 
Significance 
F(7,547)=2.12 F(7,537)=2.14 F(7,518)=5.37 
p>F 0.04 0.04 0.0000 
K-P Statistic 1.58 1.99 16.3 
Hansen-J 0.847 0.961 1.81 
Chi-square p-val 0.36 0.33 0.18 
C-Test 2.98 1.17 1.65 
Chi-square p-val 0.08 0.28 0.20 
 
1. Table 5.36 reports the results of the estimation of equation 5.9 using instrumental variables 
regression (2SLS).   
2. The sample period for (first-differenced) RMVE is described above; the sample period for all 
other (first-differenced) explanatory and control variables is 2004-08.   
3. See also notes to table 5.33.  
  
220 
 
Appendix 2 – MM-Estimator Regression Results for Non-First-Differenced 
Model 
Equation 5.11 was estimated using MM-estimator regression with RMVE in 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 as the dependent variable.  The results are shown in 
table 5.37. 
Table 5.37 – Results of MM-Estimator Regression (Dependent Variables RMVE in 
2012, 2011, 2010, 2009 and 2008) 
 
RMVE in 
2012 
RMVE in 
2011 
RMVE in 
2010 
RMVE in 
2009 
RMVE in 
2008 
Size 
0.008*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.004* 0.037*** 
(9.88) (11.11) (11.20) (2.05) (5.22) 
Power 
-0.226+ -0.238 0.017 -0.115 -1.237+ 
(-1.80) (-1.41) (0.08) (-0.70) (-1.91) 
SD of ROA 
-0.114*** -0.134*** -0.061*** -0.156*** -0.183 
(-6.40) (-7.46) (-3.52) (-3.53) (-1.04) 
Beta 
-0.005 0.004 -0.016** -0.058*** 0.021 
(-0.75) (0.38) (-2.85) (-4.77) (0.50) 
SD of 
Cashflow 
-0.097*** -0.059 -0.071*** -0.143 0.322 
(-3.90) (-1.38) (-3.90) (-1.46) (1.25) 
High RMVE 
* SD of ROA 
0.142* 0.061 -0.028 0.347** -0.091 
(2.18) (1.32) (-1.38) (2.88) (-0.16) 
Constant 
-0.015 -0.025** -0.016 0.072* -0.369*** 
(-1.60) (-2.69) (-1.61) (2.55) (-3.75) 
      
N 1003 889 776 617 525 
Wald Test of 
Joint 
Significance 
F(6,996) = 
61.4 
F(6,882) = 
84.9 
F(6,769) = 
67.2 
F(6,610) =  
16.6 
F(6,518) = 
6.13 
p>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.004 0.0000 0.000 
  
1. Table 5.37 reports the results of the estimation of equation 5.11 using MM-estimator 
regression.   
2. All variable definitions are given in section 5.4.1 and summarised in table 5.2.   
3. The sample periods for RMVE are 2012, 2011, 2010 2009 and 2008; and the corresponding 
sample periods for explanatory and control variables are 2007-11, 2006-10, 2005-09, 2004-08 
and 2003-07. 
4. MM-estimator regression was performed using the user-defined mmregress function (Verardi 
and Croux (2009)). 
5. t-statistics are shown in parentheses (2 decimal places).  
6. Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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Equation 5.11 was also estimated with returns to shareholders in 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011 and 2012 as the dependent variable.  The results are shown in table 5.38. 
Table 5.38 – Results of MM-Estimator Regression (Dependent Variables Returns to 
Shareholders in 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009 and 2008) 
 RTS in 2012 RTS in 2011 RTS in 2010 RTS in 2009 RTS in 2008 
Size 
0.026*** -0.002 0.007 0.012+ -0.006 
(5.70) (-0.26) (1.18) (1.96) (-1.02) 
Power 
-1.397* 0.951 -1.189 -2.596** 1.881** 
(-2.19) (1.50) (-1.28) (-2.84) (2.87) 
SD of ROA 
0.034 -0.175*** -0.058 -0.175+ -0.047 
(0.75) (-6.44) (-0.73) (-1.76) (-0.31) 
Beta 
0.004 -0.231*** -0.059 0.423*** -0.287*** 
(0.12) (-5.08) (-1.28) (6.39) (-4.38) 
SD of 
Cashflow 
-0.512*** -0.116 -0.713*** -0.183 -0.270** 
(-3.80) (-0.76) (-3.71) (-1.03) (-2.78) 
Ln[Book to 
Market] 
0.001 -0.013 0.005 0.024 -0.016 
(0.08) (-0.57) (0.25) (1.65) (-1.21) 
Constant 
-0.078 0.101+ 0.190** 0.040 -0.220** 
(-1.60) (1.82) (3.07) (0.49) (-2.84) 
      
N 996 884 773 665 599 
Wald Test of 
Joint 
Significance 
F(6,989) = 
13.5 
F(6,877) = 
22.7 
F(6,766) = 
3.62 
F(6,659) = 
10.6 
F(6,593) = 
8.90 
p>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.002 0.0000 0.000 
FTSE 
Returns 
8.8% -3.7% 14.4% 28.0% -30.7% 
 
1. Table 5.38 reports the results of the estimation of equation 5.11 using MM-estimator 
regression.   
2. All variable definitions are given in section 5.4.1 and summarised in table 5.2.   
3. The sample periods for returns to shareholders are 2012, 2011, 2010 2009 and 2008; and the 
corresponding sample periods for explanatory and control variables are 2007-11, 2006-10, 
2005-09, 2004-08 and 2003-07. 
4. MM-estimator regression was performed using the user-defined mmregress function (Verardi 
and Croux (2009)). 
5. t-statistics are shown in parentheses (2 decimal places).  
6. Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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Chapter Six - Risk Management Capabilities in UK FTSE 350 
Companies 
6.1 Introduction 
The finding in Chapter Five of a positive association between profit risk and return (at 
least in normal market conditions) implies that the development of a firm’s capability 
to mitigate “passive” (Merton (2005)) or “non-core” (Nocco and Stultz (2006)) risks 
would be valuable.  In addition, as discussed in Chapter One, firms have experienced 
significant pressures over recent years to “formalize principles of risk management” 
(Power (2009, p.304)).  Nevertheless, adoption of formalised approaches to risk 
management, such as Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and Business Continuity 
Management (BCM), is far from universal; even amongst large, publicly-quoted 
companies.  This chapter investigates why some firms develop specific risk 
management capabilities, whilst other firms appear not to.  This question is not only 
of theoretical interest, but also of practical interest to the shareholders and directors 
of companies; and, increasingly, to governments and to various industry regulators. 
The study uses a novel approach, in which the risk management capabilities of firms 
in the FTSE 350 are proxied by their employment of members of two professional 
institutions: the Institute of Risk Management (IRM) and the Business Continuity 
Institute (BCI).  It is argued that the employment of such professionals provides 
evidence of a generic risk management capability or, at least, a genuine aspiration on 
the part of the firm’s management to develop such a capability.  This approach 
therefore represents a theoretical advance on previous studies that have focused 
purely on the firm’s use of derivatives or insurance contracts to mitigate specific risks 
(eg Tufano (1996) and Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008)); or on public announcements, 
such as the appointment of Chief Risk Officers (eg Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) and 
Pagach and Warr (2011)).  The use of this particular proxy for risk management 
223 
 
capability also has some practical advantages: it can be applied across all industry 
sectors (for example, it is not practical to use the possession of derivatives as a proxy 
for risk management within the financial services sector); and it provides information 
on the intensity of risk management which is not available from a simple binary 
distinction between firms with a Chief Risk Officer and those without.   
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows.  Building on the general discussion of 
risk management in Chapter Two, the first section develops the “’managerial’ 
concept of risk management” (Power (2007, p.3)).  Two formalised approaches to 
risk management, enterprise risk management (ERM) and business continuity 
management (BCM), are introduced and discussed; previous empirical tests on the 
adoption of risk management (measured in a number of ways) are also reviewed.  
Based on this discussion of the literature, a number of specific hypotheses are 
developed in the next section.  The two different regression models used in the 
analysis are then described in detail, and the results of the regressions are 
presented.  The final section discusses the significance of the empirical findings and 
policy implications; and considers some productive areas for future research.    
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6.2 The Managerial Concept of Risk Management 
The theory of risk management was discussed extensively in Chapter Two, and 
specifically: the history of risk management; risk management as a value creating 
activity; the role of management; risk management in the context of the RBV and 
dynamic capabilities framework; and risk management and real options theory.  This 
section builds on that discussion, focusing specifically on formalised approaches to 
risk management or, as Power (2007, p.3) put it: the “’managerial’ concept of risk 
management.”  The section begins by introducing, and comparing, the two 
approaches to risk management upon which the empirical study is based, ERM and 
BCM; with reference to the strategic frameworks described in Chapter Two.  This is 
followed by a review of previous empirical tests of theories concerning the adoption 
of risk management; and, in particular an explanation of the limitations in these 
studies which provide the motivation for the current empirical work. 
6.2.1 Enterprise Risk Management and Business Continuity Management 
6.2.1.1 Enterprise Risk Management 
ERM has arisen from a growing appreciation that significant benefits can be derived 
from managing the portfolio of risks that a firm faces within an overall strategic 
framework, rather than addressing each type of risk individually.  The benefits of 
adopting an integrated approach include the more effective use of the firm’s capital 
(Merton (2005), Nocco and Stultz (2006)); ensuring that risks are owned at the 
appropriate level within the company; and ensuring that risk are managed in a 
consistent manner (Ward (2003), Nocco and Stultz (2006)).  There is no single 
concept of ERM, but COSO (2004, p.2) provides probably the most widely used 
definition: “…a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management, and 
other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to 
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identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risks to be within its 
risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity 
objectives.”  Even though this definition is widely accepted, there is still an ongoing 
debate regarding how to actually implement an ERM system and, in particular, how 
to determine an appropriate “risk appetite” for a firm. 
Empirical studies into the implementation of ERM have highlighted significant 
practical problems in achieving a true enterprise-wide approach to risk management.  
Arena et al (2010) examined the success of implementation by conducting long-term 
case studies of three Italian companies that had adopted ERM.  They found that, in 
two out of three cases, pre-existing approaches to risk management remained in 
widespread use and were not in any way linked to the ERM programme.  The authors 
suggest that the persistence of these legacy approaches stems primarily from 
“…differing risk rationalities and their potential to challenge the conceptualization of 
uncertainty” (p. 673).  Power (2007, p. 120) makes a very similar observation about 
the tension between the fundamentally different epistemologies of “Calculative 
idealists” and “Calculative pragmatists” in the implementation of operational risk 
management in the banking industry.   
6.2.1.2 Business Continuity Management 
BCM has grown out of a number of disciplines concerned with the management of 
operational disruptions such as disaster recovery (DR), crisis management and 
business continuity planning (BCP) (Herbane (2010)).  Elliott et al (2002) is perhaps 
the first mention of BCM in an academic work; the title of the book - “Business 
Continuity Management: A Crisis Management Approach” – is also important for 
making an explicit link to the previous work of crisis management researchers.  The 
authors trace the evolution of BCM through the stages of “technology mindset”, 
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“auditing mindset” and “value mindset” towards the goal of “normalization of BCM” 
as a core management activity.  Building on this theme of BCM as a core 
management activity, Herbane et al (2004) emphasise the strategic nature of BCM; in 
contrast to both DR and BCP, which they categorise as purely operational activities.  
Referencing the RBV, they state that “BCM is not simply a functional process with a 
limited remit and impact. Instead, it can be considered as a capability (i.e. a mix of 
routines and skills that is observable but not necessarily tangible or transferable) that 
underpins organisational development in complex environments” (p.437).  The 
development of theory has been accompanied by a progressive codifying of the 
practice of BCM in, for instance, BSI (2003, 2006, 2007) and ISO (2012).  As with the 
previous discussion of ERM, empirical studies into the implementation of BCM 
(Herbane et al (1997), Herbane et al (2004)) have found significant variation in 
progress towards the BCM paradigm amongst different firms. 
The problems of implementation, observed in studies of both ERM and BCM, are a 
very important issue in the design of empirical tests of the effect of risk management 
on firm performance; but are not a concern in the current study. 
6.2.1.3 A Comparison of Enterprise Risk Management and Business Continuity 
Management 
Despite the clear connection between the two disciplines, it is rare for BCM and ERM 
to be mentioned in the same article.  There are however a few interesting exceptions 
to this pattern which directly compare and contrast the two approaches to risk 
management.  Bonafede et al (2007) see the relationship as follows: “It is inside the 
BIA [Business Impact Analysis] that must be searched the principal interactions and 
the differences between Risk Management (RM) and Business Continuity 
Management. In fact the key parameters for BCM are Time and Impact, for RM they 
are Impact and Frequency” (p. 83).  More generally, Power (2009), in analysing the 
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failure of ERM to prevent the current financial crisis, suggests that BCM offers a 
better epistemological basis for managing risk, stating that “BCM is fundamentally 
unlike discrete risk management practices such as ERM in its self understanding. It is 
premised on the necessity of representing the interconnected nature of commercial 
life…” (p. 853).  Similarly, Young (2011) suggests that BCM potentially represents a 
more effective approach to risk management than the accounting and compliance-
driven approach of ERM, as embodied in COSO (2004).  However, it is important to 
temper this last point with the observation that there is already an international 
auditable standard for BCM (ISO (2012)); whereas the corresponding standard for 
risk management (ISO (2009)) merely provides guidance on good practice. The ERM 
and BCM approaches are compared in table 6.1.  
Table 6.1 – Comparison of ERM and BCM Approaches (Adapted from BCI (2008, p.7)) 
 ERM BCM 
Key Method Risk analysis 
Business impact analysis 
(BIA) 
Key Parameters Impact and probability Impact and time 
Type of Incident All types of events 
Events causing significant 
business disruption 
Intensity All from gradual to severe Sudden or rapid events 
Unit of Analysis The firm The whole value chain 
Typical Professional 
Background of 
Practitioners 
Insurance, finance, 
accounting 
Military, emergency 
services, IT, facilities 
management, health and 
safety 
International Standards 
ISO 31000 (2009) – 
guidance and best 
practice 
ISO 22301 (2012) – 
auditable standard 
 
6.2.1.4 ERM and BCM in the Context of the Resource Based View 
As mentioned in section 6.2.1.2, Herbane et al (2004) argue that BCM is a capability 
in the context of the resource based view (RBV), which was introduced in Chapter 
Two.  Critically, the RBV may provide insights into how BCM and ERM may lead to a 
sustainable competitive advantage.  However, it must be stressed that this chapter 
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does not attempt to test whether the adoption of ERM or BCM does indeed lead to 
such superior firm performance.  The implementation of both ERM and BCM requires 
the sort of “Capabilities as organizational routines” defined by Grant (1991, p. 122) 
as “…regular and predictable patterns of activity which are made up of a sequence of 
coordinated activities by individuals”.  However this does not, in itself, guarantee 
that either ERM or BCM creates a competitive advantage.  In order to achieve a 
sustainable competitive advantage it is necessary to develop a (dynamic) capability 
that is difficult to imitate (Barney (1991)); it is argued below that two elements of 
developing a risk management capability can potentially create such barriers to 
imitation: organisational culture and relationships with stakeholders.  
The need to foster an appropriate culture across the entire organisation is an 
important reason why imitating the successful implementation of risk management 
may be difficult.  The importance of developing an appropriate culture is stressed in 
good practice guidance from both the IRM and the BCI, eg: “The BC [business 
continuity] professional has a number of approaches available to help develop a BC 
aware culture within an organization...” (BCI (2013, p.39)).  The importance of 
organisational culture for effective risk management was also specifically identified 
by Kimborough and Componation (2009) as a factor in the successful implementation 
of ERM in their survey of 116 internal audit executives.  In addition, as highlighted in 
Chapter Two, organisational culture has been discussed extensively in the crisis 
management literature: for example, Pauchant and Mitroff (1988) and Miller (1988) 
both sought to understand how organisational culture can predispose organisations 
to crises.  Conversely, the High Reliability Organisations (HRO) school (eg Roberts 
(1990)), identified a number of important cultural similarities in risky organisations 
that functioned safely over extended periods.   
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Another potential barrier to imitation can be inferred from comparison with a study 
of the adoption of environmental management systems (specifically certification to 
ISO 14001).  Delmas (2001, p.348) argued that “…involvement of stakeholders in the 
design and structure of ISO 14001 sets up a path dependency process generating the 
sort of causal ambiguity just described and, with it, increases the difficulty of 
imitating the process for other competing firms.”  Her empirical study found, in 
support of her hypothesis, that the involvement of external stakeholders in the 
design of the environmental management system had the greatest effect on the 
competitive advantage that firms derived from it, much more so than the 
involvement of employees of the firm.  A similar argument could be applied to ERM, 
and particularly to BCM, where stakeholder involvement has long been considered 
absolutely critical (Power (2009)); and developing good relationships with a wide 
network of stakeholders is also going to be very difficult, and time-consuming, to 
imitate.   
6.2.1.5 ERM and BCM in the Context of Real Options Theory 
At a very practical level, risk management involves the use of both financial options 
and real options.  The purchase of financial options to hedge risks has become a very 
important part of the risk management function over the last forty years; indeed 
much previous research (see section 6.2.2) has been based solely upon the use of 
derivatives holdings as a measure of risk management.  Meanwhile, the contingency 
planning approach of BCM (described in section 6.2.1.2) involves the building up of a 
portfolio of real options, which can be exercised in the event of specific forms of 
disruption, such as IT disaster recovery solutions, back-up power and home-working 
arrangements.  More importantly though, it is argued that investment in a risk 
management capability, as set out in the relevant guidance and standards for ERM 
(COSO (2004)) and BCM (ISO (2012)); provides the firm with a generic ability to react 
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effectively to many forms of disruption.  This represents a very important real 
option, the value of which will only increase with the level of environmental 
uncertainty to which the firm is exposed.     
6.2.2 Empirical Tests on the Adoption of Risk Management 
It follows from the discussion in Chapter Two on risk management as a value-
creating activity (section 2.5.2), that firms that have a greater probability of financial 
distress; firms operating in sectors where the costs of bankruptcy are inherently 
high; and firms that have greater growth opportunities are more likely to actively 
manage risks.  The effect of firm size on the propensity to adopt risk management 
was unclear: the proportional cost of bankruptcy is greater and tax functions are 
usually more convex for smaller firms; but larger size is generally associated with 
“increasing scope and complexity of risks” (Gatzert and Martin (2015, p.36)), and 
larger firms have more resources with which to implement risk management 
(Beasley et al (2005)).  The discussion of agency theory (sections 2.3.2 and 2.5.3.1), 
produced a number of further predictions concerning the relationship between 
managerial compensation and risk-taking.  It was also argued that institutional 
investors are likely to encourage managers to adopt good practice in corporate 
governance, of which formalised processes for risk management are a core 
component.  Finally, the discussion of the behavioural theory of the firm (section 
2.5.3.2) suggested that the adoption of risk management may be triggered by a 
failure to meet specific targets; and that informal conventions on acceptable levels of 
risk management may exist in some (or all) industry sectors. 
The key challenge in all empirical studies of the adoption of risk management is that 
a firms’ risk management capability is not directly observable67.  A number of 
                                                          
67 Molloy et al (2011) discuss the general problem of measuring intangibles in some detail. 
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different proxies for risk management have been used and these are discussed in 
section 6.2.2.1.  It is important to bear in mind that many types of risk can be 
effectively mitigated in a number of distinct ways eg by purchasing insurance, 
hedging with derivatives or by an operational hedge; so tests based on different 
proxies may yield very different results.  This is followed by discussions of the results 
of various studies of the effects of size (section 6.2.2.2) and the probability and 
expected costs of financial distress (section 6.2.2.3 ) on the propensity to adopt risk 
management; as these have been subjected to the most extensive empirical tests.  
Section 6.2.2.4 reviews the findings from tests of the predictions of agency theory; 
and section 6.2.2.5 summarises the findings of some empirical tests of other 
predictions.  Finally, section 6.2.2.6 reviews how different studies have controlled for 
risk exposure. 
6.2.2.1 Proxies for Risk Management 
Early studies of the adoption of risk management were based on the possession of 
specific risk management resources: Nance et al (1993) and Géczy et al (1997), used 
a simple dichotomy between firms that used derivatives and those that didn’t and 
used straightforward logistic regression.  Haushalter (2000) improved on this 
approach by using the actual extent of derivatives usage as the dependent variable 
and applying a Tobit regression (in order to cope with the large number of firms that 
purchased no derivatives); he also focused on a single industry (oil and gas) to 
eliminate the variability in risk exposure between sectors.  More recent studies have 
tended to focus on announcements in the media about the appointment of a CRO, 
taking this as a proxy for a risk management capability68.  Early examples of these 
were similar in method to the first derivatives-based studies, performing cross-
                                                          
68 Beasley et al (2005) specifically test the relationship between presence of a CRO and 
maturity of ERM and find a significant positive relationship. 
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sectional analyses using logistic regression (eg Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003)); but 
Pagach and Warr (2011) made an important advance by using panel data and a Cox 
proportional hazard model69.  Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) refined the approach of 
searching media databases further, looking for a range of relevant phrases (such as 
“Chief Risk Officer”, “Enterprise Risk Management” and “Strategic Risk 
Management”) in order to form a more rounded view as to whether a firm had a risk 
management capability; Eckles et al (2014) used the same approach.  The use of 
public announcements as a proxy for capability represents an attempt to move 
beyond crude indicators, based on the mitigation of specific risks; but it must be 
borne in mind that the content of such announcements may be “…less a response to 
specific risks and more a feature of what it is to be a legitimate (large) organisation” 
(Power (2007, p.86)).  Beasley et al (2005) is somewhat unusual, in that they use a 
survey instrument to classify firms into five levels of ERM maturity: subject to the 
validity of the survey instrument, this is almost certainly the best measure of firms’ 
risk management capability used in previous studies. 
6.2.2.2 The Effect of Firm Size on the Adoption of Risk Management 
Most studies into the effect of firm size on the adoption of risk management are in 
agreement but with one important exception, as discussed below.  The simple 
approaches of Nance et al (1993) and Géczy et al (1997) both found a positive 
association between firm size and the likelihood of using derivatives.  This initial 
finding was confirmed by the more advanced approaches of Haushalter (2000), 
Beasley et al (2005), Pagach and Warr (2011), Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) and Eckles 
et al (2014).  However, all of these results are challenged by Aunon-Nerin and 
Ehling’s (2008) finding that smaller firms were actually more likely to purchase 
property insurance.  All the studies were based on large, publicly-traded firms; and it 
                                                          
69 The use of a hazard model removes assumptions about the independence of observations. 
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is impossible to dismiss this conflicting finding on methodological grounds as Aunon-
Nerin and Ehling’s (2008) approach is broadly similar to Hasuhalter’s (2000), but with 
insurance coverage as the dependent variable and using GMM instead of Tobit 
regression (as all firms in the sample have some insurance coverage).  The argument 
therefore centres on which is the most useful proxy for risk management: Aunon-
Nerin and Ehling argue that insurance coverage is a better indicator as it can only be 
used to mitigate risk (as opposed to derivatives which can also be used for 
speculation).  The authors then go on to suggest that the high fixed costs of 
implementing a derivatives programme simply make derivatives usage uneconomic 
for smaller firms (an argument previously advanced by Stultz (2003)); ironically this 
exposes a serious flaw in their own study in that larger firms have a wider range of 
options for managing risk open to them, so lower levels of insurance coverage may 
simply indicate the use of alternative risk transfer approaches.   
6.2.2.3 The Effect of the Probability and Expected Cost of Financial Distress on the 
Adoption of Risk Management 
The results of studies into the effect of the probability of financial distress on the 
adoption of risk management are largely consistent, despite the wide range of 
proxies used.  Nance et al (1993) found a positive association between leverage and 
the use of derivatives whilst Géczy et al (1997) found a negative association with the 
quick ratio.  Once again, these early results were confirmed by the more rigorous 
approach of Haushalter (2000), who found that more highly leveraged firms (in the 
oil and gas sector) were more likely to hedge risks.  More recently, Liebenberg and 
Hoyt (2003) found that more highly leveraged firms were more likely to appoint a 
CRO; and Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) found that more highly leveraged firms 
were also more likely to purchase property insurance.  However, using a maximum-
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likelihood treatment effects model, Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) found that more 
highly leveraged firms were less likely to adopt ERM.   
There doesn’t appear to be any direct empirical evidence that the expected cost of 
bankruptcy drives adoption of risk management: even the most methodologically 
sophisticated study, Pagach and Warr (2011), failed to find a significant relationship 
with the proportion of intangible assets.  However, Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) 
assert that the negative association that they observed between size and purchase of 
property insurance is because of the relatively higher bankruptcy costs for smaller 
firms (but see comments in previous paragraph about larger firms having alternative 
ways to manage risk). 
6.2.2.4 Tests of the Predictions of Agency Theory 
The predictions from agency theory about the relationship between managerial 
incentives and risk taking have received considerable empirical support.  Tufano’s 
(1996, p. 1097) study of gold-price hedging amongst North American gold-mining 
firms found that: “…firms whose managers hold more options manage less gold price 
risk, and firms whose managers hold more stock manage more gold price risk…”.  
Subsequent research has largely supported these initial findings with Sanders and 
Hambrick (2007) finding that a high proportion of share options in CEOs’ 
compensation packages led to increasing investment in risky activities (R&D, capital 
investments and acquisitions); as well as more extreme financial performance and a 
greater likelihood of poor financial performance.  Similarly, Low (2009) found that 
the general risk aversion of managers was reduced if the CEO’s compensation was 
based more on share options; indeed he found some evidence that firms actively 
pursued this approach.  Adams et al (2011, p.551) provide a further insight in their 
study of the usage of property insurance in Chinese firms in which they found that 
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“...the purchase of property insurance for managerial self-interest is only prevalent in 
firms subject to lax monitoring...”   
However, it is important to reiterate that the purpose of corporate risk management 
is not to reduce overall risk per se70; rather it is to cost-effectively mitigate “passive” 
(Merton (2005)) or “non-core” (Nocco and Stultz (2006)) risks so as the firm can take 
on additional “value-adding” (Merton (2005)) risks.  Thus, there is no basis to suspect 
a direct relationship between managerial risk aversion and the development of a risk 
management capability.  However, two studies that have specifically attempted to 
investigate the relationship between managerial incentives and risk management 
have found negative associations.   Pagach and Warr (2011) found that firms where 
the CEO’s compensation is more sensitive to stock-price volatility were more likely to 
appoint a CRO; whilst Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) found that banks where the CEO’s 
compensation is more sensitive to stock-price volatility tended to have higher scores 
in their “risk management index”71.  Pagach and Warr (2011) speculated that the 
appointment of a CRO may indicate an attempt on the part of the board to address a 
potential agency problem.  Whilst this is plausible in the specific context of the 
appointment of a CRO, the argument is not applicable to risk management more 
generally: managerial incentives are therefore not considered further as a driver in 
this study.   
As regards the nature of ownership, Pagach and Warr (2011) found that companies 
with greater institutional ownership are more likely to appoint a CRO, and both Hoyt 
and Liebenberg (2011) and Eckles (2014) found that such companies were more 
likely to adopt ERM; however Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) found no significant 
                                                          
70 Although, of course, specific risk management activities (such as purchase of insurance) are 
used to mitigate particular risks that stakeholders do not wish to bear. 
71 The risk management index is based on the existence, status and compensation of the CRO; 
and the experience and activity level of the risk committee. 
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relationship between institutional ownership and adoption of ERM (amongst banks).  
As explained above, the fact that large block owners are generally institutional 
investors means that empirical studies of the effect of concentration of ownership 
are actually a joint test of the effects of concentration of ownership and of 
institutional ownership.     
6.2.2.5 Other Tests 
A number of other relationships have also been tested in some previous studies with 
differing results: in general the significant results from early derivatives-based 
studies have not been replicated in later work.  Given the reservations outlined 
above about using derivatives usage as a proxy for risk management capability, it 
would therefore be unwise to make any generalisations about these relationships.  
The early studies of Nance et al (1993) and Géczy et al (1997) found a significant 
positive relationship between growth options and the use of derivatives; but neither 
Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) nor Pagach and Warr (2011) found any significant 
relationship in their studies based on the appointment of Chief Risk Officers.  
Similarly, whilst both Nance et al (1993) and Haushalter (2000) found a significant 
positive relationship between the convexity of the tax function and usage of 
derivatives; more recent studies have all failed to find a significant relationship (eg 
Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) and Pagach and Warr (2011)).   
6.2.2.6 Controlling for Risk Exposure 
As discussed in section 6.2.1.5, the development of a risk management capability 
creates real options, the value of which will increase with the risk exposure of the 
firm: it is therefore necessary to control for risk exposure in any regression model.  
Haushalter (2000) first attempted to address this issue by restricting his study to a 
single industry sector, oil and gas.  Subsequent studies improved on this approach by 
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including specific control variables for profit risk (Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003)), 
market risk (Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003), Pagach and Warr (2011), Eckles et al 
(2014)) and cashflow risk (Pagach and Warr (2011)); but no previous study has 
controlled for all three of the dimensions of risk identified in Chapter Four.   
6.2.3 Summary 
Following a discussion of the two risk management approaches of interest in this 
study, ERM and BCM, various previous empirical studies on the adoption of risk 
management were reviewed.  In the course of this review, it became apparent that 
there were a number of shortcomings in prior empirical tests; and these provide the 
motivation for the current study.  The principal concern centred around the 
suitability of the proxies used for risk management capability: this is addressed by 
the use of a novel dependent variable, the employment of members of professional 
risk management institutions, in this study (the use of this proxy is discussed in more 
detail in section 6.3.1).  There are also concerns around how previous studies have 
controlled for the risk exposure of firms.  This study will improve on prior work by 
including control variables for profit risk, market risk and cashflow risk; as derived in 
Chapter Four.   
The review of previous empirical work highlighted one other area worthy of further 
investigation but the design of the current study precludes this.  There is an 
interesting contradiction between arguments based on the costs of financial distress 
(and convexity of tax function), which predict that managers in smaller companies 
should be more likely to adopt risk management; and the majority of empirical 
evidence (generally based on using derivatives usage as a proxy for risk management 
capability) that larger companies tend to engage more in risk management.  
Unfortunately the use of the employment of members of professional organisations 
238 
 
as the proxy for the intensity of firms’ risk management activity does not allow for a 
meaningful investigation of this particular question (although size will be controlled 
for in all regressions).    
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6.3 Developing the Model 
This section begins with a discussion of the principal innovation of this study, the use 
of the employment of risk management professionals as a proxy for a firm’s risk 
management capability, or at least the intention to develop one.  This is followed by 
an explanation of a number of specific hypotheses concerning the drivers of risk 
management to be tested in this analysis.    
6.3.1 Selection of an Appropriate Dependent Variable 
As discussed in Chapter One, a firm’s risk management capability cannot be directly 
observed; rather an appropriate proxy must be used.  The use in many studies of the 
possession of derivatives (eg Nance et al (1993), Géczy et al (1997), Haushalter 
(2000) and insurance contracts (Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008)) as a proxy for a risk 
management capability is flawed for a number of reasons.  Purchase of these 
resources indicates that particular risks are being mitigated somewhere in the 
organisation; but, in many cases, insurance and derivatives are substitutes for each 
other so reliance on one measure will not give a complete picture.  Moreover, as 
noted in section 6.2.2, there are often alternative approaches to risk mitigation, eg 
operational hedges, which will not be captured by either metric.  More 
fundamentally though, they give no indication of the development of an enterprise-
wide approach to identifying and managing risks in an integrated manner; which is 
the subject of this study.   
The use of public announcements by the firm as a proxy for risk management 
capability, eg the appointment of a CRO, represents an improvement on these early 
approaches, but it is important to recognise that these announcements may be 
primarily symbolic; as Power (2007, p.86) suggests: “...the category of CRO has 
become institutionalized as a standardized role for large organizations…” (p.86).  It 
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also suffers from the practical drawback that “it allows for no differentiation with 
respect to the level of ERM implementation” (Gatzert and Martin (2015, p.34)).  As 
stated in section 6.2.2.1, Beasley et al’s (2005) approach of using a survey instrument 
to measure a firm’s risk management capability is attractive in many situations, 
although the labour involved in administering the survey limits the practical sample 
sizes that can be used (Beasley et al (2005) only examined 123 firms).  Moreover, in 
addressing the specific research objective of this study; it suffers from the drawback 
that it (attempts to) measures the risk management capability that a firm has already 
developed, rather than the intention to develop such a capability.     
The use of the employment of risk management professionals as a proxy for risk 
management capability addresses all of the concerns listed above.  Hiring such a 
professional clearly implies an intention on the part of the firm’s management to 
develop a risk management capability, as discussed in section 6.2.1.  The evidence of 
this intention is updated annually in the membership records of the relevant 
professional institutions, even though it may be some years before the firm develops 
a substantive capability; but, crucially, this information is not generally made public.  
Beyond these theoretical benefits, the use of the employment of risk management 
professionals as a proxy has a number of practical advantages: it can be used in all 
industry sectors72; it can be used to measure the intensity of risk management as 
well as a simple binary decision to adopt or not; and membership information is 
already collated by the relevant professional institutions so data does not have to be 
collected from individual firms.  
Clearly there are some important issues with the use of the employment of 
professionals as a proxy for the intention to develop a risk management capability; 
                                                          
72 Obviously this would be problematic if the sample included consultancy firms with large 
ERM or BCM practices but the FTSE 350 in July 2011 did not contain any such management 
consultancy firms.  
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the measures taken to address these issues are discussed below.  Most importantly, 
it is possible that firms could be developing risk management capabilities, without 
directly employing any risk management professionals, through the use of 
contractors or consultants.  It is argued that this is likely to be more prevalent in 
smaller firms; so by restricting the study sample to the largest firms in the UK, the 
FTSE 350, this effect will be minimised.  Obviously though this means that the 
findings of the study cannot be generalised to smaller firms.  It is also important to 
acknowledge that the IRM and BCI do not operate in a monopolistic environment, 
and that there are alternative organisations to which suitably qualified professionals 
may belong (or indeed individuals may choose not to join any organisation at all).  In 
particular, there are two other membership organisations for BCM professionals but 
these are of limited relevance to the UK: the Disaster Recovery Institute is largely 
based in the US, whereas the BCM Institute is mainly focused on the Far East.  In 
addition, the Public Risk Management Association (ALARM) and the Emergency 
Planning Society include large numbers of UK-based risk managers and BCM 
professionals respectively in their membership; but the overwhelming majority of 
these will be employed in the public sector.  
It is also possible that a firm may recruit people who happen to be risk management 
professionals, even though they do not (currently) intend to make use of that 
particular expertise.  Equally, people might be initially recruited to develop a risk 
management capability which is subsequently abandoned, but they are retained in 
the company in other capacities.  Employees might also join one of the professional 
institutions of interest in this study, the IRM or BCI, for purely personal reasons (eg 
seeking employment elsewhere) without the encouragement (or even knowledge) of 
their employer.  In order to minimise these effects, a data set based on the voluntary 
declaration of their employer’s name by the employee is used: significant numbers of 
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IRM members (and a smaller proportion of BCI members) choose not to declare an 
employer in their membership entry.  It is argued that if an employee is not using 
their professional risk management expertise for their employer, and/or feels that 
their employer is not truly committed to developing a risk management capability; 
they are less likely to declare their employer’s name in their membership entry.   
6.3.2 Hypotheses to be Tested 
Four hypotheses, derived directly from theories of how risk management creates 
value for shareholders discussed in Chapter Two, are tested in this analysis; all of 
these have been subjected to numerous previous empirical studies.  One further 
hypothesis, concerning the firm’s possession of tangible assets; is derived from 
consideration of the specific nature of the risk management capabilities being 
studied (ERM and BCM).  The final hypothesis investigates predictions relating to 
whether institutional investors influence managers to adopt formalised approaches 
to risk management.      
Leverage is an important determinant of the likelihood of financial distress, which is 
one of the central motivations for firm owners to manage risk (Smith and Stultz 
(1985)).  A number of previous empirical studies have found an association between 
leverage and the possession of risk management resources; for instance Liebenberg 
and Hoyt (2003) found that more highly leveraged firms were more likely to appoint 
a CRO.  
Hypothesis 1a: Managers of highly leveraged firms are more likely to employ 
members of the IRM. 
Hypothesis 1b: Managers of highly leveraged firms are more likely to employ 
members of the BCI. 
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A lack of liquidity may also result in financial distress.  Once again, a number of 
previous empirical studies have found an association between liquidity and the 
possession of risk management resources; for instance Géczy et al (1997) found a 
negative relationship between the quick ratio and the use of derivatives. 
Hypothesis 2a: Managers of firms with lower liquidity are more likely to 
employ members of the IRM. 
 Hypothesis 2b: Managers of firms with lower liquidity are more likely to 
employ members of the BCI. 
Whilst both of these arguments were introduced from the perspective of creating 
value for the owners of the firm, it should be noted that the probability of financial 
distress is also of great interest to both lenders and managers.  Logically, the 
expected costs of financial distress will also be a driver for risk management (Smith 
and Stultz (1985)); but, unlike the likelihood of financial distress, the costs are only 
really of interest to the shareholders of the firm (on whom they fall).  A number of 
different measures have been applied in previous empirical studies; following 
Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) and Pagach and Warr (2011), the market value of the 
firm is used as a proxy for the expected cost of financial distress as it captures 
investors’ expectations about future growth opportunities.   
Hypothesis 3a: Managers of firms with a high market-to-book ratio are more 
likely to employ members of the IRM. 
 Hypothesis 3b: Managers of firms with a high market-to-book ratio are more 
likely to employ members of the BCI. 
However, it is important to acknowledge that high market-to-book values may also 
indicate a lower probability of financial distress: investors have confidence in the 
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firm’s long-term prospects so the firm should be able to access external funding if 
required.  It is therefore necessary to also test the competing hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 3c: Managers of firms with a low market-to-book ratio are more 
likely to employ members of the IRM. 
 Hypothesis 3d: Managers of firms with a low market-to-book ratio are more 
likely to employ members of the BCI. 
Two previous studies (Pagach and Warr (2011) and Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011)) 
have used the proportion of intangible assets as a proxy for ‘opacity’; reasoning that 
the more opaque a firm’s assets are the more value will be lost in bankruptcy.  The 
logic of this is questionable though, as intangible assets includes items such as 
patents, trademarks, internet domains and customer lists; which could actually be 
transferred to another owner without significant loss of value.  Moreover, both ERM 
and BCM are primarily focused on the protection of physical and financial assets 
which can be insured, hedged or physically protected.  The empirical evidence from 
previous studies is also inconclusive: Pagach and Warr (2011) found a positive 
association with the likelihood of appointing a CRO; and Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) 
found a negative relationship with the likelihood of adopting ERM, but neither result 
was statistically significant.  Given that the model already includes a proxy for the 
expected cost of financial distress, it is argued that the focus of ERM and BCM on the 
protection of tangible assets will dominate.    
Hypothesis 4a: Managers of firms with a high proportion of tangible assets 
are more likely to employ members of the IRM. 
 Hypothesis 4b: Managers of firms with a high proportion of tangible assets 
are more likely to employ members of the BCI. 
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In many cases the effective tax rate for firms is a convex function of profit before tax: 
in these situations value can also be created by minimising fluctuations in earnings 
(Smith and Stultz (1985)).  Once again, this is primarily of interest to the shareholders 
of the firm.  Both Nance et al (1993) and Haushalter (2000) asserted that they found 
a significant relationship between the convexity of the effective tax function and the 
usage of derivatives; however, Plesko (2003) highlights some serious problems with 
deriving marginal tax rates from accounting data.  Following Muff et al (2008)73, it is 
simply argued that the higher the effective tax rate a firm experiences the more 
motivated managers will be to reduce fluctuations in earnings.  
Hypothesis 5a: Managers of firms which have a higher effective tax rate are 
more likely to employ members of the IRM. 
 Hypothesis 5b: Managers of firms which have a higher effective tax rate are 
more likely to employ members of the BCI. 
Finally, consistent with the hypothesis of Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011), supported by 
their empirical results and those of Pagach and Warr (2011); institutional ownership 
may be a significant driver for adopting formalised approaches to risk management.   
Hypothesis 6a: Managers of firms with a high proportion of institutional 
owners are more likely to employ members of the IRM. 
 Hypothesis 6b: Managers of firms with a high proportion of institutional 
owners are more likely to employ members of the BCI.   
  
                                                          
73 Muff et al (2008) use two additional tax measures: a dummy variable if the firm has 
experienced net operating losses (as a proxy for tax carry-forwards) and a dummy if the 
marginal tax rate is greater than 32.75%.  Graham and Rogers (2002) dispute the validity of 
the former measure (and it is highly correlated with the standard deviation of ROA); the latter 
is not used because of the inherent unreliability of constructing marginal tax rates from 
accounting data (Plesko (2003)). 
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6.4 Data 
6.4.1 Sample of Companies 
The sample of companies used in the study is based on the 332 firms in the FTSE 350 
as at 6th July 2011 for which the FAME and Datastream databases contain data74.  In 
order to be included in the sample, firms had to have a positive turnover figure in 
2010 and at least one employee; these validity criteria reduced the sample size to 
298 firms.  30 of these firms did not have five years of accounting data, and a further 
two firms did not have sufficient market data; leaving a sample size of 266. 
6.4.2 Dependent Variables 
The IRM provided a list of the country and membership grade of the 1634 IRM 
members (as of July 2011) who have given details of their employers (this constitutes 
slightly less than 50% of the total membership of the IRM); 1120 of these members 
are UK-based.  It is of course possible that a company might have IRM members in its 
overseas subsidiaries but none actually based in the UK although it is unclear 
precisely what this implies about the company’s commitment to ERM.  However, 
only 3 companies in the FTSE 350 fell into this category so the matter is not 
considered any further.  The BCI provided a complete membership list as of July 2011 
giving country, membership grade and employer (where members had given this).  
There are a total of 5798 entries, of which 2389 are UK-based; and 89% of these UK-
based members have listed an employer.  The numbers of firms within the sample 
which employ a member of the IRM (Certificant or above), a member of the BCI 
(Associate or above), neither and both75 are shown in table 6.2. 
                                                          
74 Most of the FTSE 350 firms that are missing from the FAME database are registered 
overseas; only one firm that was in the FAME database did not have any data in Datastream. 
75 There were a small number of BCI members who listed their employer as “Blackrock” or “JP 
Morgan”, but it was impossible to attribute these people to a specific firm in the FTSE 350. 
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Table 6.2 – Numbers of Firms Employing Members of the IRM and BCI  
 IRM Member 
Yes No 
BCI Member 
Yes 15 25 
No 20 206 
 
The number of firms employing IRM and BCI members by relevant industry sectors is 
shown in table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 – Number of Firms Employing IRM and/or BCI Members by Industry Sector 
SIC Section 
Number of 
Firms 
IRM 
Member 
BCI 
Member 
Agriculture 0 0 0 
Mining and Quarrying 18 2 2 
Manufacturing 39 5 6 
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning 
Supply 
3 1 1 
Water Supply; Sewerage, Waste Management 
and Remediation Activities 
2 1 1 
Construction 15 1 1 
Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor 
Vehicles and Motorcycles 
24 2 5 
Transportation and Storage 6 1 0 
Accommodation and Food Service Activities  10 0 2 
Information and Communication 24 4 5 
Financial and Insurance Activities 48 5 6 
Real Estate Activities 4 0 0 
Professional, Scientific and Technical 
Activities76 
10 1 2 
Administrative and Support Activities 13 2 2 
Public Administration and Defence; 
Compulsory Social Security 
4 2 1 
Education 0 0 0 
Human Health and Social Work Activities 1 0 0 
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 3 0 0 
Other Services Activities 2 0 0 
Activities of Households as Employers 0 0 0 
Activities of Extraterritorial Organisations and 
Bodies 
0 0 0 
Total 226 27 34 
 
                                                          
76 Firms in the sample with the SIC code 70100 (“Activities of Head Offices”) are excluded 
from this breakdown. 
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The breakdown of the actual number of IRM and BCI members employed in the firms 
that employ at least one member is shown in fig. 6.1.   
Fig. 6.1 Number of IRM and BCI Members Employed 
 
6.4.3 Explanatory Variables 
Accounting data are derived from the FAME database and market data from 
Datastream.  Variable definitions are consistent with those used in previous 
chapters, where applicable; but definitions of all the variables are repeated below for 
completeness, and summarised in table 6.4.  Data were collected over a five year 
period finishing with the last set of accounts published before 1st April 2011; for 
simplicity accounting periods ending between 1st April 2010 and 31st March 2011 are 
denoted 2010 and likewise for previous years.  Unless otherwise stated, ratios are 
calculated annually and averaged over five observations from 2006 to 2010.  
Debt-to-market-value-of-equity is used as the measure of leverage as this was 
previously found to be less skewed than debt-to-book-value-of-equity.  The ratio was 
calculated as follows: short term loans and overdrafts (FAME field 52) plus long term 
liabilities (FAME field 85), divided by the market capitalisation (Datastream field MV 
– “Market Value (Capital)”).  Liquidity was calculated as current assets minus current 
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liabilities77 (FAME field 67 – “Net Current Assets”), divided by total assets (FAME field 
70).  Market-to-book value is calculated by dividing the average market capitalisation 
(Datastream field MV – “Market Value (Capital)”) over the period 2006-10 by the 
book value of equity (FAME field 93 – “Shareholders’ Funds) averaged over the same 
period.  The proportion of tangible assets is calculated by subtracting the average 
values of “Intangible Assets” (FAME field 35) divided by “Total Assets” (FAME field 
70) from 1.  Many firms had missing data for intangible assets and/or R&D in 
individual years: these missing values were not included in the calculation of the five-
year average.  However, where a firm had no data in any year from 2006 to 2010, the 
value for R&D is set to “0” and the value of tangible assets is set to “1”.   
The effective tax rate is calculated by dividing the total “Profit Before Tax” (FAME 
field 14) over the period 2006-10 by the total tax paid (FAME field 15 – “Taxation”) 
over the period; in the small number of cases where this ratio was negative, the 
value from the nearest five-year period with a non-negative value was used78.  
Institutional ownership is calculated as 1 – the proportion of private ownership 
(FAME code I – “One or more named individuals”) as of July 2011; note that as this is 
designed to be a measure of control, only voting shares are included.      
6.4.4 Control Variables 
As stated in section 6.2.3, profit risk, market risk and cashflow risk are all controlled 
for in the model: the outputs from the principal component analysis (PCA) in Chapter 
Four were used directly to control for profit risk and market risk (this leads to a 
further reduction in sample size to 229).  Following Froot, Scharfstein and Stein’s 
argument that variability in cashflows is only really of interest to firms that invest in 
                                                          
77 Negative values are included. 
78 Salamander Energy had a negative effective tax rate in all time periods so is dropped from 
the study leaving a sample of 265 firms.  
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R&D; the cashflow risk component from the PCA is interacted with R&D intensity.  
R&D intensity was calculated by dividing R&D spending (FAME field 28 – “Research & 
Development”) in each year by book value of equity79 (FAME field 93 – 
“Shareholders’ Funds”); a number of firms have negative values for book value of 
equity in some years, resulting in negative values of R&D intensity, these negative 
values were omitted from the calculation of the five-year average.   
A number of other firm characteristics may also affect the likelihood of firms 
developing a risk management capability.  Numerous previous studies have found a 
positive relationship between firm size and possession of risk management resources 
eg  Nance et al (1993), Geczy et al (1997), Stultz (2003) and Pagach and Warr (2011).  
Because of the specific design of this study, no hypotheses about the effect of size 
can be directly tested; however size remains an important control variable.  Previous 
studies of risk management have all used financial proxies for firm size eg “log 
[market value of equity + book value of debt]” (Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008)), or 
“total assets” (Pagach and Warr (2011)).  However, it is judged that a measure based 
on the number of Employees” (FAME field 26) is much more appropriate in this 
context.  This is calculated by averaging the “Number of Employees” (FAME field 26) 
over the period 2006-10 and taking the natural log. 
It is also necessary to control for two regulatory issues that pertain in the UK.  
Financial Services firms are not only regulated in their management of market and 
credit risks; the UK Financial Services Authority80 also states that a regulated firm 
“…should have in place appropriate arrangements, having regard to the nature, scale 
and complexity of its business, to ensure that it can continue to function and meet its 
                                                          
79 See previous chapter for discussion of why this specific definition of R&D intensity is used. 
80 The Financial Services Authority ceased to exist and its responsibilities were split between 
two new bodies, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority, in 
April 2013. 
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regulatory obligations in the event of an unforeseen interruption.” (FSA (2004, 
paragraph 3.2.19).  A dummy control variable is therefore included for firms with SIC 
codes 64110-66300 (inclusive).  The UK Civil Contingencies Act (2004) identified firms 
involved in the following areas of critical national infrastructure as “Category 2 
Responders”: electricity, gas, water, telecommunications, railways, airports and 
harbours.  Whilst not placing any statutory risk management obligations on these 
firms (over and above what is already contained in their licence conditions), the fact 
that the externalities of a disruption to these services have been highlighted in this 
way may tend towards a greater emphasis on risk management.  A dummy control 
variable is therefore included for firms with SIC codes 35110-37000 (electricity, gas 
and water supply), 49100-49310 (land transport), 51100 (scheduled passenger air 
transport), 51210 (freight air transport) and 61100-61900 (telecommunications).   
As was previously mentioned (section 2.5.3.2) in the context of the behavioural 
theory of the firm (Cyert and March (1992)), there may be unwritten conventions on 
good practice in risk management within industry sectors.  In order to control for 
this, dummy variables are included for the industry sectors with ten or more firms in 
the sample, as follows: “Mining and Quarrying” (SIC codes 05100-09900); 
“Manufacturing” (SIC codes 10110-33200); “Construction” (SIC codes 41100-43900); 
“Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles” (SIC codes 
45100-47990); “Accommodation and Food Service Activities” (SIC codes 55100-
56300); “Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities” (SIC codes 69100-75000); 
and “Administrative and Support Service Activities” (SIC codes 77100-82900)81. 
  
                                                          
81 No dummy variable was included for “Information and Communication” as there is a 
significant overlap with “Category 2 Responders”. 
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6.4.5 Summary of Variable Definitions 
Table 6.4 – Definitions of Explanatory and Control Variables 
Risk Measure Definition 
Debt to MVE 
(Short term loans and overdrafts + long term liabilities) / 
market capitalisation.  Annual ratios averaged over the 
period 2006-10. 
Liquidity 
(Current assets - current liabilities) / total assets.  
Annual ratios averaged over the period 2006-10. 
Market to Book Value 
Market capitalisation (averaged over the period 2006-10) 
/ book value of equity (averaged over the same period. 
Tangible Assets 
1-(Intangible assets / total assets). 
Annual ratios averaged over the period 2006-10. 
Effective Tax Rate 
Profit before tax (summed over the period 2006-10) / 
total tax paid (summed over the same period). 
Institutional Ownership 1 – the proportion of private ownership as of July 2011. 
Profit Risk 
Outputs from the PCA in Chapter Four for the time period 
2006-10. 
Market Risk 
Cashflow Risk 
R&D Intensity 
R&D expenditure / book value of equity.  
Annual ratios averaged over the period 2006-10. 
Size 
Ln [number of employees (averaged over the period 
2006-10)] 
Financial Services 
Dummy 
1 for SIC codes 64110-66300 (inclusive); 0 otherwise. 
Critical National 
Infrastructure Dummy 
1 for SIC codes 35110-37000, 49100-49310, 51100, 51210 
and 61100-61900 (all inclusive); 0 otherwise. 
 
6.4.6 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the explanatory and control variables are shown in table 6.5. 
 
253 
 
Table 6.5 – Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory and Control Variables 
 N Mean Median Min Max SD MAD Skewness Kurtosis 
Debt to MVE 265 1.09 0.397 0.000389 39.3 3.13 0.413 8.38 91.3 
Liquidity 265 0.0791 0.0594 -0.547 0.805 0.194 0.124 0.789 5.62 
Market-to-Book Value 265 4.83 2.18 0.189 123 12.1 0 6.48 52.3 
Tangible Assets 265 0.793 0.870 0.0953 1 0.210 1.79 -0.876 2.88 
Effective Tax Rate 265 0.311 0.275 0 6.58 0.482 0.0809 9.75 117 
Institutional Ownership 265 0.944 0.995 0.190 1 0.127 0.00682 -3.14 13.7 
Profit Risk 229 -1.15 0.0499 -135 7.92 10.6 1.16 -9.06 112 
Market Risk 229 5.88 5.13 1.78 16.2 3.34 1.59 2.73 16.9 
Cashflow Risk * R&D Intensity82 229 -1.82 0 -326 0.00857 21.6 0 -14.7 221 
Size 265 8.10 8.50 1.39 13.3 2.56 2.20 -0.987 3.72 
 
                                                          
82 The median and MAD values are impacted by the high proportion of zeros in the distribution of R&D intensity. 
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As in previous chapters, the distributions of some variables depart very noticeably 
from the normal distribution.  In particular, the distributions of debt-to-market value 
of equity and effective tax rate are both highly positively skewed; the distributions of 
profit risk and the interaction between cashflow risk and R&D intensity are both very 
negatively skewed; and all four distributions exhibit very high kurtosis.  In order to 
understand these distributions better, quantile plots are shown in figs. 6.2 to 6.5. 
Fig. 6.2 – Quantile Plot of Debt-to-Market Value of Equity 
 
Fig. 6.3 – Quantile Plot of Effective Tax Rate 
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Fig. 6.4 – Quantile Plot of Profit Risk 
 
Fig. 6.5 – Quantile Plot of Cashflow Risk * R&D Intensity 
 
 
In addition, various percentiles of the four distributions are shown in table 6.6, 
expressed in terms of median absolute deviations from the median (the customary 
measure of standard deviations from the mean is not appropriate as neither of these 
estimators are themselves robust to outliers).  In each case it is clear that there are 
small numbers (5 to 10) of extreme outliers, the inclusion or removal of which may 
greatly affect any regression results.  
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Table 6.6 – Quantiles of Debt to Market Value of Equity, Effective Tax Rate, Profit 
Risk83 (Expressed in Median Absolute Deviations from the Median) 
 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 95% 96% 97% 98% 99% 
Debt to 
MVE 
-0.958 -0.952 -0.926 -0.910 -0.882 8.20 12.8 20.1 24.9 34.4 
Effective 
Tax Rate 
-3.40 -3.39 -3.333 -3.28 -3.21 3.87 4.61 5.31 11.2 26.3 
Profit 
Risk 
-34.9 -14.7 -12.9 -9.91 -9.14 4.71 5.05 5.66 6.68 14.2 
 
The Spearman correlation coefficients of the explanatory and control variables are 
shown in table 6.7.  It is important to note that, in particular, the three controls 
variables for risk exposure have a number of highly significant correlations with the 
explanatory variables.  This is not surprising given that these control variables are 
linear combinations of a number of risk measures, including the explanatory 
variables in this study; the correlations may however have important implications for 
the conduct of regression analysis (see section 6.5). 
  
                                                          
83 It is not possible to calculate this measure for the interaction of cashflow risk and R&D 
intensity because of the zero value of MAD.  
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Table 6.7 – Correlation of Explanatory and Control Variables 
 
Debt to 
MVE 
Liquidity 
Market-to-
Book Value 
Intangible 
Assets 
Effective 
Tax Rate 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Profit 
Risk 
Market 
Risk 
Cashflow Risk * 
R&D Intensity 
Size 
Debt to MVE 1          
Liquidity -0.27*** 1         
Market-to-Book 
Value 
-0.30*** 0.01 1        
Tangible Assets 0.03 -0.01 -0.42*** 1       
Effective Tax 
Rate 
0.07 0.14* 0.18** -0.13* 1      
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.14* -0.16* 0.01 0.02 -0.12 1     
Profit Risk -0.06 -0.02 -0.51*** 0.45*** -0.02 -0.11 1    
Market Risk 0.42*** 0.13* -0.10 -0.08 0.12 -0.03 -0.12 1   
Cashflow Risk * 
R&D Intensity 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.20** 0.35*** 0.02 -0.25*** 0.55*** -0.20** 1  
Size 0.31*** -0.19** 0.27*** -0.44*** 0.17** 0.19** -0.41*** 0.05 -0.21** 1 
 
1. Table 6.7 reports the Spearman correlation coefficients between each pair of independent variables. 
2. All variable definitions are given in sections 6.4.3 and 6.4.4 and summarised in Table 6.4.  
3. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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6.5 Method and Results 
In common with previous studies based on the announcement of the appointment of 
a CRO (eg Pagach and Warr (2011)), this section begins by developing a binary 
outcome model; which is then estimated with a probit regression using both the 
employment of one or more members of the IRM and one or more members of the 
BCI as the dependent variable.  However, managing risk is not in reality a binary 
decision: all firms manage risk (even if they have no formal processes for doing so) 
but some firms manage risk more than others.  Therefore, in order to study the 
intensity of risk management, count-data models are also estimated using the actual 
number of IRM (or BCI) members employed as the dependent variable.  
6.5.1 Binary Outcome Model 
6.5.1.1 Developing the Binary Outcome Model 
The following binary outcome models are estimated using a probit model: 
IRMi = f{explanatory variablesi, control variablesi} + εi   (6.1) 
BCIi = g{explanatory variablesi, control variablesi} + εi   (6.2) 
Where IRM is a binary variable which takes the value one if the firm employs one or 
more members of the IRM (Certificant and above); BCI is a binary variable that takes 
the value one if the firm employs one or more BCI members (Associate and above); 
the explanatory and control variables are defined in sections 6.4.3 and 6.4.4 
respectively; and εi is a random error term.   
It is possible that ERM or BCM might be used simply to reduce net risk; so there is a 
potential issue of reverse causality in having controls for risk exposure in the model.  
In order to test for endogeneity it is necessary to instrument the variables of 
concern: following the approach of Peters and Wagner (2014), these variables could 
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potentially be instrumented using their respective weighted averages for each 
industry sector.  Firm values for profit risk and market risk were weighted by 
“Turnover” (FAME field 1), averaged over the period 2006-10, to calculate sector 
averages for each of the 21 sections within the SIC classification.  In order to improve 
robustness to outliers, median values of the profit risk and market risk for each 
industry sector were also investigated as potential instruments; the results of OLS 
regressions using each set of potential instruments for profit risk and market risk are 
shown in table 6.8. 
Table 6.8 – Results of OLS Regression of Sector Weighted Averages and Sector 
Medians on Profit Risk and Market Risk 
 Profit Risk Market Risk Profit Risk Market Risk 
Sector Median of 
Profit Risk 
2.509*** -0.075   
(6.88) (-0.61)   
Sector Median of 
Market Risk 
0.948 0.807***   
(1.43) (3.64)   
Weighted 
Average of Profit 
Risk 
  0.872*** -0.052 
  (8.13) (-1.36) 
Weighted 
Average of 
Market Risk 
  0.726* 0.096 
  (2.15) (0.81) 
     
N 229 229 229 229 
Wald Test of Joint 
Significance 
F(2,226)=23.8 F(2,226)=8.15 F(2,226)=33.1 F(2,226)=1.74 
p> X2(2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.18 
R2 0.17 0.07 0.23 0.02 
  
1. Table 6.8 reports results of the estimation of OLS regressions of two sets of potential 
instruments for profit risk and market risk.   
2. Heteroscedastic-robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses (2 decimal places). 
3. Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
The sector medians appear to be much better instruments, and were therefore used 
as the instruments in a Smith and Blundell (1986) test of the exogeneity of profit risk 
and market risk.  As can be seen from table 6.5 (and illustrated in figs. 6.2-6.4) debt-
to-market value of equity, effective tax rate, profit risk and the interaction between 
cashflow risk and R&D intensity all had highly skewed distributions.  Because of the 
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possibility for results to be unduly influenced by extreme outliers, regressions were 
performed with the full sample and with two Winsorized samples; in which 
observations with the lowest and highest 1% (2.5%) of values84 of debt-to-market 
value of equity, effective tax rate, profit risk and the interaction between cashflow 
risk and R&D intensity were removed.  The results are shown in table 6.9. 
Table 6.9 – Results of Smith and Blundell (1986) Test of Exogeneity in a Probit Model 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Full Sample 
Winsorized 
(1%) 
 Winsorized 
(2.5%) 
IRM 
S&B X2 Test Statistic 
(2df) 
0.230 2.00 2.31 
p> X2(2) 0.89 0.37 0.32 
BCI 
S&B X2 Test Statistic 
(2df) 
2.48 2.73 2.35 
p> X2(2) 0.29 0.26 0.31 
 
1. Table 6.9 reports results of the Smith and Blundell (1986) test of exogeneity in a probit model.   
2. The dependent variable is the employment of one or more members of the IRM/BCI.  
3. The test was conducted using the user-defined STATA function probexog  (Baum et al (2003)). 
4. The null hypothesis is that all variables of interest are exogenous. 
Based on the results of the Smith-Blundell test (table 6.9), the probit regressions 
were conducted without instrumental variables.  However, given the high correlation 
between some of the explanatory variables (see table 6.7), the extent to which 
multicollinearity might be affecting the results was also investigated by calculating 
the variance inflation factors; the results for each of the three samples are shown 
below. 
  
                                                          
84 Note that there are a large number of zeros in the distributions of effective tax rate so a 
lower cut-off point cannot always be identified. 
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Table 6.10 – Variance Inflation Factors 
 Full Sample Winsorized (1%)  Winsorized (2.5%) 
Profit Risk 7.26 4.20 4.49 
R&D Intensity * 
Cashflow Risk 
6.70 3.99 3.43 
Market Risk 2.64 2.12 1.72 
Financial Services 2.39 2.27 2.05 
Debt to MVE 2.08 2.02 1.66 
Size 1.87 2.04 1.87 
Tangible Assets 1.55 1.55 1.56 
Market-to-Book 1.51 1.65 1.24 
Construction 1.51 1.54 1.67 
Liquidity 1.48 1.38 1.45 
Manufacturing 1.41 1.38 1.41 
Retail 1.34 1.38 1.36 
Mining 1.31 1.37 1.37 
Critical National 
Infrastructure 
1.26 1.16 1.18 
Accommodation and 
Food Services 
1.26 1.30 1.30 
Administration and 
Support Services 
1.16 1.19 1.18 
Professional Services 1.14 1.17 1.21 
Institutional Ownership 1.10 1.09 1.11 
Effective Tax Rate 1.09 1.30 1.21 
Mean VIF 2.11 1.79 1.71 
 
1. Table 6.10 reports the variance inflation factors calculated using the Stata vif function 
(uncentred). 
There is clearly a degree of multicollinearity so it is important to bear in mind the 
potential for standard errors and t-statistics to be slightly inflated.  However, no 
individual VIF values are particularly high so it is not possible to significantly reduce 
the mean VIF by simply dropping the variables with the highest VIF values.   
6.5.1.2 Probit Regression Results 
The results of the probit regressions with employment of one or more members of 
the IRM and employment of one or more members of the BCI as the dependent 
variables are reported in tables 6.11 and 6.12 respectively. 
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Table 6.11 – Results of Probit Regression with Employment of one or more Members 
of the IRM as the Dependent Variable 
 Full Sample Winsorized (1%) Winsorized (2.5%) 
Debt to MVE 
0.077 0.721** 0.679** 
(0.85) (3.29) (2.68) 
Liquidity 
-0.145 -0.215 -0.196 
(-0.22) (-0.28) (-0.25) 
Market-to-Book 
0.010 0.028* 0.043* 
(1.18) (2.33) (2.25) 
Tangible Assets 
2.450*** 2.295** 2.326** 
(3.61) (3.23) (3.20) 
Effective Tax Rate 
0.058 -0.695 -1.136 
(0.29) (-1.04) (-1.09) 
Institutional Ownership 
5.617** 5.999** 6.535** 
(3.13) (2.68) (2.65) 
Profit Risk 
0.019 -0.010 0.051 
(0.75) (-0.16) (0.61) 
Market Risk 
0.026 -0.023 -0.032 
(0.48) (-0.32) (-0.41) 
R&D Intensity * Cashflow Risk 
-0.008 0.174 -0.237 
(-0.74) (1.24) (-0.65) 
Size 
0.271*** 0.272*** 0.262*** 
(4.34) (3.97) (3.78) 
Constant 
-10.964*** -11.311*** -11.688*** 
(-4.73) (-4.17) (-4.11) 
    
N 219 209 188 
Wald Test of Joint Significance 
(18df) 
74.9 66.9 49.7 
p > X2(18) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo-R2 0.27 0.36 0.30 
Wald Test of Joint Significance 
(8df) 
7.93 9.13 9.73 
p > X2(8) 0.44 0.33 0.28 
 
1. Table 6.11 reports the parameter estimates from the estimation of equation (6.1) using probit 
regression.   
2. The dependent variable is “1” if the firm employs one or more members of the IRM as of July 
2011. Definitions of explanatory and control variables are given in section 6.4.3 and 6.4.4 and 
summarised in Table 6.4. 
3. Parameter estimates for the industry dummies are not reported but the result of a Wald test 
of joint significance is.  Note that it is not possible to estimate a parameter for the 
accommodation and food services industry dummy so this test has only eight degrees of 
freedom.  Note also that the ten observations from this sector are automatically dropped. 
4. Pseudo-R2 is McFadden’s (1974) likelihood ratio index (see below for a discussion). 
5. Heteroscedastic-robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses (2 decimal places). 
6. Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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Table 6.12 – Results of Probit Regression with Employment of one or more Members 
of the BCI as the Dependent Variable 
 Full Sample Winsorized (1%) Winsorized (2.5%) 
Debt to MVE 
0.329** 0.309** 0.444** 
(3.22) (2.91) (2.91) 
Liquidity 
-0.632 -0.699 -0.334 
(-0.96) (-1.03) (-0.48) 
Market-to-Book 
0.032** 0.035** 0.050** 
(3.05) (3.01) (3.06) 
Tangible Assets 
1.126 1.293+ 1.142 
(1.57) (1.75) (1.46) 
Effective Tax Rate 
-0.699 -0.630 -0.484 
(-0.90) (-0.73) (-0.41) 
Institutional Ownership 
1.226 1.073 1.056 
(0.70) (0.53) (0.51) 
Profit Risk 
0.020 -0.043 0.064 
(0.48) (-0.74) (0.95) 
Market Risk 
-0.370*** -0.380*** -0.420*** 
(-5.43) (-5.11) (-5.30) 
R&D Intensity * Cashflow Risk 
-0.040* 0.092 -0.538+ 
(-2.32) (0.77) (-1.73) 
Size 
0.312*** 0.291*** 0.328*** 
(4.57) (4.11) (4.31) 
Constant 
-4.628* -4.427+ -4.720+ 
(-2.14) (-1.88) (-1.85) 
    
N 229 219 197 
Wald Test of Joint Significance 
(19df) 
88.3 60.5 54.3 
p > X2(19) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo-R2 0.38 0.36 0.36 
Wald Test of Joint Significance 
(9df) 
7.81 7.64 8.58 
p > X2(9) 0.55 0.57 0.48 
 
1. Table 6.12 reports the parameter estimates from the estimation of equation (6.1) using probit 
regression.   
2. The dependent variable is “1” if the firm employs one or more members of the BCI as of July 
2011. Definitions of explanatory and control variables are given in section 6.4.3 and 6.4.4 and 
summarised in Table 6.4. 
3. Parameter estimates for the industry dummies are not reported but the result of a Wald test 
of joint significance is.   
4. Pseudo-R2 is McFadden’s (1974) likelihood ratio index (see below for a discussion). 
5. Heteroscedastic-robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses (2 decimal places). 
6. Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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The parameter estimates for key variables are fairly consistent across the different 
samples (tables 6.11 and 6.12); suggesting that the results are not unduly influenced 
by a small number of outliers.  In all cases the null hypothesis that the parameter 
estimates are jointly insignificant can be rejected; however the null hypothesis that 
the parameter estimates for the industry dummies are jointly insignificant cannot be 
rejected in any of the regressions.  The pseudo-R2 values (McFadden’s (1974) 
likelihood ratio index) are marginally higher for the regressions with employment of 
one or more members of the BCI as the dependent variable (36-38%) than those with 
employment of one or more members of the IRM as the dependent variable (27-
36%).  Some care must be taken in the interpretation of these values, whilst bounded 
by 0 and 1, the likelihood ratio index is not a measure of the proportion of variance 
explained by the model; Windmeijer (1995, p.105) shows instead that it represents 
the “empirical percentage uncertainty explained”.  It is also important to highlight an 
issue with this model due to the unbalanced nature of the sample: only 14.4% of 
firms in the sample employ one or more members of the IRM; and only 16.2% of 
firms in the sample employ one or more members of the BCI.  In these circumstances 
it is found that the estimated prediction probabilities for firms not employing an IRM 
(BCI) member will be higher, potentially very much higher, than the estimated 
prediction probabilities for firms employing an IRM (BCI) member (Cramer (1999))85.    
Both regressions show support for theories that development of a risk management 
capability is driven by considerations of protecting shareholder value. Firstly, there 
are significant positive parameter estimates for debt to MVE with all but one sample 
(in support of hypothesis 1).  There are also significant positive parameter estimates 
for market-to-book value in all but one sample, in support of hypotheses 3a and 3b: 
                                                          
85 This also means that goodness-of-fit measures based on prediction probabilities are 
problematic with unbalanced samples.  
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the competing hypotheses 3c and 3d are thus rejected.  The parameter estimates for 
liquidity were all negative, as predicted by hypothesis 2, but universally insignificant; 
and the parameter estimates for effective tax rate varied in sign and were all 
insignificant, so there is no support for hypothesis 5.  There are also significant 
positive parameter estimates for the proportion of tangible assets and the 
proportion of institutional ownership in all the regressions with IRM members as the 
dependent variable (in support of hypotheses 4a and 6a); but the parameter 
estimates are insignificant (although universally positive) in all the regressions with 
BCI members as the dependent variable.   
As regards the control variables, the parameter estimates for the three risk exposure 
controls are all insignificant for the regressions with IRM members as the dependent 
variable.  However, in the regressions with BCI members as the dependent variable 
there is a negative and highly significant negative parameter estimate for market risk 
with all three samples: this will be discussed further in section 6.6.1.  There is also a 
moderately significant negative parameter estimate for the interaction of cashflow 
risk and R&D intensity in the regression with BCI members as the dependent variable 
using the whole sample.  The parameter estimates for size were all positive and 
highly significant, as expected from the structure of the model.  As remarked above, 
the parameter estimates for the industry sector dummies were jointly insignificant in 
all regressions.   
6.5.2 Count-Data Models 
6.5.2.1 Developing the Count-Data Models 
As stated previously, managing risk is not, in reality, a binary decision.  In order to 
understand the inter-firm variation in the intensity of risk management (and to 
enable) more direct comparisons with previous studies based on the extent to which 
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insurance or derivatives are used (eg Haushalter (2000)); it is desirable to also 
analyse the total number of IRM or BCI members employed by each firm.  The 
following count-data models were therefore estimated. 
IRMi = f{explanatory variablesi, control variablesi} + εi   (6.3) 
BCIi = g{explanatory variablesi, control variablesi} + εi   (6.4) 
Where IRM is the number of IRM members (Certificant and above) employed by the 
firm; BCI is the number of BCI members (Associate and above) employed by the firm; 
the explanatory and control variables are defined in sections 6.4.3 and 6.4.4 
respectively; and εi is a random error term.   
Inspection of fig. 6.1 would suggest that the distributions of IRM and BCI members 
may be over-dispersed so a formal test was conducted, based on regressing the 
generated dependent variable on the estimated mean: a significant parameter 
estimate indicates over-dispersion (Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p.670)).  The results 
of this test with each sample are shown in table 6.13. 
Table 6.13 – Mean and Standard Deviation of IRM and BCI Members per Firm 
  Full Sample Winsorized (1%) Winsorized (2.5%) 
Dependent Variable  
IRM Members 
t 1.16 0.97 1.35 
p>t 0.25 0.33 0.18 
Dependent Variable  
BCI Members 
t 0.80 1.80 2.50 
p>t 0.42 0.07 0.01 
 
1. Table 6.13 reports the results of a Cameron and Trivedi (2005) test for over-dispersion. 
2. A significant parameter estimate indicates over-dispersion.   
The results would suggest that the number of BCI members is significantly over-
dispersed in the Winsorized samples; a Poisson regression is therefore not 
appropriate to estimate equation 6.4 in these cases, and a negative binomial 
regression was also used.   
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6.5.2.2  Poisson and Negative Binomial Regression Results 
The results of the Poisson regressions to estimate equation 6.3 and 6.4, and negative 
binomial regression to estimate equation 6.4, are shown in tables 6.14 to 6.16.   
Table 6.14 – Results of Poisson Regression with IRM Members per Firm as the 
Dependent Variable 
 Full Sample Winsorized (1%) Winsorized (2.5%) 
Debt to MVE 
0.115 0.166+ 0.318* 
(1.18) (1.73) (2.57) 
Liquidity 
0.084 -0.312 0.357 
(0.13) (-0.43) (0.47) 
Market-to-Book 
0.012* 0.014* 0.019* 
(2.21) (2.58) (2.47) 
Tangible Assets 
3.360*** 3.001*** 2.841*** 
(3.80) (3.52) (3.35) 
Effective Tax Rate 
-0.058 -0.208 -1.591 
(-0.13) (-0.18) (-1.28) 
Institutional Ownership 
7.321* 6.991* 6.869* 
(2.30) (2.33) (2.35) 
Profit Risk 
0.019 -0.006 0.036 
(0.61) (-0.08) (0.38) 
Market Risk 
-0.126 -0.129 -0.158 
(-0.78) (-0.70) (-0.88) 
R&D Intensity * Cashflow Risk 
-0.020 0.076 -0.230 
(-1.37) (0.39) (-0.52) 
Size 
0.342*** 0.282*** 0.320** 
(4.04) (4.32) (3.23) 
Constant 
-13.446*** -12.339*** -12.090*** 
(-3.85) (-3.74) (-3.94) 
    
N 229 219 197 
Wald Test of Joint Significance 
(19df) 
2500 2130 1520 
p > X2(19) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo-R2 0.24 0.23 0.17 
Wald Test of Joint Significance 
(9df) 
1420 1260 1210 
p > X2(9) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
1. Table 6.14 reports results of the estimation of equation (6.3) with Poisson regression.   
2. The dependent variable is the number of IRM members employed by each firm as of July 
2011. Definitions of explanatory and control variables are given in section 6.4.3 and 6.4.4 and 
summarised in Table 6.4. 
3. Parameter estimates for the industry sectors dummy variables are not reported but the result 
of a Wald test of joint significance (with 9 degrees of freedom) is.  
4. Pseudo-R2 is based on log-likelihoods, note that Pseudo-R2max < 1. 
5. Heteroscedastic-robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses (2 decimal places). 
6. Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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Table 6.15 – Results of Poisson Regression with BCI Members per Firm as the 
Dependent Variable 
 Full Sample Winsorized (1%) Winsorized (2.5%) 
Debt to MVE 
0.420*** 0.533*** 0.371 
(5.42) (5.52) (1.59) 
Liquidity 
-1.211 -2.289* -1.707 
(-1.19) (-2.00) (-1.37) 
Market-to-Book 
0.039*** 0.042*** 0.046*** 
(5.85) (6.48) (5.31) 
Tangible Assets 
0.759 0.673 0.497 
(0.82) (0.78) (0.55) 
Effective Tax Rate 
-0.091 -0.512 -0.476 
(-0.15) (-0.36) (-0.25) 
Institutional Ownership 
5.242 5.202 5.597 
(1.03) (0.93) (0.97) 
Profit Risk 
-0.015 -0.078 0.021 
(-0.33) (-0.99) (0.22) 
Market Risk 
-0.583*** -0.647*** -0.663*** 
(-4.87) (-5.11) (-4.59) 
R&D Intensity * Cashflow Risk 
-0.045* 0.023 -0.543 
(-2.49) (0.14) (-1.58) 
Size 
0.472*** 0.376*** 0.366*** 
(4.10) (3.90) (3.40) 
Constant 
-9.820+ -8.635 -8.750 
(-1.85) (-1.51) (-1.51) 
    
N 229 219 197 
Wald Test of Joint Significance 
(19df) 
1020 301 142 
p > X2(19) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo-R2 0.66 0.51 0.45 
Wald Test of Joint Significance 
(9df) 
24.0 21.1 20.8 
p > X2(9) 0.004 0.01 0.01 
 
1. Table 6.15 reports results of the estimation of equation (6.4) with Poisson regression.   
2. The dependent variable is the number of BCI members employed by each firm as of July 2011. 
Definitions of explanatory and control variables are given in section 6.4.3 and 6.4.4 and 
summarised in Table 6.4. 
3. Parameter estimates for the industry sector dummy variables are not reported but the result 
of a Wald test of joint significance (with 9 degrees of freedom) is.  
4. Pseudo-R2 is based on log-likelihoods, note that Pseudo-R2max < 1. 
5. Heteroscedastic-robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses (2 decimal places). 
6. Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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Table 6.16 – Results of Negbin Regression with BCI Members per Firm as the 
Dependent Variable 
 Full Sample Winsorized (1%) Winsorized (2.5%) 
Debt to MVE 
0.444*** 0.508*** 0.430+ 
(4.69) (4.90) (1.91) 
Liquidity 
-1.511 -1.962+ -1.505 
(-1.45) (-1.74) (-1.32) 
Market-to-Book 
0.039*** 0.042*** 0.048*** 
(5.87) (6.32) (5.22) 
Tangible Assets 
1.212 1.232 0.893 
(1.25) (1.22) (0.84) 
Effective Tax Rate 
-0.302 -0.464 -0.177 
(-0.48) (-0.39) (-0.10) 
Institutional Ownership 
3.849 3.511 3.714 
(0.80) (0.67) (0.68) 
Profit Risk 
-0.012 -0.081 0.029 
(-0.25) (-1.12) (0.33) 
Market Risk 
-0.591*** -0.639*** -0.655*** 
(-5.31) (-5.46) (-5.27) 
R&D Intensity * Cashflow Risk 
-0.047* 0.042 -0.534+ 
(-2.46) (0.27) (-1.66) 
Size 
0.479*** 0.420*** 0.423*** 
(5.01) (4.42) (4.17) 
Constant 
-8.673+ -7.750 -7.813 
(-1.71) (-1.46) (-1.40) 
    
N 229 219 197 
Wald Test of Joint Significance 
(19df) 
879 194 130 
p > X2(19) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald Test of Joint Significance 
(9df) 
17.9 17.0 16.0 
p > X2(9) 0.04 0.05 0.07 
 
1. Table 6.16 reports results of the estimation of equation (6.4) with negative binomial 
regression.   
2. The dependent variable is the number of BCI members employed by each firm as of July 2011. 
Definitions of explanatory and control variables are given in section 6.4.3 and 6.4.4 and 
summarised in Table 6.4. 
3. Parameter estimates for the interaction terms between industry sector and unsystematic risk 
are not reported but the result of a Wald test of joint significance (with 9 degrees of freedom) 
is.  
4. Heteroscedastic-robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses (2 decimal places). 
5. Significance levels are indicated as follows: + p<.1, * p < .05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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The parameter estimates for key variables in the Poisson regressions (tables 6.14 and 
6.15) are fairly consistent across the different samples; the parameter estimates for 
Poisson and negative binomial regressions (tables 6.15 and 6.16) are also very 
consistent.  In all cases, the null hypothesis that the parameter estimates are jointly 
insignificant can be rejected; the null hypothesis that the parameter estimates for 
the industry dummies are jointly insignificant can also be rejected in the Poisson 
regressions, but not in the negative binomial regression with BCI members as the 
dependent variable (table 6.16).  The Pseudo-R2 values in the Poisson regressions are 
much higher for the regressions with employment of one or more members of the 
BCI as the dependent variable (0.45 to 0.66) than those with employment of one or 
more members of the IRM as the dependent variable (0.17 to 0.24).   
The sign and significance of the parameter estimates are also largely consistent with 
the results of the probit regressions in section 6.5.1 (tables 6.11 and 6.12).  All three 
regressions have significant positive parameter estimates for market-to-book value 
with all samples; and significant positive parameter estimates for debt-to-market 
values of equity with at least one sample.  The parameter estimates for liquidity 
were generally negative (with one significant negative value in the Poisson regression 
with BCI members as the dependent variable); and the parameter estimates for 
effective tax rate were all negative and insignificant.  There are also significant 
positive parameter estimates for the proportion of tangible assets and the 
proportion of institutional ownership in the Poisson regressions with IRM members 
as the dependent variable; and the parameter estimates are insignificant (although 
universally positive) in all the regressions with BCI members as the dependent 
variable.  As regards the control variables, the parameter estimates for the three risk 
exposure controls are all insignificant for the regressions with IRM members as the 
dependent variable.  However, in the regressions with BCI members as the 
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dependent variable there are negative and highly significant negative parameter 
estimates for market risk with all three samples in both the Poisson and negative 
binomial regression.  There is also a moderately significant negative parameter 
estimate for the interaction of cashflow risk and R&D intensity in both regressions 
with BCI members as the dependent variable using the whole sample.  The 
parameter estimates for size were all positive and highly significant, as expected 
from the structure of the model.   
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6.6 Discussion 
This study set out to understand the drivers for the development of a risk 
management capability, amongst firms in the UK FTSE 350, by analysing their 
employment of members of the IRM and BCI.  It was argued that these measures are 
more useful proxies for a firm’s risk management capability in this context than the 
possession of specific financial assets, such as insurance or derivatives contracts, or 
the announcement of the creation of a CRO position.  The initial analysis consisted of 
a binary outcome regression based on a distinction between firms that employed 
one or more members of the IRM/BCI and those that didn’t; this was complemented 
by count-data regressions based on the total number of IRM/BCI members employed 
by each firm.  The results of the two analyses were very consistent and will therefore 
be discussed together below.  
6.6.1 Development of Theory 
The main finding of this study is the strong support for the traditional arguments for 
the adoption of risk management, based on protecting value for firm owners (eg 
Smith and Stultz (1985)).  In particular there was a positive (and generally statistically 
significant) association between both debt-to-market value of equity and market-to-
book value and the development of a risk management capability in all tests: thus, 
both the likelihood and expected costs of financial distress appear to be important 
drivers. This finding is consistent with a considerable body of previous empirical 
work, including: Nance et al (1993), Géczy et al (1997), Haushalter (2000), Liebenberg 
and Hoyt (2003), Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008), Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) and 
Pagach and Warr (2011).   
The study also found, as predicted, that the development of an ERM capability was 
positively associated with the proportion of tangible assets (there was also a positive 
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effect on the development of a BCM capability but this was not significant); in 
support of the argument that ERM is primarily applicable to mitigating the risks to 
tangible assets.  In addition, and in line with the findings of Hoyt and Liebenberg 
(2011) and Pagach and Warr (2011), firms with a higher proportion of institutional 
investors were found to be significantly more likely to be developing an ERM 
capability (there was also a positive effect on the development of a BCM capability 
but this was not significant).  This supports the argument that institutional investors 
value formal risk management processes.  Specifically, these results suggest that 
institutional investors view the adoption of ERM as a signal of good corporate 
governance; but it is not clear if BCM is viewed in the same way.    
As regards risk exposure, there was no evidence that risk exposure was a significant 
driver of the decision to develop an ERM capability; however, there was strong 
evidence of a negative association between market risk and the development of a 
BCM capability.  This observation can be understood if one considers that investors 
expect higher returns from firms that experience higher market risk, so managers 
must set a higher benchmark return for investing in projects.  It is therefore less 
likely that a BCM project will meets the required level of return to be approved in a 
high market risk firm.       
6.6.2 Practical Implications 
As observed in Chapter One, considerable heterogeneity persists in risk management 
capabilities across firms.  The appropriateness of firms’ risk management capabilities 
are of significant interest to shareholders and, by extension, to anybody whose 
pension fund is invested in the stock market.  The finding that the observed 
heterogeneity in risk management capabilities can largely be explained by 
considerations of the likelihood and expected costs of financial distress is therefore 
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very positive; in that it suggests that managers of firms are acting, as they should, in 
the interests of shareholders.  However, the finding that the proportion of 
institutional investors is a significant driver of the development of ERM capabilities 
could either suggest that managers require some prompting to carry out their 
fiduciary responsibilities in this regard; or that institutional investors are requiring 
managers to develop risk management capabilities in excess of what is required in 
pursuit of corporate legitimacy (Power (2007)).  The fact that there was no significant 
effect of institutional ownership on the development of BCM capabilities would tend 
to favour the latter; but either explanation has important implications for corporate 
governance.  Finally, the fact that there was no significant association between the 
proportion of tangible assets and the development of BCM capabilities would 
suggest that there is now a recognition that BCM is an effective approach to 
managing a broad range of risks to the firm (Young (2011)); rather than simply a 
means of mitigating threats to physical assets (eg buildings and IT systems).      
6.6.3 Areas for Further Research 
Despite the useful insights provided by this study, there is one obvious area where 
further work could usefully be conducted in order to better understand the 
heterogeneity of risk management capabilities across firms.  As discussed in section 
6.2.3, the choice of dependent variable in this study precluded any meaningful 
analysis of the relationship between firm size and the propensity to adopt risk 
management; and the restriction of the sample to FTSE 350 firms means that the 
results cannot be generalised to smaller firms anyway.  Thus it was impossible to 
resolve the contradiction between theoretical arguments based on the costs of 
financial distress and convexity of tax function, which predict that managers in 
smaller companies should be more likely to adopt risk management; and the 
majority of empirical evidence that larger companies tend to engage more in risk 
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management.  However, this remains an important issue to resolve.  It would also be 
of great interest to examine the relationship between risk management and firm 
performance; as Gordon et al (2009) found with their contingency model, it is likely 
that value creation is dependent on the correct fit between the firm, the 
environment in which it operates and the extent of its risk management.  The 
measurement of the relationship between risk management and performance is 
discussed further in section 7.5.   
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Appendix 1 – The Institute of Risk Management and The Business 
Continuity Institute 
The Institute of Risk Management and Business Continuity Institute are, respectively, 
the preeminent professional bodies for ERM and BCM practitioners working in the 
private sector in the UK.  Critically, for the purposes of this study, they have well-
established and rigorous entry criteria, requiring new members to demonstrate both 
knowledge and professional experience.  As discussed extensively in section 6.3.1, 
whilst employment of such an IRM or BCI member doesn’t in itself constitute a risk 
management capability; at the very least, it indicates an intention to build such a 
capability.   
The Institute of Risk Management 
“The Institute of Risk Management (IRM) is the world’s leading enterprise-wide risk 
education Institute” (IRM website).  It focuses primarily on delivering training and 
providing professional recognition in risk management, but it also represents a 
professional network for its members.  The IRM defines risk management, in line 
with the general concept of ERM, as follows:  
“…the process whereby organisations methodically address the risks 
attaching to their activities with the goal of achieving sustained benefit 
within each activity and across the portfolio of all activities.”  (IRM (2002, 
p.2)) 
At the time of the study,86 there were six classes of IRM membership, as follows. 
Fellow - Fellowship is open to all full members of the Institute who hold the MIRM 
designation.  It is achieved by demonstrating the achievement of 250 Continuing 
Professional Development (CPD) points and having at least five years risk 
                                                          
86 Membership information was downloaded from the IRM website on 8th November 2012; 
the IRM significantly revised its membership structure in 2014. 
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management experience, two of which must have been achieved while a Member of 
the Institute. 
Member - IRM full membership is recognised worldwide as the hallmark of a risk 
management professional.  It is awarded to those who have successfully completed 
the International Diploma in Risk Management and who have 3 years relevant 
professional experience.   
Certificant - members who have successfully completed the IRM International 
Certificate in Risk Management may apply to become Certificant members of the 
Institute.   
Specialist - members who have completed the Risk Management in Financial Services 
qualification or completed one of the specialist modules of the International Diploma 
and who have 5 year's risk management experience may apply for Specialist 
Membership and the use of the designation SIRM. 
Affiliate membership is open to those working in risk management, or those with an 
interest in risk issues, and who wish to be involved in risk management activities as a 
member of IRM.  There are no formal entry requirements for Affiliate membership. 
Student membership is available to those wishing to study for the International 
Certificate in Risk Management or International Diploma in Risk Management. 
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The Business Continuity Institute 
The BCI was founded in 1994 “To enable individual members to obtain guidance and 
support from fellow business continuity practitioners” (BCI website).  The BCI has 
continued to pursue this aim but it now also offers formal training courses and, 
critically for this study, professional recognition for its members.  In addition, the BCI 
lobbies governments and other relevant bodies and works directly with companies 
and public sector organisations through the BCI partnership.  BCM has grown out of a 
number of disciplines concerned with the management of operational disruptions 
such as Disaster Recovery, Crisis Management and Business Continuity Planning 
(Herbane (2010)); and is defined as: 
“[An] holistic management process that identifies potential threats to an 
organization and the impacts to business operations that those threats, if 
realized, might cause, and which provides a framework for building 
organizational resilience with the capability for an effective response that 
safeguards the interests of its key stakeholders, reputation, brand and value-
creating activities.” (BCI (2010, p.3)) 
At the time of the study87 there were six classes of BCI membership, as follows: 
Fellow – this senior membership grade is currently held by c125 BCM practitioners. 
Applications or nominations to this grade are considered from very experienced 
MBCIs or SBCIs who can provide evidence of a significant contribution to the Institute 
and the BCM discipline. There is no direct entry into Fellowship. 
Member – those wishing to attain this well respected certification need to 
demonstrate experience of working as a BCM practitioner for 3+ years across all six 
                                                          
87 Membership information was downloaded from the BCI website on 8th November 2012; 
the BCI removed the Specialist membership grade and added a new membership grade, 
Associate Fellow, in 2014. 
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Business Continuity Competencies and hold the BCI Certificate credential of CBCI 
with merit or other recognised credentials. 
Associate Member – this entry level certification is for those with at least one year’s 
general experience within BCM across all six Business Continuity Competencies. 
Applicants need to obtain a Pass in the BCI Certificate examination or hold other 
recognised credentials. 
Specialist – this membership grade was developed to allow certification to those 
practitioners who specialise in aspects of BCM or who work in associated disciplines. 
Two years specialist experience, a Pass in the BCI Certificate examination and a 
professional qualification from another awarding body will enable the applicant to 
enter one of the six Specialist Faculties. 
Affiliate - this membership is often taken by those very new to the profession who do 
not yet have the experience to apply for Statutory membership or those who do not 
work as BCM practitioners but have a general interest in the discipline. 
Student - applicants for Student membership are accepted from those who are 
undertaking a course of study, either full or part time, on a programme of any BCM 
related subject which leads to a qualification. 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusions 
7.1  Overview 
This final chapter aims to integrate the findings of the three separate empirical 
chapters into a cohesive narrative; from which some overall conclusions can be 
drawn.  The chapter begins by summarising the main findings of each chapter; the 
overall theoretical contribution of the study is then described; followed by a 
discussion of the most important implications for practitioners.  The penultimate 
section discusses the limitations of the current research, and suggests some fruitful 
areas for future work; and the chapter concludes with a short summary.          
7.2  Summary of the Main Findings 
7.2.1 Chapter Four - Measuring Corporate Risk 
One of the first themes to emerge from the discussion in Chapter One was that, in 
any given situation, different stakeholder groups experience different risks: the 
investigation of the measurement properties of a variety of corporate risk measures 
in Chapter Four identified the best ways to measure these different risks.  The robust 
principal component analysis (PCA) of nineteen risk measures yielded a compact set 
of components (three or four in each time period) that accounted for the majority of 
variation in each of the six overlapping five-year time periods.  Components relating 
to variability in profits, variability in share price and variability in cashflow were 
retained in each period; and these were interpreted as “profit risk”, “market risk” 
and “cashflow risk” respectively.  It was argued that profit risk is the most important 
measure of risk from the point of view of managers, whilst market risk captures a key 
risk to investors.   In 2003-07 an additional component was retained, “distress risk”, 
which, it was argued, captures an important component of the risk to both lenders 
and managers.  These components were then successfully applied as risk measures in 
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Chapter Five and Chapter Six; in investigations into the relationship between risk and 
performance, and the drivers for developing a risk management capability 
respectively.   
It was also evident from the PCA that both the composition and relative importance 
of the risk components change over time, as a result of changes in the environment; 
in particular a marked change in the component structure was observed between 
the 2003-07 and 2004-08 time periods.  This is at variance with the findings of Miller 
and Bromiley (1990), who found a consistent component structure across two non-
overlapping five-year periods (1978-82 and 1983-87).  It was argued that the change 
in component structure was a result of the step change in environmental uncertainty 
that occurred with the onset of the financial crisis in 2008.  More forward-looking 
risk measures (eg beta or unsystematic risk) reacted to the significant change in 
environmental uncertainty more quickly than rearward-looking measures (eg the 
standard deviation of ROE or ROA); and thus the relationships between risk 
measures that had previously existed were disrupted until a new equilibrium is 
reached.  In addition, in the conditions of extreme uncertainty that existed during 
the financial crisis, some variables simply ceased to be useful measures of risk.   
7.2.2 Chapter Five - The Relationship Between Corporate Risk and Performance 
Environmental conditions were also seen to be an important mediating factor in the 
relationships between risk and subsequent performance investigated in Chapter 
Five; although the precise mechanism of interaction differed depending on which 
measure of performance was used.  A positive relationship between profit risk and 
future profitability (return on market value of equity) was observed for both high 
and low-performing firms in the environment of high growth that persisted before 
the financial crisis.  However, as growth opportunities became much reduced and 
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interest rates fell to close to zero, it appeared that managers required a much lower 
premium to accept risk; indeed managers in poorly-performing firms required no 
premium at all.  This latter observation provides support for the idea of “problemistic 
search” within the behavioural theory of the firm; but it is interesting to note that 
this was only observable in the truly exceptional economic conditions arising from 
the financial crisis.  As regards the relationship between market risk and future 
returns to shareholders; a positive relationship was observed when overall market 
returns were above the risk-free rate.  However, when overall market returns were 
below the risk-free rate, a negative relationship was observed between risk and 
realised future returns to shareholders in common with a number of previous studies 
(eg Pettengill et al (1995)).  In addition to the above, relationships between market 
risk and return on market value of equity, between profit risk and returns to 
shareholders, and between cashflow risk and returns to shareholders were observed 
in one or more time periods in the study.   
7.2.3 Chapter Six - Risk Management Capabilities in UK FTSE 350 Companies 
The finding in Chapter Five of a positive association between risk and subsequent 
return (at least in normal market conditions) implies that investment in the 
development of a firm’s capability to mitigate “passive” (Merton (2005)) or “non-
core” (Nocco and Stultz (2006)) risks would be attractive.  In common with many 
earlier studies, based on various different proxies for risk; the study in Chapter Six 
found evidence that theories based on protecting value for shareholders were 
significant in explaining the observed heterogeneity in risk management capabilities 
amongst firms in the UK FTSE 350.  In particular, both the risk of financial distress 
(proxied by leverage) and the availability of growth opportunities (proxied by 
market-to-book value) were significant drivers for the development of both an 
enterprise risk management (ERM) capability and a business continuity management 
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(BCM) capability.  As predicted, the proportion of tangible assets and the proportion 
of institutional investors in a firm were both found to be significant drivers for the 
development of an ERM capability too.          
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7.3  Contribution 
The investigation of the measurement properties of a variety of corporate risk 
measures in Chapter Four makes a contribution in terms of the overall understanding 
of what different risk measures represent, how they are related and, crucially, that 
these relationships are not static but are functions of environmental uncertainty.  
The analysis also identified a set of corporate risk measures, relevant to different 
stakeholder groups; that can be used in future research, as demonstrated in 
Chapters Five and Six.   
In trying to explain the apparent paradox of the negative relationship between 
accounting measures of risk and return that he observed; Bowman (1980) suggested 
that it arose because well-managed firms were able to combine high profitability 
with low variation in profits: ie the quality of management was a missing variable.  
Andersen et al (2007) subsequently developed a mathematical model to 
demonstrate that a “strategic responsiveness” capability, if heterogeneously 
distributed between firms, gives rise to a negative risk-return relationship.  The main 
contribution from Chapter Five is the finding that, when firm fixed effects are 
removed (by first-differencing), there is a positive correlation between profit risk 
(standard deviation of ROA) and subsequent accounting performance (ROA) in the 
pre-crisis period, as predicted by theory; and no significant correlation thereafter.  
The results of regression analyses with return on market value of equity as the 
dependent variable supported these findings, and also suggested that the 
relationship between profit risk and subsequent profitability is contingent on the 
prior performance of the firm.  The regression analyses with returns to shareholders 
as the dependent variable confirmed the findings of Pettengill et al (1995), and 
others, that the relationship between market risk and realised return is contingent 
on the overall performance of the market.   
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Chapter Six contributes to an understanding of the observed heterogeneity in risk 
management capabilities across firms.  Specifically, the study provides evidence that, 
at least within this sample of large, listed UK firms, the desire on the part of 
managers to develop risk management capabilities (as opposed to simply mitigating 
specific risks) is driven by traditional arguments based on protecting shareholder 
value.   
In addition to the findings from individual studies, taken as a whole, the thesis makes 
a further methodological contribution to the academic study of risk and risk 
management.  The comparison of results using different data samples (with and 
without outliers) throughout the thesis, highlights the influence of extreme values in 
the distributions of risk measures on the results of various techniques of statistical 
analysis.  Moreover, the studies in Chapters Four and Five demonstrated how some 
readily-available robust techniques can successfully be applied to address this 
problem.  
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7.4  Implications for Practice 
As stated in Chapter One, persistent pressure on firms to “... codify and formalize 
principles of risk management...” Power (2009, p.304) has led to an increased focus 
on how to measure risk more effectively.  The investigation of the measurement 
properties of a variety of risk measures in Chapter Four, proposed a number of new 
criteria for selecting the most appropriate risk measure in any given situation 
including: relevance to a particular stakeholder group, the degree to which a 
measure is forward-looking and resolution.  Furthermore, the risk components 
developed in the chapter may be of direct use to practitioners in risk management 
and associated disciplines (such as internal audit and corporate governance) as 
measures of risk; although it is important to bear in mind that the components 
change over time, and are only valid for the time period in which they were 
constructed.   
The pay and bonuses of senior executives have become matters of considerable 
public and shareholder concern in the UK and beyond in recent years88: the model 
developed in Chapter Five, relating profit risk and subsequent profitability (return on 
market value of equity) could potentially contribute towards addressing this disquiet.  
The model could be applied to compute an expected level of profitability for a firm, 
given the level of profit risk that managers have chosen to bear; against which the 
past performance of managers can be judged.  The application of the model in a 
forward-looking context is not as straightforward, as the relationship between profit 
risk and profitability was demonstrated to be contingent on economic conditions, 
particularly growth rates; but a risk-return relationship derived from a previous 
                                                          
88 See, for example, Gregory-Smith et al’s (2014) study of voting dissent by shareholders in UK 
firms on remuneration arrangements.  
287 
 
period of similar growth could be used as a benchmark against which to judge the 
attractiveness of different investment opportunities in the present.   
As observed in Chapter One, considerable heterogeneity persists in risk management 
capabilities across firms.  The appropriateness of firms’ risk management capabilities 
are of significant interest to shareholders and, by extension, to anybody whose 
pension fund is invested in the stock market.  The finding in Chapter Six, that the 
heterogeneity in risk management capabilities can largely be explained by a simple 
model based on protecting shareholder value; is therefore very positive, in that it 
suggests that managers are acting in the interests of shareholders.  However the 
finding that the proportion of institutional investors is a significant driver of the 
development of ERM capabilities has important implications for the design of 
corporate governance systems.    
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7.5  Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research 
The restriction of the analysis to publicly listed firms89 represents a significant 
limitation of the current study, in that it limits the extent to which the findings of the 
study can be generalised: it is not possible to say with any certainty how applicable 
any findings are to small, privately-held firms, charities or public-sector 
organisations.  It is superficially attractive to conduct similar analyses to those in 
Chapter Five, with models that simply omit the market-based risk measures, so as 
the study could be extended to a much wider range of firms; however, as discussed 
in section 5.5.2.2, it was not possible to estimate models with pure accounting 
measures of performance as the dependent variable.  Indeed this may represent a 
fundamental limit on what is achievable with this particular approach.  Also, even if it 
was somehow possible to estimate the model with pure accounting measures of 
performance; the regressions analyses with return on market value of equity as the 
dependent variable found very different parameter estimates for market risk than 
the regressions with returns to shareholders as the dependent variable.  It would 
therefore appear that market risk is salient to managers in publicly listed firms, and 
there is a distinct possibility that models that simply omit risk measures relevant to 
owners will be mis-specified.  Some further thought is required on how to construct 
a risk measure relevant to owners of firms that are not quoted; particularly in 
closely-held firms, where the dividend policy may be determined by unobservable 
personal preferences of the owners.  Extending the analysis to charities and public-
sector organisations would also be of both theoretical and practical interest, but is 
even more challenging as there is no direct analogue for profitability: a large 
accounting surplus may indicate a failure to deliver necessary services rather than 
efficiency.    
                                                          
89 In the case of Chapter Six, the study was further restricted to the largest listed firms. 
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Most previous research on risk at the firm level has been conducted on US firms so it 
is interesting to explore another market; and the UK provides an attractive 
environment for such research as there are a large number of listed companies, 
compared to other European countries. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge 
that there may be idiosyncratic national issues that may, for instance, influence the 
relationship between risk and return; so the findings of this study cannot be 
generalised to other countries.  It would therefore be interesting, and should be 
perfectly feasible, to conduct similar studies in other countries and compare and 
contrast the results. 
A further important limitation arises due to the specific period, 2003-12, over which 
the study was conducted.  The onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 was 
characterised by immediate significant falls in UK GDP growth and market returns, 
together with substantial increases in the volatility of both measures; the values of 
all of these measures then continued to fluctuate widely over the remainder of the 
study period (compared to historical norms).  Whilst this step-change in 
environmental conditions constituted an important natural experiment, and yielded 
a number of useful insights, it also meant that a number of conclusions had to be 
drawn (tentatively) from the results of a single time-period.  In both Chapter Four 
and Chapter Five it was noted that it would be useful to continue the empirical work 
longitudinally as macroeconomic conditions evolve and stabilise again (potentially 
returning towards historic norms).  In particular, this might help in interpreting the 
component structures for the period 2008-12 in Chapter Four; and in understanding 
the relationships between accounting-based measures of risk and market-based 
measures of performance (and vice versa) in Chapter Five.  If it was possible to 
compile a panel data set over an extended period of stable environmental 
conditions; (dynamic) panel techniques could usefully be applied, which should be 
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more analytically efficient.  The highly unusual environmental conditions existing 
over the course of the study also limit the extent to which the results can be 
generalised to other time periods.   
The final limitation of the study concerns the difficulties in exploring the effect of risk 
management on performance, an issue of both theoretical and practical interest.  
The difficulties arise from the recognition of the fundamentally long-term nature of 
risk management.  An apparently simple approach would be to include a risk 
management measure in the models for risk and performance in Chapter Five; but 
the need to eliminate firm-fixed effects (see section 7.3) means that risk 
management, which on the timescale of the study is effectively fixed, is also 
removed.  More generally, as discussed extensively in the resource based view 
literature (see Chapter Two), the measurement of the performance effects of 
capabilities presents formidable methodological challenges.  Empirical tests are 
confounded by difficulties in operationalising capabilities; selection of an appropriate 
dependent variable; and alternative explanations for superior performance.  Each 
capability that could potentially influence performance would have to be separately 
proxied and included in the model; in addition, many of these proxies would have to 
be instrumented as the capabilities may be co-determined with performance.    
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7.6  Summary  
This concluding chapter has attempted to capture how the study has contributed to 
both theory and practice.  As stated in Chapter One, the overall aim of this study was 
to improve the understanding of how to measure and manage corporate risk more 
effectively; the study therefore began with a detailed investigation of the 
measurement properties of a variety of risk measures.  This identified a novel set of 
risk measures, the utility of which was demonstrated in subsequent chapters; and it 
is hoped that these measures will be of value to both researchers and practitioners in 
the future.  Perhaps the most important finding of the whole study was the positive 
correlation between profit risk (standard deviation of ROA) and subsequent 
accounting performance (ROA), contrary to numerous previous studies; this finding 
was supported by the results of regression analyses with return to market value of 
equity as the dependent variable.  However it is important to note that this 
relationship is mediated by environmental conditions; as is the relationship between 
market measures of risk and subsequent market returns.  Finally, turning to look at 
the management of risk, it was shown that the heterogeneity in the development of 
risk management capabilities across large listed firms in the UK can largely be 
explained by traditional arguments based on protecting value for shareholders.   
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